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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between decentralization and capacities in 
local governance addressing the central question of ‘when decentralisation leads to better 
governance?’. Literature in public management suggests that local governments can monitor 
and act better on local needs, thus empowering local government with the discretion to 
mobilize local resources leads to higher accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in 
governance. This edifice was first challenged when contradictory results were attained from 
case studies in developing countries in the 1990s. The cases showed that decentralization may 
lead to higher corruption, local elite capture and decrease in public service quality. These 
equivocal outcomes of decentralization practices were largely addressed as part of 
'management deficit' in governance and various capacity building programmes have been 
implemented by international donor organizations to educate managers, organizations, even 
communities and institutions. Albeit not being a substantial evidence of improvement in 
governance, every year billions of dollars are spent on capacity building programmes to 
enhance the governance capacity in developing countries. Relying on surveys and official data 
collected from 65 Turkish provincial municipalities, this dissertation provides evidence that 
socio-economic conditions are the main determinant on the outcomes of decentralization in 
comparison to governance capacity. Using regression based analysis, the paper suggests the 
relationship between decentralization and governance should be addressed not only on 
managerial perspective but also on developmental level. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Deze verhandeling focust op de verhouding tussen decentralisering en de capaciteit tot 
besturen binnen lokale overheden, met als centrale vraag "wanneer leidt decentralisering tot 
een beter beleid?". De literatuur over publiek management suggereert dat lokale overheden 
beter geplaatst zijn om lokale noden te monitoren en er naar te handelen. Lokale besturen in 
staat stellen om de lokale middelen in te zetten zou dan ook leiden tot een meer 
verantwoordelijk, efficiënter en effectiever beleid. Dit principe werd voor het eerst in vraag 
gesteld wanneer case studies over ontwikkelingslanden in de jaren 1990 tot tegenstrijdige 
resultaten leidden. Deze voorbeelden toonden aan dat decentralisering kan leiden tot meer 
corruptie, machtsmisbruik door elites en een achteruitgang van de openbare dienstverlening. 
Deze dubbelzinnige resultaten van decentralisering werden over het algemeen gekaderd als 
een gebrek aan managementkwaliteiten in het beleid. Internationale donororganisaties 
lanceerden daarom tal van capaciteit opbouwende programma's om managers, organisaties en 
zelfs gemeenschappen en instellingen op te leiden. Hoewel er geen substantieel bewijs bestaat 
dat dit voor een verbetering van het beleid zorgt, worden elk jaar miljarden dollars besteed 
aan programma's om de bestuurscapaciteit in ontwikkelingslanden te versterken. Gebaseerd 
op enquêtes en officiële data vergaard in 65 Turkse stedelijk-provinciale entiteiten, komt deze 
verhandeling tot de vaststelling dat de socio-economische factoren de belangrijkste 
determinanten vormen wat betreft de uitkomsten van decentralisering en de link met 
bestuurscapaciteit. Gebruik makend van een regressie-analyse suggereert dit onderzoek dat de 
verhouding tussen decentralisering en beleid niet enkel vanuit een managementperspectief, 
maar ook vanuit een ontwikkelingsperspectief moet benaderd worden.   
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
In the second half of the 20th century, the literature on public administration witnessed 
a rapid transformation in methods and in way of thinking. This transformation has altered the 
Weberian notion of the state which relies on the hierarchical state structure and functioning. 
Particularly, the embodiment of Thatcher and Reagan’s market oriented public policies paved 
way to the inclusion of private sector originated principles and techniques into the realm of 
public administration. New concepts such as deregulation, privatisation, and adaptation of 
management principles have occupied the public administration literature. Consequently, the 
field of public management has emerged as a separate branch from public administration. 
This change in the literature took another turn in 1990s with the emergence of another 
buzzword, i.e. governance. Nowadays, governing the society incorporates horizontally public, 
private and civil society organisations on the one hand, and vertically local, regional, national 
and supranational state organisations on the other into a complex, reticular set of relations. 
Hence, what used to be a dihedral relation between citizen and the state, turned into a 
multidimensional realm with various interactions among different actors.  
Shifting roles and changes in governance necessitated local governments to incur new 
discretionary responsibilities and matching capabilities. Decentralisation, albeit being a far 
older concept in the literature, has become thus a fundamental element in the governance 
literature. It is widely acknowledged that decentralised systems contribute both to democracy 
and also to the efficiency and effectiveness of public governance. Thus, decentralisation has 
been a favoured policy priority among policy makers in different democratic political 
structures for the last decades (Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983; Treisman, 2002; 
Swenden & Maddens, 2009). Although decentralisation policies and the degree of 
decentralisation vary across country cases, it is expected that decentralised authority and 
responsibilities provide in return some advantages to governance system, e.g. effectiveness, 
efficiency, better service quality, empowerment of different segments of the society, 
economic growth, democratisation, accountability, and even in some cases security (Rodden, 
2004; Pollitt, 2005; Sharma, 2006; Treisman, 2007). So far, many studies have been 
conducted to evaluate certain aspects of decentralisation policies. Yet, the outcomes of 
decentralisation policies are not coherent in each case. For instance, it is observed that 
decentralisation practices in some developing countries have caused in return high corruption 
with inefficiency and ineffectiveness on public services (Prud’homme, 1995; Litvack, Ahmad 
 12 
 
& Bird, 1998; Smoke, 2003; Oxhorn, 2004). Evidences indicate that decentralisation can have 
positive effect but only if certain conditions are met (Smoke, Gomez and Peterson, 2006). 
Even though, the determinants for the success of decentralisation policies are 
equivocal, one commonly agreed element is an adequate local capacity is necessary for the 
successful implementation of the decentralisation reforms and for the functioning 
decentralised governance (UNDP&BMZ, 2000). In that sense, the capacity building 
programmes have been embraced widely by donor organisations (e.g. UNDP, World Bank) in 
developing and transition countries to assist on policy implementation. However, capacity is 
an elusive concept (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001) and ‘what variation of capacity on 
different local administrations is functional?’ remains largely unanswerable (UNDP&BMZ, 
2000). Furthermore, there is limited knowledge on how variations of capacity are affecting the 
decentralisation practices.  
Hence, the relationship between capacity and decentralisation is largely 
unapprehended. There are different assumptions on this relationship, but basically there are 
two different camps. The first camp claims that possessed capacity is a determinant for the 
success of decentralisation policies (e.g. Bahl & Linn, 1992). The second camp argues that 
decentralised organisations will obtain the capacity in time thus rejecting the former argument 
(e.g. Rondinelli et al., 1983). In this regard, the World Bank supports the latter by positing the 
following; 
“Working Group 5 (Institutional Capacity) at the Technical Consultation on 
Decentralisation and Rural Development, FAO, Rome, December 1997: "Rather than 
plan and make large up-front investment in local capacity building as a prerequisite 
for devolution of responsibility, there was a broad consensus that it would be quicker 
and more cost-effective to begin the process of devolution, to permit learning by doing 
and to build up capacity through practice." The evidence increasingly shows that local 
capacity can be built by the process of decentralisation, particularly when appropriate 
programs to increase interaction with the private sector are included in 
decentralisation design” (World Bank) 
This debate is not only limited within the academic circles or international donor 
organisations but also it is relevant for the policy practitioners and policymakers.  For 
instance, during a technical consultation on decentralisation, Fiszbein (1997) gives the 
following anecdote: 
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“An interesting illustration of the controversies associated with these questions (i.e. 
whether the local level has, or can develop quickly enough, the necessary capabilities) 
is the parliamentary debate that took place in Colombia as a new law that would 
create untied fiscal transfers to local governments was being discussed in the early 
1980s. The mainstream opinion in Congress was that no real benefit would be derived 
from transferring funds and responsibilities to local governments if their lack of 
capacity would not allow them to manage them effectively in order to improve the 
quantity and quality of services offered to the population. Interestingly enough, the 
proponents of the law --that would eventually be passed by Congress-- did not try to 
argue that such capacities indeed existed. Rather, their argument was that only if 
fiscal resources and responsibilities for service delivery were transferred to local 
governments would those capabilities develop, as it is only if and when faced with 
concrete challenges that local institutions would acquire them (Galan [1990]).  
In fact, at least for some of the Colombian reformers, the creation of local capacity -- 
understood as the consolidation of democratic state and civic institutions particularly 
in more than 800 rural municipios-- was an objective rather than a condition for 
decentralisation. Almost a decade later, Bolivia would follow a similar path, and 
similar discussions can be found in post-civil war debates in several countries in 
Central America.” 
Besides, the traditional modes of governance are changing parallel to the overall shift 
in public management. Now private sector organisations and civil society groups are taking a 
more tangible role and responsibility in governing the society. In this transitional stage, roles 
of the state and other actors are re-evaluated in terms of their legitimacy, responsibilities and 
function in governance. Inevitably, these new dimensions are expanding the discussion on 
governance capacities for public organisations. All these systemic changes necessitate 
reconsidering the implications of decentralisation and capacity in the broader sense of 
governance.  
 
1.1 Research Aims   
The main aim of this research is to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the subject of 
‘when decentralisation leads to better governance?’ by analysing the relationship between 
capacity and decentralisation in local governance scale. The research aims to achieve a better 
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understanding on the dynamics that shape the interaction between capacity and 
decentralisation in relation to better governance. 
The main research question of this study is ‘what is the relationship between capacity 
and decentralisation in local governance?’. Two complementary research questions are 
indicated to answer the main research question. First, ‘which capacities are primarily 
important for the success of decentralisation?’ and second, ’how does the variation in 
capacities influences decentralisation in local governance?’ Each research question will be 
elaborated respectively through specific research objectives. 
 
1.2 Contribution of the Study 
There are three main reasons to consider this problem worthy of consideration. First of 
all, as mentioned above, there is limited knowledge on the mutual implication of 
decentralisation and capacity. It is unclear, what is the required capacity in governance 
institutions to implement successful decentralisation reforms or how decentralisation policies 
affect the existing capacities. It has been an under-researched area and the existing literature 
allows limited ‘generalisations’ (Fiszbein, 1997). Secondly, the capacity building programs 
are being applied as subsequent actions after decentralisation reforms took place in country 
cases. In this respect, this research has the possibility to bring new perspectives on capacity 
building regarding when to apply and what to apply. Third, this research will be conducted 
with a governance perspective, thus it will not only evaluate the intra-organisational capacity 
changes, as most of the capacity assessment studies do, but it will comprise the relational 
capacity of the locality as well.  
On a more country specific level, Turkey, profoundly known as a centralised state, has 
enacted various local administration reform acts in the last decade. Functions, roles and 
responsibilities of local governments have been extended with these regulations. Services 
which had been traditionally carried out by central government organisations including 
activities in culture, sports and arts; issues and precautions in social service provision for 
women, youth and children; organisation of supplementary courses for job opportunities; 
active foreign relations; provision of medical services; educational responsibilities; 
establishment of geographical and urban information systems; environmental health 
protection and waste collection and management have been assigned to municipalities. Along 
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with increased responsibilities, municipalities have obtained increased opportunities of 
borrowing and entrepreneurship and to be able to establish commercial companies and firms. 
The rapid transition of local administrations in functions and responsibilities revived the 
discussions on the lack of capacities in local governments and the need of capacity building. 
Although the need of capacity development in administrative, financial and personnel related 
dimensions was recognised in the 9th Development Plan (p-93-95), the need of capacity 
enhancement exists to be a major priority for local administrations. Hence, the findings of this 
research will provide insight on the trajectory of decentralisation policies in Turkey. Policy 
makers in central and local authorities will benefit from the results of the study and will be 
able to apply the model on their own policy choices for capacity enhancement. Furthermore, 
both theoretical and empirical studies on Turkey are limited in terms of decentralisation and 
capacity. Since country cases are essential for the accumulation of knowledge in governance 
literature, the research will be a contribution for this literature as well. 
The practical contribution of this research will be on the policy design for capacity 
building programmes. By examining different aspects of decentralisation and capacity in 
governance institutions new approaches and inherently new programmes will be able to be 
developed for country cases. Subsequently, it will contribute to studies trying to understand 
the ambiguous nature of decentralisation regarding to policy outcomes.  
 
1.3 Overview of the Chapters 
The dissertation is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical 
framework of the study. Respectively, the chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual 
dimensions of local governance, decentralisation and capacity, and elaborates the challenges 
on building theoretical arguments for the relationship between capacity and decentralisation 
within the local governance. After a careful assessment, the chapter sets forward the choices 
made to overcome the foreseen theoretical challenges. Chapter 3 familiarises the reader with 
the Turkish case. It sheds light on the reform trajectory and characteristics of the public 
administration system in Turkey with a focus on local government system. Additionally, the 
power relations between the local and central authorities and the capacities in local 
administrations are other focal points in the chapter. Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter and 
states the methodological choices taken in the research. The highlights in the chapter are the 
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research design and the data collection method, operationalisation of the variables, selection 
of the indicators, validity and reliability criteria.  Chapter 5 analyses the collected data and 
evaluates the assumptions on the relationship between capacity and decentralisation in local 
governance. Chapter 6 expands the data analysis with the qualitative responses gathered in the 
field research. The chapter reflects on the interpretation of the statistical findings and provides 
a more consistent analysis for Turkish case. Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks and 
reflects on the theoretical and policy implications of the findings.  
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CHAPTER II- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the three core concepts of this study- local governance, 
decentralisation and capacity- and builds up the theoretical arguments on the relationship 
between capacity and decentralisation in local governance. There are two fundamental 
challenges to overcome in this attempt. First of all, these concepts predicate multiple 
cognitive meanings, which directly affect their definitions and applications. Thus, any 
researcher should elaborate the different conceptual dimensions and reflect on how they are 
affecting the theoretical propositions. Secondly, the concepts of capacity and decentralisation 
will be adjusted into the theoretical framework of local governance. However, the literature 
on governance does not indicate a fully-fledged theory. Rather, it is a composition of various 
theoretical approaches towards different aspects of governance. As a remedy for this, a 
synthetic approach will be adopted. The various theoretical contributions on governance will 
be synthesised into a comprehensive theoretical framework to adjust decentralisation and 
capacity.  
The chapter is a composition of four subsequent parts. It starts with the presentation of 
local governance. The aim in this part is to lay out the usage of the concept theoretically and 
cognitively, and to set the stage for the application of decentralisation and capacity. In 
consecutive parts, decentralisation and capacity will be elaborated respectively and will be 
positioned in local governance. In the final part, theoretical propositions will be drawn on the 
relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local governance, and an analytical 
model will be presented as a basis for the measurement of capacity.  
 
2. 1  Local Governance 
2.1.1 What is governance? 
In the last two decades, governance has become overwhelmingly popular in social 
sciences. Nevertheless, the usage of the term is frequently not precise and equivocal. In his 
notable article, Rhodes (1996) highlights six different usages of governance in the literature: 
the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management; ‘good governance’; 
socio-cybernetics systems; and self-organising networks. The ambiguity surrounding the term 
is not limited with its applications in the literature but it pertains to the semantics as well. 
Whilst in the earliest usages, the term was predominantly a synonym for government; the 
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contemporary ones might refer to the rules, to the practices or to the system of governing 
itself. Considering these conceptual shortcomings, it is worthy to ask why ‘governance’ has 
turned into such a prevailing concept in political sciences. Pierre & Peters (2000) answer this 
question by underlining ‘its capacity to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships 
involved in the process of governing’. Inherently, it is no surprise, that different scholars have 
highlighted different attributes of governance on their studies and studied the term from their 
point of view.  
One of the prime definitions of the term is made by Rhodes (1996). According to his 
definition, governance is ‘self-organising, interorganisational networks’ which complement 
markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and 
exercising control and co-ordination. Rhodes portrays a transformation in the ways of 
governing the society where the traditional roles of state institutions on public service delivery 
are replaced by compelling ‘self-organising networks’. These networks created by 
governmental and societal actors are propelling the state to a systematic change where ‘no 
sovereign actor is able to steer or regulate’ (Rhodes, 1996:15). In Rhodes’ view, governance 
is an adversary concept against government where the government is obliged to cooperate 
with these networks to govern the society.  
Another prominent scholar, Gerry Stoker, on the other hand, adopts a more 
comprehensive definition towards the concept. Stoker (2000:3) defines governance ‘as a 
concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in 
conditions where it is not possible to recourse to the authority of the state’. In Stoker’s 
definition, governance refers not only to networks but also to governing institutions, 
mechanisms and styles as well. In an earlier article, Stoker describes five propositions on 
different aspects of governance: 
“1) Governance refers to set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also 
beyond government. 
2) Governance defines the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling 
social and economic issues. 
3) Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between 
institutions involved in collective action. 
4) Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors. 
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5) Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the 
power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to 
use new tools and techniques to steer and guide” (Stoker, 1998:2).  
Although in Stoker’s approach, governance lacks the distinct boundaries to enable a 
theoretical framework, it envisages a map to identify the key trends and developments in the 
changing world of government. In this approach, governance is something independent from 
the control of any actor (including state), which is a ‘set of practices’ for collective decision-
making.  
The third valuable approach towards governance was demarcated by Pierre & Peters 
(2000). Referencing to the etymological roots1 of the concept, Pierre & Peters prioritise the 
‘steering’ notion on their definition.  From their point of view, governance is not a substitute 
concept against traditional institutional linkages between public and society but rather 
adaptation of more informal channels to enhance resource mobilisation and coordination with 
key actors surrounding the society. Thus, state is not depicted as a passive and incapable actor 
unable to exercise control over emerging networks but instead it is a deliberate policy 
preference. In their governance definition, state is the ‘primus inter pares’ and the only 
potential actor with the ability to mobilise other societal actors for its purposes. Unlike the 
conventional state perspective, in this governance approach, the strong states are those which 
incorporate entrepreneurial skills, political zeal and brokerage abilities thus able to coordinate 
and get the priorities on various joint public-private projects. 
These three approaches provide a general overview on the governance perspective. 
Hence, governance can be perceived as a specific type of governing style (e.g. Rhodes), as the 
compilation of various attributes to governing (e.g. Stoker) or it can be a generic term to 
define the style of governing in a setting (e.g. Pierre & Peters). In a more simplistic way, the 
cognitive meaning of governance can correspond to ‘one of them’, ‘all of them’ or ‘each one 
of them’. Most of the definitions in the literature are situated in line with either of these 
cognitive approaches. Nevertheless, regardless of the definition adopted, there is a consensus 
on that the emphasis on governance is an outcome of the changes in domestic and 
international environment. Therefore, it is not possible to frame governance without stating 
the causes that led to the changes. 
                                                            
1  The etymological roots of ‘governance’ indicate in its Greek origin ‘steering’. 
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To start with, the key underlying factors articulated in the literature are usually 
associated with globalisation. Globalisation suggests that with the internationalisation of 
markets (Hirst & Thompson, 1999) and increasing speed on economic transactions among 
countries, multinational companies have freed themselves from the national boundaries and 
political control of nation-states (Baylis & Smith, 1997; John, 2001). The severe economic 
competition among multinational companies affected not only the capital markets but also the 
political settings to please the markets. The demand from private sector to be involved in 
public decisions and to be more influential in the political agenda has increased with the 
purpose to secure the competitiveness of their businesses. Especially, private actors have 
become more interested with local politics to ensure the required labour force and efficiency 
of transport links (John, 2001:13). On the other hand, local and regional administrations have 
perceived the increased attention of private sector to local service provision as an alternative 
to the state investments for economic development (Parkinson et all, 1992; John, 2001:11). 
The globalisation had also implications on the social and cultural segments as well, thus 
eventually paved way to the creation of complex networks among social, private and political 
actors.  
New policy challenges and changes on the demand of the society are other causes on 
changes on governing practices. The complexity of newly emerged policy areas such as 
environmental problems, high levels of migration or ageing population in the developed world 
required the involvement of various levels of government and non-government actors in 
cooperation and decision-making to find solutions. Moreover, the increasing dissatisfaction of 
citizens with the government policies has become evident starting with 1970’s economic 
crisis in the world (John, 2001:13). The trust of people on traditional government policies had 
fallen and the turnout rates decreased gradually. The unconventional forms of political 
behaviour through associations and new interest groups have become popular. The changes on 
political behaviours encouraged both academicians and politicians to seek new ways to 
determine public policies. In this regard, the most prominent initiative was pioneered by 
Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA by their extensive support for market-based 
practices on public service delivery and deregulation of government. The practices of 
privatisation, deregulation, cut-backs in public spending, tax cuts, monetarist economic 
policies, radical institutional and administrative reforms, and adoption of market-based 
philosophy on public service production and delivery were remarked as the indication of a 
new phase in the public service system labelled as New Public Management (Hood, 1991, 
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Pierre & Peters, 2000:2). Additionally, the issue of democratic government and the legitimacy 
of non-governmental organisation have become part of the discussions in the context of 
governance. 
As a third point, the evolution of the EU as a sui generis political creation and the end 
of the Cold War contributed tremendously to the discourse on governance. First of all, the EU 
enabled the structural framework, thus sub-state entities have become hub of power on 
decision-making and development policies. The allocation of the EU structural funds through 
NUTS regions and the adoption of ‘subsidiarity’ principle as a constitutive element for the EU 
functioning, have contributed to the importance of regional and local governments. Second, 
with new international institutions, e.g. the Committee of Regions, the EU enabled 
international bodies where sub-national entities can precede their policies without the 
limitation of national boundaries. The sub-national entities found the platform to exchange 
ideas and to interact with other organisations to empower their policies. Third, with the 
creation of the internal market, the EU disassociated the monopoly of nation states on setting 
trade and tariff policies which eventually increased the competition among regional and local 
governments to attract more international investment. Fourth, the EU has guaranteed a legal 
and political framework for nation states to adapt bolder policies on allocating political and 
administrative rights to the historical and ethnical regions, as it is apparent in the creation of 
Scottish parliament or Belgian federal structure. Fifth, the creation of the concept ‘multi-level 
governance’ to define the functioning of the EU contributed to the governance literature. 
Thus, public policy making has been perceived in the EU context as an interplay between sub-
national, national and supranational entities. Beside the EU, other international institutions 
such as the OECD and the IMF have contributed to the governance discourse as well, both 
academically and also by creating international standards for better governing. Especially, the 
‘good governance’ principles have been manifested as the international norms that all 
governments are encouraged to transpose their systems to achieve the standards defined by 
those organisations. 
 
2.1.2 The ‘state of the art’ in public governance  
Until 1990s, the general consensus was that national governments are the main actors 
to steer the society and economics. However, this idea has been contested with increasing 
emphasis on policy networks and emergence of New Public Management (NPM) rhetoric. 
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The state has been portrayed as an overly extensive, bureaucratic body which is ineffective 
and inefficient compared to the private sector. As mentioned previously, this perception was 
empowered by Thatcher’s and Reagan’s policies, and state as an actor on public service 
system has been delegitimised. In this period, the foremost studies in the US literature (see 
Stone, 1989) debated the informal networks between market and public sector organisations 
(i.e. regimes) as the best practices for localities to compete in the global market economy. 
Nevertheless, the discussions on regimes at that time were predominantly limited with the 
governing decisions related with market functioning. 
On the other hand, particularly in the European literature, the emphasis has been given 
to the networks of societal and international actors and their functions on managing the 
society (see, Kooiman, 1993). The activity of governing has been disassociated from the 
monopoly of state and governing has been redefined as ‘all activities of social, political and 
administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to steer, guide, control or manage 
societies’ whereas governance is ‘the patterns that emerge from governing activities of social, 
political and administrative actors’ (Kooiman, 1993:2). Additionally, Rhodes, through his 
well-known studies ‘Hollowing out the State’ (1994) and ‘Governance without Government’ 
(1997) took the arguments one step further and brought new aspects to the discussion on 
state’s role in governance and to the governance literature in general. In this sense, Rhodes 
(1994) first declared that the state has ‘hollowed out’ his capabilities to international and 
national networks of private and societal actors; thus lost its ability to steer the society. In the 
latter study, Rhodes (1997) took the argument further, and stated the governance of society is 
‘about managing networks’. These networks have both the capacity and the influence to steer 
the society and the only way to steer the society is for the government to cooperate with these 
networks as an equal actor on public sector management (Rhodes, 1997). In this setup, state is 
the collection of inter-organisational networks made up of government actors and society as a 
whole, in which all are interdependent and equal in terms of sovereignty. All actors are 
motivated from their own interests and the networks are independently organised. The 
distinction among the public, private and civil society is no longer important whereas only the 
networks made up by those organisation are at the heart of the governance (Rhodes, 1997; 
Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999; Giguère, 2008: 47).  
Hence, networks have been acknowledged as new ways of public service delivery and 
public policy implementation. In this regard, networks are recognised as ‘stable patterns of 
social relations between interdependent actors which take shape around policy problems 
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and/or policy programmes’ (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999:6). Nevertheless, new 
challenges and questions have been introduced regarding the management of networks and to 
rationalise the co-operation among actors. The practices of network governance have been 
introduced as part of these discussions, and the role of the government has been assumed as a 
network manager. Kickert and Koppenjan (1999) described that the network management 
comprises three types of activities: action concerning a pattern of relations, consensus 
building and problem solving. Within a network, the managers adapt some certain tasks as 
network activation (initiating an interaction process) and organising interactions (defining the 
rules and procedures), setting up contacts (linking problems, solutions and actors), facilitation 
(putting in place effective conditions for interaction), and mediation and arbitration (conflict 
solving). In the case of an insolvable situation, the network manager, i.e. the government, can 
seek to restructure the network through changing the rules of its compositions. Moreover, 
government can use regulations, financial resources and communication tools to influence 
actors thus to ensure they meet expectations as best as possible (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; 
Giguère, 2008:48). 
Nevertheless, there are still some criticisms to the premises of network governance. 
Since the assumption is that the actors in the network are interdependent and have the same 
legitimacy, even though the government can pursue negotiations and compromises among 
network actors, it is not certain the solution will be in public interest. The success on 
compromises to sustain common interest will be too dependent on the personal skills of the 
network manager and it is highly probable in the cases where a compromise close to private 
interests of private sector actors is, the collective well-being and public interest could be in 
question (Giguère, 2008:48). In addition, the lack of mechanisms to enable democratic 
participation and the criticisms on the accountability of actors are the biggest challenges to 
networks.  
As part of the discussions on networks, new ideas are presented to enable public 
services. Among those, public-private partnerships (PPPs) or in general partnerships among 
governance actors deserve further attention. Although partnerships have been acknowledged 
in earlier practices as means of solving problems specific to the regions, with the shifting 
ideas, partnerships have been advertised as best practices for public service delivery. The 
general idea is that partnerships are set up by the initiator for a predetermined general 
purpose, where members of public, private and voluntary sectors participated in different 
forms of representation (Giguère, 2008:49). Partnerships have been promoted especially on 
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their functions to channel the local actors in local development and contributing to formation 
of national policies through the lessons learned in local level (Giguère, 2008:49). First local 
partnerships were initiated in 1991 in Ireland with the objectives to enable local employment 
and economic development. The pilot practices have been acknowledged as successful and 
partnerships are now part of the governance structures in most of the developed countries. 
OECD (2001) defines a number of principal tasks of partnerships: (1) pursuing a general 
objective such as stimulating economic development, promoting social cohesion and 
improving the quality of life; (2) endeavouring to achieve that objective mainly by increasing 
the degree of co-ordination between policies and programmes via the different services and 
levels of government, and by adapting them to the local context; (3) when the outcome of 
improved co-ordination is insufficient, setting up new projects and services; and (4) working 
at the local level to involve local actors; and especially civil society, in identifying prioritised 
and in project development, and to harness local resources and skills (Giguère, 2008:49). 
Beside the network-oriented approach towards governance, other scholars have 
conceptualised governance in terms of structures and processes (see Pierre & Peters, 2000). In 
the structural view, Pierre & Peters (2000:15) propose four different governance modes 
among political and economic institutions, each of whom has a distinct approach to direct the 
society and economy. These governance modes include hierarchy, market, network and 
community based governance arrangements. Pierre & Peters (2000:14) underline that each of 
them have strong sides to deal with one part of governance issue, but also weaknesses 
corresponding to others. Additionally, the solutions suggested by these modes are bound in 
cultural and temporal terms and depend on time and place.  
Coming to the features of the modes, hierarchical governance refers to the Weberian 
model of public services which foresees the vertical integration of bureaucratic institutions 
regulated by law. The state as the embodiment of collective interest is separated from the 
society and all institutions within the state apparatus function through command and control 
in a hierarchical order. The subnational governments are embedded within the integrity of 
state system and their autonomy is limited within the legal authority of the state. Hence, the 
hierarchy regulates both the functioning of state institutions and also their interactions with 
the society. This mode of governance has been called in the literature as traditional or ‘old’, 
but as Pierre & Peters (2000:14-15) underline the legal and constitutional frameworks 
regulating current state institutions have been created according to this system of functioning 
thus it still prevails as a mode of governance despite all the substantial changes.  
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The second, market governance, refers to both a set of relations between economic 
actors cooperating to resolve common problems but also adopting the basic functioning of 
market system based on supply and demand to govern the public service mechanism. The idea 
is that the most just and efficient way of resource allocation on public services relies on 
citizen’s choices not to elected officials, which may or may not be responsive to their 
constituencies (Pierre & Peters, 2000:19). 
The third mode, network governance, corresponds to the general conceptual 
discussions on networks which were elaborated previously. According to this mode, networks 
are organised interests among state and non-state actors on a given policy sector. The 
relationships among actors are less informal compared to market and hierarchy based 
structures, the coordination mechanisms are formed through cooperation and negotiation 
among equal partners instead of formal rules. The argument favoured by this model is that 
networks facilitate coordination among public and private interests, and enable diffusion of 
the expertise in private actors in the policy process. thus increase the efficiency on public 
services (Kitthananan, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 2000). The counter argument holds that since 
networks represent common interest, they could challenge the interests of the state. Hence, the 
issue of accountability and representation will be in question. 
The last mode of governance described by Pierre & Peters (2000) is the communities 
or communitarian governance. Based on communitarian perspective (see Etzioni, 1995, 
1998), states are too big to resolve the problems of communities thus communities should 
resolve their common problems through a collective responsibility with minimum 
intervention of the state (Kitthananan, 2006). The underlying element on this mode of 
governance is the virtue of civic spirit as the key to governance. The main criticism to 
communitarian governance is the simplistic view of communitarians that individuals are 
inclined to make personal sacrifices for common good of community. 
Pierre & Peters (2000:22) underline that the structural view on governance is 
important since it enables to determine what roles the state and other actors can play within 
the framework of governance. On the other hand, the process perspective highlights another 
important dimension on governance framework which is the interactions among structures. 
This perspective focuses on the processes of ‘steering’ and ‘coordination’ and perceives 
governance as a dynamic outcome of social and political actors (Kitthananan, 2006). This 
conceptual approach is especially beneficial to study the changes in governance, since it 
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focuses on the degree of inclusion and influence among actors and evaluates the changes over 
time. 
One other possible approach towards governance is adopting an institutionalist 
perspective. For instance, Pierre (2011) adopts an institutionalist approach on his recent study 
about urban governance. He justifies his stance by underlying that current literature on 
governance focuses too much on processes, partnerships and joint ventures whilst overlooking 
the institutions and structures which matter for governance as well. Following a normative 
institutional perspective, that institutions represent structures and systems of norms, beliefs, 
practices and routines (see. Peters, 1999), Pierre (2011:21) argues that the literature on 
governance overlooks the significance of the systems of values and norms which gives the 
processes meaning and purpose. Further, he asserts that without studying the purposes, goals 
and objectives, governance cannot be understood and assessed as a process. In this regard, 
neo-institutional theory enables valuable contributions to the governance framework.  
Based on this perspective, Pierre (2011:25) describes four different models for urban 
governance: managerial, corporatist, pro-growth and welfare governance. Each model 
suggests different governance objectives and strategies to the institutions in localities as well 
as their interactions with regional and central government. In managerial governance, the 
classical NPM elements on public management are influential as emphasising on relaxing the 
political control over the city administration and service production. Customer-oriented 
approaches should be adopted on political decisions, and whereas managers should employ 
the public decision with substantive discretion and autonomy, elected officials should focus 
on long-term goals and objectives. The criticism to this model is rooted in the controversies 
existing in NPM as being inadequate on accountability and democratic deficiency. Corporatist 
model emphasises the role of organised interest in local government and allows local 
government to bring the ‘third sector’ into public service production and delivery. The 
questions raised in this model are related with the governability of cities (see Pierce, 1993) 
where sometimes the tensions among different segments of the city (such as labour 
organisations against business organisations) can hinder effective cooperation. The third 
model, pro-growth governance, suggests the economic growth is the overarching objective of 
local governance system and being the ‘unitary interest’ among all actors, it should be 
separated from political debates. This model of governance is the least participatory model 
among four models and posits concerted public-private actions as the engine of the local 
economy. The last model, welfare governance, focuses on the governance of the industrial 
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cities whose local economy relied traditionally on manufacturing, and failed to restructure its 
economic setup to meet the needs of international economic forces. In this depiction, these 
states have very limited viability and growth in the local economy and depend to the influx of 
capital through the central government. Therefore, this type of governance tries to 
reinvigorate the state’s involvement on resource mobilisation rather than public-private 
collaborations. The examples of this model are observable largely in formerly prosperous 
regions in Germany, the USA, the Scandinavian countries and the UK. 
Last but not least, Bouckaert (2015) describes ‘spans of governance’ as an attempt to 
merge the structuralist and institutionalist approaches towards modes of governance. 
Bouckaert identifies five spans of governance namely, corporate, governance, holding 
governance, public service governance, suprastructure governance and systemic governance. 
Corporate governance captures the notion of the transferability of private sector governance 
into public sector management system. Corporate governance pursues the adaptability and 
limitations of governance systems and practices in private sector into public sector. Holding 
governance broadens the focus of corporate governance and look into the ‘connectedness’ of a 
range of organisations in terms of function, territory, policy field...etc. Public sector 
governance focuses on the public service delivery and incorporates cooperation with private 
and non-for-profit actors. Suprastructure governance brings the ideological and normative 
aspects of governance and deals with values, norms, culture and ideologies which shape and 
direct governance. The last span, the systemic governance, refers to the system design of 
governance in state level. This type of governance elaborates that macro-governance deals 
with issues such as the distribution of power, checks and balances and mechanisms inside the 
country on decision-making and implementation.  
All these different studies provide valuable insight on how to grasp governance from 
different aspects. Another major debate in the literature is to create a fully-fledged theoretical 
framework towards governance. The discussions on differences and similarities of NPM and 
governance are worthy of consideration in this debate.  
It is generally acknowledged, that the premises of NPM have a kinship with the 
emerging forms of governance (Peters& Pierre, 1998). For that matter, both perspectives 
acknowledge the downplaying role of elected officials on public services. Unlike the 
traditional public administration’s approach, both of them accept the diffusion between the 
public and the private sector and perceive competition as positive for public service delivery. 
Moreover, both NPM and governance underline the importance of results and output controls, 
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and disregards input control which was preferred as main control mechanism within the 
traditional public administration. Output control can either be implemented through customer 
satisfaction charts and performance indicators like NPM suggests, or it can be generated by 
bringing members of private and voluntary sector into public service production and delivery 
as governance perspective suggests. There is one additional similarity between NPM and 
governance, which is their shortcoming to implement accountability while trying to replace 
the political power derived from the legal mandate or from elected office, with an 
entrepreneurial style of leadership or with an indirect remote model of leadership as in the 
NPM. Whilst governance literature suggests ‘stakeholderism’ and consumer choice as an 
alternative to traditional channels of accountability, NPM has little concern about the 
accountability as arguing the customers have the opportunity to influence the service 
production directly without the involvement of their elected representatives (Peters& Pierre, 
1998).  
On the other hand, the main differences between two concepts are generally related 
with the theoretical underpinnings. First of all, governance is part of the political theory and 
unlike the ideologically driven NPM, it is an old concept in the literature of social sciences. 
Inherently, governance anticipates efficiency while preserving some degree of political 
control over the public services; NPM just seeks to transform the public sector to a set of 
organisations whose only difference from private sector is the nature of the product that is 
delivered (Pierre & Peters, 1998). Second, while NPM focuses on the intraorganisational 
relations to enhance output on customer satisfaction and efficiency through management 
techniques, governance is largely about the processes on interorganisational relationships. The 
final difference is that NPM foresees a cultural shift on production of public goods, whereas 
adoption of new forms of governance does not require such a cultural shift. 
The most recent contribution to this academic debate has been posited by Osborne 
(2011). Osborne (2011:7) argues that governance once an element within the PA and NPM 
regimes of public policy implementation and public services delivery, turned into a distinct 
regime in itself. This new regime, called New Public Governance (NPG), has different 
characteristics theoretically and practically from PA and NPM regimes. Theoretically, NPG is 
situated within institutional and network theories and posits ‘both a plural state, where 
multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a pluralist 
state, where multiple processes inform the policy-making system’ (Osborne 2011:9). In 
practice, this regime focuses upon organisational relationships and upon the governance of 
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processes, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction of PSOs 
with their environment. On the issues of resource-allocation and accountability, according to 
the NGM, inter-organisational networks are the central resource allocation mechanisms and 
accountability is achieved by negotiations at the interorganisational and interpersonal level 
within these networks (Osborne, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the question of accountability and legitimacy is a major contested topic 
in the governance literature. The argument revolves around that service provisions through 
networks are leading to the democratic deficiency as they are hampering the traditional 
accountability mechanisms through elected parliamentarians. Indeed, in the traditional 
parliamentarian democracy, decision-makers are held accountable through elections and 
constitutional checks on public authority. The clear hierarchy between the state and lower 
tiers of government ensures this chain of accountability between citizens and policy makers. 
However, networks function through negotiations among cooperating actors and a 
hierarchical control of service provisions are not possible as in the traditional system. In most 
cases, the networks depend on the convergence of state and private interests which reduces 
local democratic input and legitimacy.  
Different theoretical approaches addressed the issue of accountability and legitimacy 
of new governance structures, e.g. communitarianism, deliberative democracy, direct 
democracy, multi-level governance. The common point of these approaches is that they are 
proposing alternative ways of accountability and a sort of deinstitutionalisation of existing 
government structures (Peters & Pierre, 2000:138).  
For that matter, communitarianism argues that large-scale decision-making 
mechanisms of the government should be replaced by smaller units of governing which 
represent the interest of communities directly. The deliberative democracy argues that 
representative democracy does not allow average citizens to exert power on decision-making 
and decision-making institutions should be reformed to allow the involvement of citizens on 
decision-making. The direct democracy argument takes a step further and argues that citizens 
are both capable and ready to decide on policy actions and suggests replacement of 
representative democracy mechanisms with new mechanisms allowing citizens to decide on 
public policies through popular votes. However, Pierre & Peters (2000:140) note that none of 
these theoretical approaches supplements governance in coherent and integrated manner that 
is required. Instead of this, Pierre & Peters (2000:141) claim that in many instances the 
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traditional patterns of governance are preferable and the use of the alternatives might reduce 
governance capacity.  
Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that different systems of accountability 
exist in current modes of governance. For instance, Goss (2001:24) argues, that each agency 
involved in local networks has different systems of accountability through ministers, local 
politicians, shareholders, local communities or boards where the audit and regulation regimes 
depend on the individual case. Although Goss acknowledges the need of modern 
accountability systems that match the reality of local governance, the idea of creating new 
institutions to ensure accountability is not articulated in this approach. 
Finally, the idea of multi-level governance has developed with the evolution of the EU 
decision-making structure. This approach suggests the accountability of public decision-
making can be traced in supra-national level as well, and the legitimacy is ensured through the 
interplay among different governments existing in local, regional, national and supranational 
levels. 
 
2.1.3 Local governance and the actors in local governance 
The previous part provided a comprehensive overview of governance literature. In this 
regard, local governance is the reflection of these discussions into the local scale. Therefore, 
the definition of local governance opens up the discussion on cognitive meaning of 
governance. In this research, the local governance will be used close to the Pierre and Peters’ 
definition. In other words, local governance will be perceived as the governing action of local 
government whereas the local government is the ‘primus inter pares’. Thus, better local 
governance corresponds to the success of local government on mobilising other actors to 
provide demanded public services in the locality. However, different from Pierre & Peters’ 
definition, better governance is not only the indication of the abilities of one actor but also the 
compliance of other actors to the expected roles. Hence, the emphasis in this part is 
identifying the key actors in local governance and shedding light on theoretical approaches 
towards their functions. But, before that, I will first focus on the concept of ‘local’ and 
question what does it stand for. 
Goss (2001:26) defines four premises to define ‘local’. According to Goss, first, local 
can be perceived spatially, as the proximity to the necessary facilities. Second, local 
represents a sense of identity which creates the feeling of belonging among the residents. For 
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this approach, spatiality is a relative concept which can vary in terms of distances. Local 
reflects the shared history, common identity and connectedness among the residents. Third, 
local can be understood as an element of scale. Local owns the minimum scale to create 
economies of scale and capacity to adopt strategic decision-making. Fourth, local conjures a 
site of power which can counteract and negotiate with regional and central governments. In 
this sense, ‘local’ can correspond to different inferences thus ‘local governance’ is not a 
confined concept comparing to local government since its borders are not limited with the 
borders of local government’s jurisdiction. 
After this remark, the first and foremost actor who will be elaborated in this part is the 
local government. Local governments are democratically elected authorities that exercise 
political choices within denoted boundaries (John, 2001:34). However, depending on 
traditional and historical status, there is a great variation among local governments across 
country cases in terms of size, structure and discretionary powers. This variety reflects to the 
literature both in terms of contextualising the local government and also defining its 
typologies.  
In his classical work ‘Considerations of Representative Government’, John Stuart Mill 
describes two important functions to local governments. First, local government is the 
keystone of the democratic system by enabling political participation of local citizens through 
elections. Second, local government is the means of providing effective and efficient local 
services as they contain the local knowledge, interest and expertise, especially compared to 
the distant central authority (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998). The efficiency and democracy 
arguments have been expressed by other British academics as well (e.g. L.J. Sharpe, K. Joung, 
John Steward). The American argument, on the other hand, shows a slight difference on 
underpinning the context of local government. Unlike the efficiency argument of British 
scholars, on American writings local governments are associated with pluralism and 
individual sovereignty (Andrew& Goldsmith, 1998, Wolman, 1996). In the European context, 
the emphasis is on the dichotomy between northern and southern practices (see Page and 
Goldsmith, 1987; Page, 1991). According to Page & Goldsmith’ classification, the northern 
group of Scandinavian countries, UK and Netherlands preserve a form of ‘legal localism’ 
(Page, 1991) where the values of local self-government and decentralisation are eminent. The 
local government has the legitimacy as the primary responsible institution to provide local 
public services. In the practices of northern group, there is a clear distinction between local 
politics and central politics. The southern group (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy and Greece), 
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on the other hand, emphasises territorial representation of local interests nationally which 
Page defines as ‘political localism’. Unlike the northern group, there is a sense of 
communality and unity between centre and local administration. Clientelist practices of local 
representatives are other common features of southern countries. Other classifications on local 
governments (e.g. Bennett, 1993; Hesse & Sharpe, 1991) identify three or four groups instead 
of two. The main distinction in those typologies occurs on differentiating the UK from the rest 
of Nordic group, as a case close to the American and Australian practices and defining 
Germany, Netherlands, and Austria as a unique cluster on itself which hold mixed features 
from both northern and southern groups. According to Bennett, in the Anglo-Saksonian 
system, the local governments have weak constitutional status unlike the Scandinavian 
countries. Germany, Netherlands and Austria, forming a unique group, preserve both local 
government traditions like in Scandinavian countries also deconcentrated state administrations 
of Napoleonic countries which signifies the southern group in Goldsmith and Page’s 
classification. Kuhlman & Wollmann (2014) add one more category to the list of public 
administration models in Europe, namely Central Eastern European Model referring to the 
post-communist Eastern European countries part of the European Union. They identify two 
groups of countries under Central East European Model according to administration traditions 
of the formerly ruling historical empires of Habsburgs, Ottomans, Prussians and Tsarist 
Russians. The first group of countries, which were part of the realm of Habsburgs or 
Prussians, adopted decentralised constitutional and administrative model in local government 
whereas the second group of countries, which were part of the realm of Ottomans or Tsarist 
Russia, has centrally dependent, weak local administrations.  
Another distinction emphasised by Goldsmith and Page is the different political 
culture between northern and southern countries reflecting the dichotomy between Catholic 
south and Protestant north. Especially, they argue because of this dichotomy southern secular 
states administer the education services centrally while in northern cases these services are 
decentralised to the local government institutions. Moreover, among northern countries there 
are few levels of government, smaller numbers of local authorities and larger average size of 
local authority comparing to southern cases and while welfare services are provided by local 
authorities in the north, regional and central authorities are responsible in the south (John, 
2001: 36-37). 
However, with the transition of governing institutions, the distinction among local 
government systems has becoming even more perplexing. The governments are adopting 
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similar practices to deal with the emerging challenges, but in the meantime the path-
dependency to traditional systems are determining the course of actions. John (2001:23) 
describes this situation as the institutional transformation only reflects one side of story but 
since the traditional local government activities remain in place, the trajectory of local 
governance will be in similar but also intrinsically in different ways across country cases.  
The second emerging actor in local governance is the private sector and the role of 
businesses on governing. Looking back to the 19th and early 20th century, the involvement of 
local business leaders to local politics is not something new. However, with changing 
production systems and political development, local businesses drifted apart from the direct 
involvement with local politics and big production facilities are removed to suburban areas 
(Harding, 1994). As seen in British and French cases, the central authority controlled the local 
policy making on transport and development issues. Moreover, the central authority 
dominated the public finances either through direct supervision of local expenditures like in 
France, or through the control over capital projects as in the UK (John, 2001:43). Local 
politicians were hinged on the consent of central authority on investment and planning, thus 
business representatives did not see any economic initiative to involve in the local politics. 
Besides, developments in domestic market and financial systems empowered the capital or 
central cities on financial services. Thus, the involvement of businesses is consolidated 
largely on centres close to the central decision-making (John, 2001:43). Additionally, the 
political culture of traditional local governments focusing either on delivering services or 
accessing to central government resources did not contribute to the development of relations 
between local politics and private sector. Hence, in classical literature on local administration, 
the business participation was not eminent (John, 2001:43).  
As mentioned previously, the changes in international economic systems have exposed 
local economics to international competition. Local politicians have become more concerned 
with ensuring the competitiveness of their local economies and with attracting private 
businesses to invest their localities. The social policies affecting the labour market and 
investment on transport services are turned into the primary interest of involving private 
businesses. The increase of local administrations’ discretion on planning of local services 
motivated the private businesses even more to intervene in local decision-making and to 
become part of the local politics. As an outcome, public-private partnership has turned to an 
essential way to realise investment for local development. In return, the local policy makers 
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have become more concerned to create a good reputation in order to attract inward investment 
(John, 2001:45).  
The roles of citizens and the local community have been altered in local governance 
framework as well. Citizens are expected to be involved directly on decision-making and in 
some cases to participate in public service delivery unlike their conventional role as passive 
receivers in public service equation. New governance organisations, such as city councils, 
development agencies, tenant management organisations or neighbourhood initiatives, are 
emerging as complementary to traditional public service bodies (see Goss, 2001: 186-187). 
The motive is to enable the direct involvement of citizens and representatives of civil society 
institutions to public service mechanism, thus to ensure consistent and effective policies 
compatible with the demand of the society. With this purpose, a wide range of community 
representatives is placed to the task forces and boards of governance institutions. 
Additionally, most of the local governments have created advisory councils and bodies to 
exchange ideas with civil society institutions. The practice of direct participation of citizens to 
public service mechanisms turned to a general norm rather than a preference of individual 
local authorities. Although in theory, the direct involvement of citizens is acknowledged as a 
priority in governance, in practice there is still no consensus on which responsibilities the 
participating citizens or civil society institutions should carry, how should they perform them 
and what is their legitimacy. The assumption is that putting a variety of people with different 
expertise and backgrounds to a board, will enable concise policies to govern the community. 
However, as Goss (2001) underlines, in reality neither the community nor the local politicians 
has a civic understanding what responsibilities these governance bodies should carry and what 
are their roles on public service delivery. Therefore, it is not clear for policy planners what 
should be learned from these citizens’ initiatives and how to incorporate in public service 
mechanism.  
The last element that I will examine is the changing role of the central authority on 
local policies. As a general trend, central authority has loosened its control on local 
development and investment policies. The central planning agencies have removed from local 
planning decisions and former central competences on financial and administrative decisions 
have been allocated to local authorities. Although the variances among national systems are 
still evident, common provisions have emerged in most of the Western countries (Newman 
and Thornley, 1996). In this context, France has liberalised the central control over local 
planning gradually, starting with decentralisation reforms in 1980s. Traditionally welfare 
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countries, such as Sweden, have decentralised the central authority on planning of welfare 
functions to local authorities (John, 2001: 45). Additionally, regional administrations have 
been created as a middle tier between centre and local and they have obtained some former 
responsibilities of the central authority on planning decisions. On the other hand, through 
contracting out and privatisation of centrally owned enterprises, states have created the milieu 
for local and regional administrations to compete for both public and private sector resources 
thus to increase the efficiency on public service delivery. With this purpose, central 
authorities of most of the industrialised countries set up programmes to be implemented at the 
local level either by the local authorities or other agencies, sign contracts directly with local 
suppliers for the provision of services and set up new autonomous agencies in order to 
perform specific tasks (Giguère, 2008:47).  
The discussion at this stage is whether the central authority still possess the 
instruments to control or retain its former power in local public policies. As briefly mentioned 
before, there are two different views in the literature. One perspective foresees an irreversible 
decrease in state power thus the central authority is losing its leverages to control local 
policies in terms of decision-making (e.g. Rhodes, 1997). The other one depicts a more 
optimistic scenario, and argues that the state is transforming itself to adapt to changes in its 
environment changes and changes are not indications of declining of the state but deliberate 
actions where the central authority still controls the means to shape local politics (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000: 92). To supplement this argument, indirect transfers and investments from 
central authority are still vital for local governments even in the cases where decentralisation 
has been implemented extensively (e.g. Spain). Moreover, the coordination problems emerged 
with intense agencification on public service delivery (see. Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 
2010) have led to a re-centralisation of allocated functions and created the conditions for the 
central authority to intervene on locally related decisions.  
 
2.2 Decentralisation  
From the governance perspective, decentralisation is not only a mean to achieve the 
governance objectives but also an intrinsic characteristic of the governance system. The 
reason lies on the ontology of the concept which includes both procedural and systematic 
features. Nevertheless, decentralisation is conceptually not limited to governance per se but 
the theoretical premises are dispersed in different scientific fields such as political science, 
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public administration, economics and development studies. The evolution of the concept is 
intermingled among these fields, thus capturing the concept of decentralisation requires a 
comprehensive approach. Depending on the focus of the study, aims of decentralisation can 
involve increased economic efficiency and effectiveness in service provisions; increased 
democratic voice to citizens and local accountability; increased economic growth and equity 
in public services; empowerment of civil society; a remedy for ethnic based secessionist 
movements or development goals such as achieving good governance principles and poverty 
reduction. However, these anticipated outcomes of decentralisation have been contested by 
various empirical studies in both developing and developed countries. The findings of these 
studies highlighted the importance to evaluate decentralisation policies within the social and 
institutional context of the country cases rather than adopting it as one fit for all.  
In this section, first, the definition and cognitive meanings of decentralisation will be 
elucidated. Second, the theoretical premises and the conceptual evolution of decentralisation 
will be revealed. In addition, various typologies of the concept and motivations of 
governments for decentralisation practices as well as controversies in the literature will be 
elaborated. Last, decentralisation will be evaluated within the governance framework and 
propositions concerning with local governance will be subtracted.  
 
2.2.1 What is decentralisation? 
Defining decentralisation is not an easy task for scholars. In the public management 
literature the term is used, most commonly to refer to the allocation of central power and 
authority on political, administrative and fiscal issues to sub-state and non-state actors. 
However, the applications of decentralisation are neither limited to the public management 
nor homogenously spread among scientific fields. Thus, as Macmahon stated (1961, p.15), ‘It 
is impossible to standardise the usage of the word by seeking to give it meanings that would 
be acceptable universally... It is a word that is not confined to public affairs and to formal 
organisation in government or business... It must be accepted as a word of innumerable 
applications. Throughout all of them, however, runs a common idea, which is inherent in the 
word’s Latin roots, meaning away from the centre’. Unfortunately, even this considerably 
thick definition has its shortcomings on defining the concept. This is mainly due to the fact 
that this definition intrinsically includes only the dynamic elements. However, 
decentralisation can refer to the dispersion of power and authority within a closed system thus 
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giving the characteristic of the system. Therefore, a ‘decentralised system’ depicts an 
organised set of relations which function either with limited dependency to an acknowledged 
centre or without an organised centre. For instance, a market economy is a good example of a 
functioning decentralised system. So the definition of decentralisation is bound to the context 
in which it is applied. In this research, the local governance implies the governing action of 
local government. This perspective essentially sets forward that the local government would 
be the focal point. Therefore, decentralisation will be treated from a systematic point of view, 
whereas it implies the share of local government on governing actions comparing to central 
authority.  
 
2.2.2 Conceptual features of decentralisation 
Decentralisation is described in the public management literature commonly as an 
ambiguous and multifaceted concept. (Fesler, 1965; Mintzberg, 1979:181; Prudhomme, 1994: 
2; Cohen & Peterson, 1999: 23; Oxhorn et al., 2004:4, Dubois & Fattore 2009). The 
ambiguity with decentralisation is partly due to its treatment as a sub-concept under broader 
discussions rather than being the subject of a deep analysis on its own (Prudhomme, 1994; 
Hales, 1999). Therefore in numerous typologies of decentralisation, same concepts often 
correspond to different meanings. Oxhorn et al.(2004:4) add two more explanations why 
decentralisation is an ambiguous concept; first, decentralisation processes usually have 
contradictory outcomes and, second, theoretical contradictions among different schools of 
thought impede the development of persuasive theories.  
Furthermore, it is a multi-faceted concept (Oxhorn et al., 2004; Dubois & Fattore 
2009).  Dubois & Fattore (2009) shed light on this phenomenon by pointing out its impact for 
a potential misanalysis: 
“Decentralisation along one dimension could be related to one set of causes and 
effects, and decentralisation along another dimension could relate to a different or 
opposite set of antecedents and outcomes. Researchers who do not explicitly look at 
each dimension or haphazardly aggregate dimensions will mismeasure the type and 
degree of decentralisation.” (Dubois & Fattore, 2009:706; Schneider, 2003) 
One rationale behind this argument is that decentralisation has a lot of references in 
various fields such as economics, organisational science, political science or development 
studies, and drawing a demarcation line between scientific fields is practically impossible due 
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to level of interfusion. Therefore, acknowledging the overlapping definitions and the need for 
a comprehensive approach is much more important than providing precise definitions 
(Sharma, 2006).  
Another one is that different studies have the tendency to address certain aspects of 
decentralisation while trying to achieve general conclusions on it. For instance, the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on economic growth has been a popular theme among economists. 
However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies have managed to avoid contradictory 
outcomes that would indicate whether decentralisation is good or bad. One reason of this 
contradiction is that while some studies included only one aspect of fiscal decentralisation 
such as revenue decentralisation, other studies included expenditure decentralisation as well. 
Similar examples can be traced regarding to other aspects of decentralisation as well. 
 
2.2.3 Typologies of Decentralisation 
The conceptual evolution of decentralisation inevitably had an impact on the 
typologies of decentralisation as well. Consequently, the typologies on decentralisation have 
flourished (see Dubois & Fattore, 2009). The table presented by Dubois & Fattore (2009) 
gives a useful overview of decentralisation typologies in the literature. 
  
Table 2.1 Decentralisation Typologies 
Typology Reference 
Economic (industrial, regional economic planning), 
Administrative (administrative/ Internal, 
administrative/Spatial, 
administrative/Functional), Political 
(legislative, corporate, millennial) 
 
Administrative, Political 
 
Vertical vs. Horizontal, Selective vs. Parallel 
Furniss (1974) 
 
 
 
 
 
Porter & Olsen (1976) 
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Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution, 
Privatisation 
 
Inter-governmental/Political, Management 
Fiscal, Political, Administrative 
 
Functional, Territorial 
 
Political, Spatial, Market, Administrative 
 
Decentralisation by default, Privatisation, 
Deconcentration, Fiscal decentralisation, 
Devolution 
 
Structural, Decision, Resource, Electoral, 
Institutional [Treisman (2002): vertical, 
decision-making, appointment, electoral, 
fiscal, personnel] 
 
Political decentralisation, Administrative 
decentralisation, Administrative 
deconcentration 
 
Fiscal, Institutional (local and 
intergovernmental), Political 
Mintzberg (1980) 
 
Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema 
(1983) 
 
Devas (1997) 
Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird (1998) 
 
Bray (1999) 
 
Cohen & Peterson (1999) 
 
Manor (1999) 
 
 
 
Treisman (2000) 
 
 
 
 
Benz (2002) 
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Source: Dubois & Fattore, 2009 
 
As previously mentioned, same terms under different typologies usually correspond to 
different meanings in accordance with the focus of the study. For example, while political 
decentralisation refers to the legal transfer of power to autonomous bodies in one study (see 
Benz, 2002), in other, it signifies democratic preferences (see Smoke, 2003). 
Acknowledging this variety, three most common types of decentralisation, i.e. 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, will be examined accordingly. The terms 
will be elaborated largely in accordance with the definitions suggested by the World Bank2.  
 a. Administrative decentralisation: 
The World Bank defines the administrative decentralisation as ‘the transfer of 
responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from 
the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate 
units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-
wide, regional or functional authorities.’ Administrative decentralisation contains 
                                                            
2 The World Bank distinguishes four different types of decentralisation, namely political, fiscal, administrative, 
and market decentralisation. It defines market decentralisation as a transfer of power or responsibilities to private 
companies. However, this type of decentralisation is considered a kind of delegation in most of the studies. In 
this study, the functions of market decentralisation are incorporated into delegation as well. 
 
Big push vs. small steps, Bottom up vs. 
top down, Uniform vs. asymmetric 
 
Administrative, Fiscal, Political 
 
Political/Administrative, Internal/External, 
Non-competitive/Competitive, Basis of 
division (territory/function/process/target 
group) 
Smoke (2003) 
 
 
Shah & Thompson (2004) 
 
 
Falleti (2005) 
 
Pollitt (2005) 
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redistribution of authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services 
among different levels of government.  
Three major forms of administrative decentralisation have been acknowledged by the 
literature; deconcentration, delegation, and devolution.  
Deconcentration is often considered as the weakest form of decentralisation and it 
refers to the distribution of decision making authority and financial and management 
responsibilities to lower tiers of central government. This type of decentralisation is used most 
frequently in unitary states. 
Delegation occurs when central governments transfer responsibility for decision-
making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly 
controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments can 
delegate responsibilities to public enterprises or private corporations on special service 
provisions such as housing services, education services, regional development, transportation 
or for special project implementation. Usually these organisations have a great deal of 
discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service 
personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services (World Bank, 2011). 
Devolution is considered as the most extensive form of administrative 
decentralisation. Some scholars even consider devolution as part of political decentralisation. 
The act of devolution contains the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and 
management to quasi-autonomous units of local government. Devolution usually transfers 
responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise 
their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. According 
to the World Bank, in a devolved system, local governments have clear and legally recognised 
geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform 
public functions. 
b. Political Decentralisation 
Political decentralisation corresponds giving more power to citizens or to their elected 
representatives in public decision-making. Commonly, political decentralisation is associated 
with federalism and includes ‘organisations and procedures for increasing citizen participation 
in selecting political representatives and in making public policy; changes in the structure of 
the government through devolution of powers and authority to local units of government; 
power-sharing institutions within the state through federalism, constitutional federations, or 
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autonomous regions; and institutions and procedures allowing freedom of association and 
participation of civil society organisations in public decision-making, providing socially 
beneficial services, and mobilising social and financial resources to influence political 
decision-making’ (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). 
c. Fiscal decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation is the division of public expenditure and revenue between 
levels of government, and comprises the financial aspects of devolution to regional and local 
governments (Davey, 2000). Financial management, budgeting accounting, delegation, 
procurement, auditing, or other similar processes through which local governments manage 
their financial affairs is not part of the fiscal decentralisation policies (Davey, 2000). 
The World Bank explains the forms of fiscal decentralisation as the following; 
a) Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges; 
b) Co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in 
providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions; 
c) Expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes, or indirect charges;  
d) Intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central 
government to local governments for general or specific uses;  
e) Authorisation of municipal borrowing and the mobilisation of either national or local 
government resources through loan guarantees. 
Davey (2000) describes two interrelated issues in the context of fiscal decentralisation. 
The first is the division of spending responsibilities and revenue sources between levels of 
government. The second is the level of discretion in regional and local governments to 
determine their expenditures and revenues. Both aspects combined define the determinants for 
the local and regional governments to measure the actual degree of decentralisation. Davey 
(2000) formulates four determinants to measure the amount of power and responsibility that 
regional and local governments exercise;   
(1) What range of public services they finance; 
(2) Whether their revenues are commensurate with these responsibilities; 
(3) How much real choice they have in allocating their budget to individual services; 
(4) Whether they can determine the rates of their taxes and charges. 
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On the other hand, a form of fiscal decentralisation, fiscal federalism refers to the 
assignment of tax and expenditure authority to the lowest level of government possible. In 
fiscal federalism, the local government act autonomously in taxation and expenditure 
activities. The advocates of fiscal federalism argue that it creates the discipline and market 
features to ensure productive efficiency. The critics of this theory points to the fact that this 
theory disregards the transfers from central authority which can be detrimental for local 
governments (see Prud’homme, 1995).  Prud’homme (1995) highlights dangers of this sort of 
arrangements arguing that  (a) redistribution cannot be undertaken at the local level because 
of high level of competition on capital; (b) economic stability can be impaired since the 
central government has lost power over fiscal policy; (c) it would be inappropriate for 
developing countries where access to basic needs are in question; (d) corruption is more likely 
to rise with greater decentralisation. 
 
2.2.4 Theoretical premises and motivations for decentralisation 
The literature on decentralisation has been expanding parallel to its conceptual 
evaluation. Cheema & Rondinelli (2007) describes three phases on this evolution.  
The first phase, in the 1970s and 1980s, was about thinking decentralisation as a form 
of deconcentrating hierarchical government structures and bureaucracy. After more than two 
decades of centralised practices following World War II, governments in both developed and 
less developed countries, realised the limits of central economic planning and management 
governments. Governments started to decentralise their hierarchical structures, and shifted 
part of their competences to local authorities in order to make public service delivery more 
effective. Furthermore, in the early 1980’s, the promotion of administrative decentralisation 
had become part of the development strategies of aid agencies in developing countries (Cohen 
& Peterson, 1999: 11). Especially, the inability of central governments in Africa to provide 
public services to local areas (see Kiggundu, 1989) and the fall of authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America fostered the need for decentralisation. In this period, decentralisation was seen 
as a way to improve organisational performance in government as part of the organisation 
(see Mintzberg, 1979) and development theories.  
The second phase took place in the mid-1980s and included new paradigms such as 
political power sharing and market liberalisation. In this period, decentralisation was 
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contextualised predominantly within the neo-liberalist discourse. Privatisation and market 
liberalisation were embraced by the decentralisation literature. 
During the third phase in 1990’s, decentralisation was seen as a way of governance to 
wider public participation. Two important discursive developments in governance, i.e. the 
“New Public Management” movement in the western countries and promotion of ‘democratic 
governance’ by international organisations, reshaped the role of decentralisation. The NPM 
movement defined an efficient government as ‘innovative, market oriented, decentralised and 
customer oriented’ (Osborn & Gaebler, 1992), and advocated that the efficiency in public 
services can only be achieved through the participation of citizens and through the teamwork 
among the government agencies in a decentralised governance structure. According to NPM, 
decentralisation results in better governance, facilitates the development of more effective and 
efficient public sector management, increases popular participation in government, allows for 
better mobilisation and use of resources, and encourages market-like responsiveness to the 
provision and consumption of public services (Hope Sr & Chikulo, 2000). Furthermore, 
‘democratic governance’ has been embedded by the international institutions into the 
decentralisation objectives. This policy has been materialised foremost with the promotion of 
‘subsidiarity principle’ by the EU and ‘good governance’ objective by international donor 
organisations such IMF, World Bank and UNDP. In short, decentralisation has been 
incorporated into democratisation literature as an essential concept.  
Nowadays decentralisation in public management is situated in the discussions of 
enhancing democratic voice and economic efficiency on public services. Although most of the 
theoretical propositions estimate the positive effect of decentralisation on both notions, 
empirical studies reached contradictory results on backing the theoretical premises. 
In regards to theoretical arguments on economic aspects, one of the earliest theoretical 
explanations was presented by Tiebout with ‘public choice theory’. Tiebout (1956) argued 
that decentralisation would contribute to the economic efficiency on public services by 
enhancing the competition among local administrations on citizens. In the so called ‘public 
choice theory’, residents of localities are depicted as ‘shopping’ customers between different 
municipalities with the flexibility to choose the one with optimal mixture of taxes and public 
services. This creates a competition among municipalities to provide the best services with 
most reasonable amount, thus ensuring the municipalities are not wasting local resources nor 
overproducing public goods. The most common criticism to public choice theory is that in 
practice, citizens are not as mobile as the theory predicts and they are not necessarily 
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motivated with rational choices, but are bound to their social and local identities. Further 
theories driven from public choice theory anticipate that in the decentralised or federal 
systems where the competition is high, local administrations would have abilities to adopt 
innovative and regenerative systems, thus decentralisation would contribute to the economic 
growth (Feld, Zimmerman & Döring, 2003). Musgrave (1959), on the other hand, pointed to 
the fact that since local administrations have better information on the needs and demand of 
localities, decentralisation will enable increased efficiency on public services.  
Nevertheless, empirical studies based on these theoretical assumptions have not 
succeeded to provide satisfactory evidences to verify the arguments. Especially, the impact of 
decentralisation on economic growth still remains as a contested argument. The empirical 
studies are clustered in two different camps in terms of their findings on individual and 
comparative cases. The first group (see. Akai & Sakata, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Stansel, 2005; 
Iimi, 2005) verified that decentralisation has statistically a significant positive impact on 
economic growth.  The second group (see. Woller & Phillips, 1998; Davoodi & Zou, 1998; 
Zhang & Zou, 1998; Xie, Zou & Davoodi 1999; Jin & Zou 2005) determined that the impact 
on economic growth is either statistically insignificant or negative under some certain 
conditions. The main explanation on contradictory outcomes usually relies on different 
theoretical approaches and methodological choices.   
In contrast, the democracy argument relies on different propositions. Since 
Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, decentralisation has often been associated with pluralistic 
politics and representative government, but it could also support democratisation by giving 
citizens, or their representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of 
policies (World Bank, 2011). The former appraises decentralisation within the traditional 
forms of democracy and advocates that political autonomy through popular elections is 
enhanced with decentralisation (see Rudebeck et al. 1998; Whitehead 2002; Harris et al. 
2004), whereas the latter assesses decentralisation in conjunction with deliberative democracy 
and direct representation. The deliberative democracy theory (see Bessett, 1980; 1994) states 
that consultative processes through discussions among various stakeholders are essential to 
enhance democracy, whereby finding solutions to common problems would be possible with 
limited resources and constraints (Chambers, 2003). For this purpose, local governments 
should be free from the ties of bureaucracy; thus they can be more flexible in consultation and 
negotiation within locally specific conditions. So, the devised policies will be much 
responsible to the local needs which are essential for democracy (Dahl, 1971). The 
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expectation is that this sort of engagement between local citizens and the government will 
address better to diverse interests in society than those made only by national political 
authorities. However, these theoretical arguments are contested as well, especially with the 
empirical studies conducted in developing countries in Asia and Africa. For instance, Oxhorn 
et al. (2004) argue that decentralisation itself does not improve democratic governance, but 
rather, democratic effects are shaped by (1) motivations of decentralisation, (2) historical 
patterns of state-society relations, and (3) institutional arrangements. Moreover, another 
counter argument points to the danger of capture of local government by local elites thus 
impairing local democracy (see Shah & Thomson, 2004; Pal& Roy, 2010). Especially, in the 
cases where civic participation in local government is low and large inequalities in land 
ownership exist, interest groups and local elites may capture local governments and direct 
resources towards their own priorities rather than towards improving the provision of local 
public goods and poverty alleviation (Shah & Thomson, 2004).  
Nevertheless, the motivation of decentralisation is not only limited with democratic 
and economic expectations. Shah & Thompson (2004) claim that short-term political 
considerations have been more decisive on initiating decentralisation reforms rather than 
long-term structural benefits. As widely observed in Central and Eastern European countries, 
aspirations for the EU membership were substantial to implement wide-range of 
decentralisation reforms. Also, in some other developing countries, political and fiscal crises 
(e.g. Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) or political calculations to sideline oppositions (e.g. 
Poland, Peru, and Pakistan) were substantial reasons for decentralisation. In relation to 
political motivation of decentralisation, Eaton (2001) gives the following examples: 
“ i. Decentralisation might be a voluntary choice of politicians—it can increase 
political stability and economic growth in a way that compensates politicians for any 
loss of power they may experience in the short run (see also Manor, 1999). 
ii. Decentralisation may result from political pressures exerted by sub-national 
politicians. If sub-national politicians can influence the political careers of their 
representatives in the national assembly, these legislators may be coerced into 
supporting decentralisation (according to Willis et al, 1999). In Brazil, the return to 
democracy in the 1980s set the stage for fiscal decentralisation when governors 
regained political influence. 
iii. Decentralisation may reflect short-term gains for politicians, since politicians 
usually discount future gains heavily. When government is divided, the party in control 
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of the legislature may promote decentralisation as a way to constrain the executive 
branch. Experiences of Argentina and the Philippines suggest that political struggles 
over the control of revenues and expenditures may have less to do with substantive 
debates over development strategy than with short-term and highly dynamic political 
calculations.” 
Another motivation for decentralisation is the external influences through 
globalisation and information revolution (Shah & Thompson, 2004). The globalisation 
perspective relies on that nation states are ‘too small to tackle large things in life and too large 
to address small things’. Besides, international organisations such WTO, UNDP and other 
specialised institutions in global governance are taking profound roles in regulating 
information technologies, international financial transactions and macroeconomic 
management. Additionally, the EU’s policies and principles on subsidiarity, fiscal 
harmonisation and structural funds have a direct impact not only on candidate countries but 
also on developing and transition economies. 
 
2.2.5 When decentralisation leads to better local governance?  
As it is evident on the evolution of the concept, decentralisation has become a 
substantial term in governance literature. Decentralisation has not only been promoted as the 
way to reach governance objectives but also an ideal state within governance framework is 
described as a decentralised state (see Osborn & Gaebler, 1992). This state between 
decentralisation and governance can best be described as a symbiotic relationship. In other 
words, public governance today cannot be implemented without decentralising central 
functions to local and regional bodies as well as to non-state actors whereas almost in each 
political setup decentralisation is associated with governance objectives.  
Therefore, it is no surprise; decentralisation reforms have been implemented in various 
countries with the aim to develop governance. In this regard, practices and reforms in 
developing countries have been salient on empirical studies to reveal the relation between 
governance and decentralisation (see Crook & Manor, 1998; Turner, 1999; Grindle, 2000; 
Campbell, 2003; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Oxhorn et all, 2004; Saito et all, 2005). For 
instance, on their comparative study among seven Sub-Saharan countries Olowu & Wunsch 
(2004) observe that in order for decentralisation reforms to be successful they need to be 
supported by (1) effective local authority and autonomy, (2) sufficient resources for localities, 
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(3) effective institutions of collective action, and (4) open and accountable local political 
processes. However, Saito (2005:10) underlines that in most cases these factors are 
conflicting with each other and they are not necessarily complementary as a change in one 
does not directly lead a change in other. The findings of Saito et al. (2005) on a comparative 
study among Asian and African developing countries provide that decentralisation per se does 
not lead to improved governance. Rather, it relies on country specific social and institutional 
arrangements. For instance, in the case of Uganda, decentralisation is salient in order to 
redefine the roles and responsibilities of diverse stakeholders through which better 
governance might be achieved (Saito, 2001). In the cases of Sri Lanka and Ghana, capacity 
enhancement in both central and local governments are recommended rather than 
decentralising tasks to local governments (Saito, 2005:VII). Their advice is that 
decentralisation is not a technical tool to achieve better governance but decentralisation 
reforms are deeply entangled in the political landscape of countries.  
Nevertheless, different theoretical and empirical studies have proposed various 
hypotheses and propositions to explain the relationship between decentralisation and 
governance. In the subsequent part, different propositions concerning the subject will be 
arrayed in an analogical order.   
To start with, Kodras (1997) evaluates devolution and the corresponding pros and cons 
arguments of governance. Kodras underlines that devolution to local governments is 
instrumental to make public services more flexible as it brings it closer to the people. 
However, devolution can also create inequalities in service provision due to geographic 
differences in expertise, material and financial resources, infrastructures and political will. 
Moreover, local governments usually do not have the capacity to provide services that a 
higher level of government does. In addition, local governments are less capable to compete 
in international market, whereas national governments can provide uniform standards and 
regulations and fiscal redistribution for inequalities created by competition. In the case of 
fiscal federalism argument, Kodras points out that although efficiency on public services can 
be achieved to a certain extent, the competition with the state on tax incentives, free lands, 
cheap labour and infrastructure investments will lead to a zero-sum game and eventually it 
will cost more to local governments than yielded by the investment. 
Stohr (2001) states the need for new systems at the local level that are more 
decentralised and make use of civil society and private sector. In his study, Stohr deals 
predominantly with deconcentration and devolution and compares their strengths and 
 49 
 
weaknesses. He suggests that deconcentration can exercise better resource allocation than 
devolution considering that the former maintains a higher degree of centralised control over 
decision-making through line ministries. Devolution by contrast tends to lead to higher 
innovation in the creation of public-private partnerships and alternative financing strategies. 
Nonetheless, the issue of coordination appears as a salient factor on the comparison. Stohr 
underlines that the coordination between levels of government departments and ministries 
may break down in the case of devolution. Saito (2005) highlights the problem of 
coordination by comparing the former hierarchical structures with the new governance 
structures. In the former, the state, being the legally superior entity,  exercises command and 
control on local and regional bodies. Since decentralisation reforms often repeal these control 
mechanisms, new forms of coordination practices emerge through more consultative 
approaches.  
Furthermore, Stohr et al. (2001) emphasise that decentralisation should be adapted to 
the specific needs of each context, and they call for caution on that decentralisation cannot 
solve the problems of participation, poverty and inequality without considering the national 
context first. In fact, in several national contexts with multi-ethnic populations engaged in 
power struggles, decentralisation may lead to fragmentation and breakdown of the national 
polity and civil society. In this regard, Sorens (2009) opposes the idea that political 
decentralisation to the ethnically different regions will reduce the secessionist tendencies as in 
the examples of Scotland, Belgium and Catalonia. Sorens (2009) argues that the motivations 
of governments in these examples are based solely on political calculations whereby 
decentralisation is perceived as a political insurance for the winner-take-all electoral systems. 
In fact, Sorens claims that monopolisation of regional politics by a secessionist or other 
regional party would reduce the prospect of decentralisation, since the government parties will 
not have the incentive to implement further decentralisation with the prospect of increased 
political power at the regional level.  
In sum, Stohr et al. call for a formula between decentralised and centralised authority, 
which can serve better to fight against social inequalities rather than higher decentralisation. 
In the right balance, central authority can ensure redistribution of resources thus preventing 
pre-existing inequalities emerging from local power relations. Regarding to the development 
of an active civil society, four types of barriers (i.e. psychological, economic, social and 
technical barriers) are described which can impede the impact of decentralisation. Stohr 
explains that overcoming these impacts requires time as well as institutional adjustments and 
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support of national and supranational agencies to empower the sense of solidarity and 
common purpose in localities.  
Pierre & Peters (2000) position decentralisation as a policy style within the 
governance context. According to them, state can ‘decentre-down’ its functions to lower tiers 
of government or ‘decentre-out’ to agencies and similar institutions in an ‘arm-length’. Pierre 
& Peters (2000: 204) assert that ‘decentring-down’ is a strategy for the state to empower the 
capacity of sub-national governments on resource mobilisation to provide public services. 
Yet, this strategy entails a trade-off for the central authority between coordination of public 
services and increased capacities in sub-national governments. Advantages of ‘decentring-
down’ is first, it is useful for central government to share the responsibility on socially 
defined problems thus to decrease the tension towards the state. Additionally, it enhances 
citizen participation as well. Nevertheless, there is one caveat that increased engagement of 
citizens and more independent sub-national governments can challenge the traditional modes 
of governance. Therefore, governments need to adopt new policy actions and capabilities in 
order to be able to respond to policy challenges in the aftermaths.  
 The other policy style - decentring out- encompasses the dimension of efficiency 
regarding decentralisation. Through decentring out the public services to private and semi-
private institutions the competition raises and as a consequence efficiency in service 
provisions can be achieved. Yet, the caveat here is that marketisation of public services can 
foster social inequalities and impede the role of citizenry in a democratic system. Especially 
in systems with strong legalistic tradition, decentring out can cultivate dissatisfaction among 
citizens.  
Bussell (2010) highlights four hypotheses in the literature when and where 
decentralisation might produce improved governance: 
a) “electoral” hypothesis: an increase in competitive elections at the local level should 
encourage incumbents to perform better. 
b) “political entrepreneur” hypothesis: the nature of good governance will depend on 
the motivations of mayors and other officials, as “they have the greatest opportunities 
to set public agendas and use public resources to achieve their objectives” 
c) “public sector modernisation” hypothesis: municipal governance could depend on 
the degree of “public sector modernisation,” in the form of new techniques for 
improving the capacity and efficiency of local administration. 
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d) “civil society” hypothesis: good governance depends on the ability of citizens to 
organise and vocalise their demands, an activity that should become more feasible in a 
decentralised setting. 
However, Warner’s study on rural governance in USA (2003) challenges the 
arguments on competition. He asserts that the core idea of ensuring effectiveness in 
government services and responsiveness to citizen voice through competition has altered in 
time because of the inadequacy of local and rural governments in terms of administrative and 
financial capacity. Many rural governments lacking an adequate revenue base or sufficient 
professional management capacity failed to achieve successful governance practices. Even 
though the market practices could be a reliable way to increase the efficiency on government 
services, they fail to achieve equality on service provision because of uneven markets. In 
conclusion, Warren suggests that cooperation with other levels of governments and with 
private and civil society actors can bring efficiency and equity in comparison to competitive 
markets (see also Warner & Hefetz, 2003). In contrast to cooperation argument, Boyne (1996) 
argues that decentralisation is expected to bring competition to local level. Boyne makes a 
distinction between traditional and new competition. According to him, the traditional 
competition corresponds to the interparty competition which is often ineffective at the local 
level. The new competition refers to the competition between a council and other 
organisations for service production and encompasses both geographical and tier-level 
competition.  Boyne underlines three elements which shape the new competition: (1) 
structures of organisations (i.e. consolidated vs. fragmented), (2) autonomy in setting policies 
and (3) finance. Boyne claims that the higher the level of central funding, the lower the 
incentive for fiscal movement between areas. However, Boyne acknowledges that in order to 
realise ‘horizontal equity’, some central funding is necessary to remove income discrepancies 
in different areas.  
Finally, studies on developing countries provide empirical evidences on various 
institutional and organisational shortcomings can lead to inefficiencies in recently 
decentralised systems.  In their study on health service delivery in Uganda, Nannyonjo & 
Okot (2012) account for several conditions where in the absence of certain capacities, 
decentralisation fails to lead improved governance. In sum, these conditions can be 
summarised as following; (1) decentralisation may increase local monitoring and in return 
reduce corruption as long as communities possess a certain level of social capital and local 
awareness of corrupt government practices; (2) absence of oversight mechanisms and local 
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elite capture of resources for public services can pose challenge for effective decentralisation; 
(3) social capital is also important for local government to collect user’s fees and taxes; (4) in 
case where local communities lack the means of information on local governance services, 
decentralisation can lead to lowering the quality of public services; (5) even in the case where 
there is a certain level of capacity on receiving information, residents may not be in a position 
to hold local leaders accountable or the central government may be too weak to monitor local 
leaders; (6) coordination problems among different public bodies and tiers of governments 
might impede a direct accountability between citizens and the administration responsible on 
individual public services; (7) decentralisation might fail to achieve efficient service delivery 
because of poor design (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004); (8) the  most important factor of failure 
in decentralisation policies is the lack of institutional capacity and skills in local politicians 
and bureaucrats especially to levy taxes, to administer resources and operate certain public 
services which require a certain level of technical adequacy; (9) decentralisation failures 
might be a result of the lack of human capital that ensures taxes are diligently collected and 
channelled into social services; (10) decentralisation failures can take place due to challenges 
on recruiting, motivating and retaining the staff, lack of resources because of programme 
failures, reduced independence and complexity in central-local relations (11) the level of 
decentralisation might be an impediment on the success of decentralisation as in the cases of 
grants allocated by the central government to local governments. If the block grants are 
conditioned on too many restrictions, the local leaders might claim that they have no authority 
over public spending. Yet, the grants without any restrictions might lead to local elite capture; 
(12) while the ability of localities to raise revenues independently from central government 
might increase electoral accountability, it can easily lead to regional imbalances and internal 
migration towards richer regions resulting in social imbalances.  
Similarly, Sharma (2014) summarizes eight essential preconditions mentioned in the 
literature that must be ensured while implementing decentralization to avert any potential 
dangers. These are; 
• Social Preparedness and Mechanisms to Prevent Elite Capture 
• Strong Administrative and Technical Capacity at the Higher Levels 
• Strong Political Commitment at the Higher Levels 
• Sustained Initiatives for Capacity-Building at the Local Level 
• Strong Legal Framework for Transparency and Accountability 
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• Transformation of Local Government Organizations into High Performing 
Organizations 
• Appropriate Reasons to Decentralize: Intentions Matter 
• Effective Judicial System, Citizens’ Oversight and Anticorruption Bodies to prevent 
Decentralization of Corruption 
With all the empirical findings and various theoretical assumptions on decentralisation 
in governance framework discussed above, it is clear that empirical studies fall short to verify 
all prospects about decentralisation. Nevertheless, the following assumptions can be posited 
on the relationship between decentralisation and local governance: 
1) Theories suggesting that decentralisation leads to better governance anticipate a co-
dependent relationship between citizens and local governments, where the local government 
relies on local sources and has the discretion to act on it. Residents involve in governance 
process as shareholders via proxy organisations thus enhancing the accountability, efficiency 
and effectiveness in public services. This way, the source of legitimacy is created by the 
mutual interaction between citizens and local government.     
2) Arguments suggesting that higher decentralisation indicates always better 
governance are far too optimistic. A more reasonable argument would suggest that both 
centralisation and decentralisation have their aptitudes for better governance. From the state 
perspective, decentralisation and centralisation can be a trade-off where the former can enable 
more flexibility and efficiency on government services whereas the latter is important to 
ensure social equality and coordination among institutions.  
3) Decentralisation serves for better engagement in governance by bringing the 
government services closer to citizens, and promoting grass-root democracy in localities. 
However, in the cases of a local elite capture or a lack of civil awareness to supervise 
government actions, decentralisation can adversely affect the local governance. In this regard, 
a certain level of social capital is imperative to ensure the monitoring of local government’s 
action and tax revenues.  
4) Decentralisation can foster competition in public services horizontally and 
vertically, which is important for the quality of governance. Yet, it also entails the danger of 
losing coordination and creating social inequality. Most studies suggest that existence of the 
central authority is important for the insurance of equal service provisions. However, 
increased influence of central authority can impede the development of abilities in local 
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governments for better governance. Therefore, better governance would most likely rely on a 
‘pareto optimum’ between the central and local governments in terms of responsibilities and 
competences.  
5) However, the level of this ‘pareto optimum’ is dependent on some underlying 
conditions.  These underlying conditions refer to capacities of the governing institutions, 
socio-economic and socio- cultural conditions as well as the regulatory framework. Especially 
the existence of certain capacities in the governing institutions is deemed essential for the 
success of decentralisation policies. Among others, a sufficient human capital, means of 
collecting information, financial capacity, institutional capacity to ensure proper policy design 
and implementation have been suggested imperative to reap the benefits of decentralisation. 
Additionally, findings assert that the socio-cultural conditions and social cleavages arising 
from ethnic and minority related problems are also influential on adjusting the share of 
responsibilities between central and local authorities.  
In sum, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the determinants on the 
success of decentralisation policies in local governance. For this reason, decentralisation can 
lead to unexpected outcomes, but in the meantime it has the potential to bring increased 
efficiency, solidarity and effectiveness in government services. Under these conditions, it is 
most important for the governments to be aware of contextual conditions and to be capable to 
deal with what decentralisation can bring. Yet, the questions still remain that how should the 
policy makers decide on the degree of decentralisation to ensure the best outcome in local 
governance and which conditions are the main determinants on this outcome.  
 
2.3 Capacity  
In this section, the third core concept of this study, capacity, will be elaborated. The 
design of this chapter starts with the definition of capacity, wherein different approaches on 
defining the capacity will be presented. After this, the conceptual features of capacity will be 
elaborated. Here the emphasis will be on highlighting the aspects that are necessary to 
conceptualise capacity. Especially, the differences between capacity, capability and 
performance will be scrutinised. The part on conceptual features of capacity will be concluded 
with the underlying aspects of capacity assessment.  In the following part, the typologies of 
capacity in the literature will be discussed. The last part of the section will focus on defining 
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the capabilities which are associated with better local governance, and will summarise the list 
of capabilities deemed necessary for better local governance.  
 
2.3.1 What is capacity? 
Capacity is one of the most elusive concepts in the literature of public management. It 
is described as a process and an outcome (Sowa et al, 2004); as the ends and the means to the 
ends (Honadle, 1981); as dynamic and multidimensional (see Ingraham et al, 2003); it is 
given both tangible and intangible, or quantitative and qualitative dimensions (Kaplan, 2000; 
Christensen & Gazley, 2008). Different actors (e.g. academics, practitioners, analysts...etc.) 
can attribute different meanings to the concept of capacity or the scope of research can vary 
depending on macro- or micro- visions on the concept (Morgan, 2006). These multiple 
qualities of capacity complicate the task of defining the concept, and thus various definitions 
exist in the literature. However, in almost each definition, capacity is associated with an 
ability to perform. 
Although this definition is simple enough to avoid possible conceptual pitfalls related 
to capacity, it is too abstract to be operationalised. In fact, this is a problem with the nature of 
capacity itself. Capacity is in essence an ethereal concept. All efforts to define this essence are 
bound to the material limits of conceptualisation. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge 
that most of the definitions on capacity are subjective and that they are shaped by the 
perspective, professional background and objectives of the researcher.  
After clarifying this essential point, Morgan (2006) lists five different approaches with 
regards to the concept of capacity. The first approach, which was especially preferred by 
practitioners, is about perceiving capacity as a human resource which has something to do 
with skill, development and training at the individual level. The second one, which is 
generally preferred nowadays by practitioners and analysts, acknowledges that capacity goes 
beyond the conventional training and technical aspects into the realm of problem solving 
abilities and producing results. In other words, capacity is ‘the means’ to improve results and 
performance. The third approach, which is often shared by academics and researchers, 
describes capacity as a buzzword encompassing everything, thus an impractical concept. This 
perspective advocates for an improvement of existing approaches in public sector reform, 
institutional development, NGO management and good governance, instead of, seeking the 
Holy Grail for performance improvement, so to speak. They are usually sceptic on the 
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function of capacity interventions in terms of performance development. The fourth approach, 
largely advocated by governments and international agencies, highlights the symbolic 
importance of the term which can incorporate a wide range of issues, such as ‘ownership, 
commitment, innovation, partnership, learning, institutional development, decentralisation, 
public sector reform, knowledge management, change, scaling up, sustainability, 
participation, training accountability, performance improvement and so forth’. The idea in this 
perspective is that capacity is a flexible concept which can cover everything from micro to 
macro level. Therefore, any action can be implemented within the pretext of improving 
capacity. The last approach, according to Morgan, is a newly emerging way of thinking about 
capacity which is sort of a reaction to the former perspective. The argument here is that the 
former perspective (the fourth approach) fails to operationalise capacity in a practical manner. 
As a response, the last perspective advocates seeking some central ideas for capacity which 
can guide the action. This aspiration is placing the questions of ‘how and why capacity 
emerges’ next to the traditional question of ‘what types of capacities are needed’.  
Hence, the definitions on capacity vary depending on the researcher’s approach to the 
concept. For instance, when studying the impact of capacity on performance management, 
Ingraham and Kneedler (2000) prefer a precise definition for capacity as ‘government’s 
ability to marshal, develop, direct and control its financial, human, physical and information 
resources’. By contrast, other studies give broader definitions such as ‘a set of attributes that 
help or enable an organisation to fulfil its missions’ (Eisinger, 2002), or ‘the ability to carry 
out stated objectives’ (Goodman et al., 1998). Chaskin (2001) describes capacity even in a 
more comprehensive manner as ‘any quality that can promote or impede successes’.  
The term ‘governance capacity’ as the synonym of power in governing has hardly 
been studied in the literature. The most comprehensive theoretical discussions on this matter 
have been presented by Dutch and Flemish scholars under the concept of ‘bestuurskracht’ 
which can be translated as the power of governing. For instance, according to Nielsen et al. 
(2000), bestuurskracht indicates the degree in which the government is successful in solving 
the problems or in avoiding the problems to occur. Derksen et al. (1987) argue that 
bestuurskracht in local government shows the capability of carrying out the tasks legally and 
solving the local problems and needs. Maes (1985), associates bestuurskracht with the ability 
to fulfil the daily needs of the citizens, which require the appropriate means (e.g. financial and 
personnel capacities), self-sufficiency and effectiveness on service delivery and a democratic 
and transparent organisation. Lastly, Delmartino (1975) suggests that the term incorporates 
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the capability of local government in governing the locality, the ability of taking care of both 
cultural and material needs in the locality and the capability of solving the problems in the 
domain effectively. 
To sum up, capacity can have ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ definitions depending on the scope of 
the study and on the perspective of the researcher. However, in order to grasp capacity one 
additional element is required: ‘the context’, which describes expectations, statements, 
tasks...etc. In this study, capacity will be studied within the context of local governance, 
which entails all the theoretical expectations in terms of better governance. The theoretical 
propositions on better governance oblige us to consider both expectations in relation to local 
governments but also in relation to the surrounding institutional environment. Furthermore, 
‘the context’ is also affected by the country-specific conditions which delineate the tasks and 
functions expected from the local governments. In fact, capacity as a concept is like a liquid 
which takes the form of the container in which it is placed. Hence, the next part will focus on 
to define the conceptual features of capacity. 
 
2.3.2 Conceptual features of capacity 
The elusiveness of capacity impelled the researchers to identify the conceptual features 
of capacity. Overall, five different features of capacity have been underlined by various 
studies. 
First of all, capacity is not a monolithic concept; it is the collective ability of different 
components. Each component preserves an aspect of capacity which is independent on its 
own but at the same time  part of a whole. These components create jointly the capacity of the 
whole. Thus, capacity is also an outcome of the joint functioning of these components. 
Literature phrases this feature of capacity as ‘the ends and the means to the ends’. In a more 
concrete example, there is no argument that Usain Bolt has a high capacity to run fast in short 
distances, but running fast is in the meantime an outcome of the good reaction time3 and 
acceleration time4. 
Secondly, components of capacity are not necessarily tangible, quantifiable elements. 
The intangible elements such as ‘responsibility, endeavour or team spirit’ are as important as 
the skills and resources on capacity assessment. In fact, Kaplan (2000) argues that intangible 
                                                            
3		The elapsed time to start running		
4		The required time to reach full speed	
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elements are more important and higher valued components of capacity, since they determine 
the organisational functioning. 
Thirdly, usually capacity exists in a latent state. In other words, in different external 
conditions and/or with exterior interventions, capacity can reveal increased outcomes. In fact, 
this feature is the underlying rationale for capacity building practices. For instance, we know 
that with better training and new skills, the capacity of the subject can increase. However, the 
enigma is why we cannot achieve the same results with same practices in different cases. The 
answer to this question is partly related to the fourth and fifth features of capacity. 
Fourthly, despite being latent, capacity is not necessarily a static concept. It can 
increase or decrease over time. The changes in capacity can be a result of exogenous or 
endogenous factors.  In fact, this feature is related with the so-called ‘capacity development’ 
which is an important subject in the literature. The exogenous changes can be deliberate 
actions or they can occur because of the conditions in the surrounding environment. Going 
back to the runner example, Bolt had probably a good capacity to run fast even when he was a 
child, but his capacity has developed in time with growing up and having stronger muscles. 
Furthermore, his capacity has extended even more probably with good nutrition and trainings. 
So, the former refers to an endogenous change, while the latter can be an example of 
exogenous changes. In addition, Bolt grew up in Jamaica which is known for successful 
athletes and has a good tradition on running competitions. This is a good example for an 
enabling environment. 
The fifth feature is that capacity is a multidimensional concept. In a descriptive 
example, Honadle & Howitt (1986:10)  observed five different dimensions of capacity 
evidenced in a public organisation. First of all, capacity entails the ability of an organisation 
to survive, i.e. being self- sustaining.  However, since public organisations are created to serve 
to the public and to keep a certain level of quality on public services, a definition limited with 
survival is inadequate to assess the capacity of a public sector organisation. Secondly, 
capacity can refer to the power of a public organisation to achieve social goals. Thirdly, 
capacity can be defined from an institutional perspective. Thus capacity can be regarded as 
the development and maintenance of organisations. Fourthly, capacity includes a systemic 
dimension, such as the ability to convert inputs into socially desirable outputs. Lastly, 
capacity can refer to the ability of a public organisation to carry out the self-defined objectives 
(‘inner directedness’) or directed objectives from external sources (‘other directedness’). 
Honadle & Howitt (1986:13) conclude that capacity captures at a minimum all of these 
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dimensions: survival, power, institutions, systems, conforming to local expectations and 
external standards. 
In a nutshell, the researcher should pay attention to these aspects: (1) capacity 
comprises both the end also the means to the end; (2) capacity contains both tangible and 
intangible elements; (3) capacity can be in a latent state and change with external 
interventions; (4) capacity is not a static concept it can change as a result of endogenous and 
exogenous factors; (5) capacity is multidimensional. These underlying aspects of capacity are 
important to understand the nature of concept. Nonetheless, there are additional conceptual 
dimensions that need to be clarified in order to assess capacity comprehensively.  
 
2.3.3 Capacity as a black box concept 
So far, various caveats are mentioned on how to approach capacity as a concept and 
which aspects should be taken into consideration. Before moving to the theoretical 
dimensions of capacity in public governance, there is one essential element that needs to be 
mentioned as part of the conceptual discussion, and that is how to assess capacity. This 
element is important for particularly two reasons. First of all, capacity is not a standalone 
variable without an adjacent concept describing ‘capacity of what?’. In this research, this 
adjacent concept is the local governance. Secondly, we cannot observe capacity directly. We 
can only observe the outcomes of the capacity, e.g. successes, failures or achievements. 
Similarly, we cannot observe the changes in capacity as well; we refer to the changes in 
outcomes as the changes in capacity. In other words, as the transformation of potential energy 
to a kinetic energy, capacity upholds the potential of the object to perform, which could only 
be assessed by the amount of energy released from the transformation of the object from a 
potential to a kinetic state. 
These kinds of concepts are usually associated with the famous example of ‘black 
box’. The Black box metaphor implies that we can observe the concept solely in terms of its 
input, output and transfer characteristics without any knowledge of its inner mechanism. As a 
result, measuring capacity requires additional concepts indicating the changes in the input or 
output stages. For this reason, concepts such as ‘capability’ or ‘performance’ are usually 
adjusted in empirical studies to seize the impact of capacity. 
Indeed, the confusion between the meaning of capacity and its close synonyms -  
capability, competence and performance -  is a conflicting theme. Franks (1999) makes a 
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distinction between capacity and competencies or capabilities, where capability denotes ‘the 
knowledge, skills and attitudes of the individuals or groups, and their competence to 
undertake the responsibilities assigned to them’, whereas capacity refers to ‘the overall ability 
of the individual or group to actually perform the responsibilities’. Franks underlines that 
capacities do not depend only on the capabilities of the people but also ‘on the overall size of 
the tasks, the resources which are needed to perform them, and the framework within which 
they are discharged’.  
Another scholar, Peter Morgan, (2006) defines capabilities as the collective skills that 
can be both technical and logistical or ‘harder’ and ‘softer’5. The difference between 
capability and competence is that competences refer to the attributions of individuals. From 
his perspective, capacity is the construct of five core capabilities: the capability to act, the 
capability to generate development results, the capability to relate, the capability to adapt and 
the capability to integrate. Hence, capability encompasses pretty much everything which is 
required for a system to produce a value, whereas capacity is the ability of this system. 
On the other hand, the distinction between performance and capacity is the latter 
corresponds to ‘the means to achieve performance’ (Honadle, 1981).  Here, performance is 
the end product of the capacity. Similarly, Hou et al. (2003) describe capacity as a 
prerequisite for performance. In their study, they define capacity as the formal rules that 
‘restrain discretion and direct behaviour of both political and administrative actors in a way 
expected to facilitate the achievement of the performance objective’. Hence, performance is a 
key indicator to manipulate on capacity. Although it is not directly part of capacity, especially 
in empirical studies, changes in performances are usually taken as changes in capacity.  
Clearly, scholars vary on their definitions depending on their research interests. 
Studies focusing on the impact of capacity focus on the output part and usually incorporate 
performance indicators to assess capacities. Other studies interested in the capabilities of 
actors prefer an input-oriented capacity definition in order to assess capacities. Yet, a 
comprehensive capacity assessment should integrate both input and output stages while taking 
into account the operational framework. For that matter, UNDP (2008) describes that an 
appropriate capacity assessment should be ‘a structured and analytical process which should 
include assessment of various dimensions within the broader systems context, as well as the 
evaluation of specific entities and individuals within the system.’ 
                                                            
5	Morgan exemplifies ‘harder’ capabilities as ‘policy analysis or financial management’ and ‘softer’ capabilities 
as ‘the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning and identity’.	
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One other crucial aspect in assessing capacity is, that capacity depends on temporal 
and spatial conditions within the given context. Gargan (1981) explains this statement with an 
example, that quality of contemporary urban life is superior for a great majority and same 
public services are much more efficient compared to 50 years ago. However, changing new 
conditions on public services, e.g. growing interdependencies in the public sector, changes in 
expectations regarding the adequacy of public services, emergence of qualitatively new public 
problems and redefinition of roles and rules in the policy processes, necessitated to re-define 
the notion of capacity in public management. As a consequence, lack of capacity does not 
have to necessarily emerge from inadequate resources to carry out objectives. Rather, changes 
in the expectations can create an assumed capacity gap. Therefore, it is essential to define the 
expectations from the subject before capacity assessment. The used analogy of Usain Bolt can 
also assist here to have a better understanding on capacity assessment. With his physical 
attributions and training, we would have expected a good result from Usain Bolt even in his 
earlier runs. If he couldn’t have achieved good running times matching his attributions (i.e. 
input), we would have evaluated that he is not fully using his capacity. We wouldn’t have had 
the same expectations about a runner with weaker qualities and trainings. Therefore, with our 
expectations we are creating different bars of evaluation for the same activity. The 
expectations we have created about Bolt have increased even more in time because of the 
phenomenal results he had achieved in consecutive runs. Therefore, any failure or any less 
fulfilling result will be judged on him not being able to use his full capacity. And lastly, to 
visualise the effect of the context, we wouldn’t expect the same results from Bolt if he were 
40 years old. Even though his timing is not as good as his previous runs, we would think he is 
using full capacity because our judgments have been shifted by the changes in his physical 
attributions.  
To sum up, capacity is not a directly observable phenomenon. In our abstract thinking, 
we conceptualise capacity with inputs to entity and with outputs from the entity. Concepts 
such as capability or performance facilitate the analysis the inputs and outputs. Moreover, 
capacity assessment changes over time with changing conditions in the context. In other 
words, same abilities could be insufficient in different cases and in different times. Hence, 
capacity assessment should incorporate a clear understanding of contextual conditions as well.  
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2.3.4 Typologies of capacity in public governance 
Literature on capacity in public governance is situated amid the organisational science, 
management science and development studies. Typically, the locus of theoretical works on 
capacity shows variations depending on the field of interest. Therefore, there are three 
different but complementary types of capacity in the literature. The first one is the 
‘management’ or ‘managerial’ capacity, which generally corresponds to the managerial 
abilities of decision-makers in an organisation. The second, ‘organisational’ capacity reflects 
the whole ability of an organisation to produce intended outcomes. Organisational capacity 
encompasses all processes, resources (e.g. human, financial, technological...etc.), and 
competences existing in an organisation that regulate the internal and external functioning of 
the organisation. The third type of capacity, which might be called ‘institutional’, ‘systemic’ 
or ‘societal’ capacity, is based on the holistic assumption that the capacity of an organisation 
cannot be explained solely by its components. The functioning of an organisation is 
dependent on the conditions in the surrounding environment, and this capacity reflects the 
capacities existing in the milieu where the organisation is operating. Usually, studies on 
institutional capacity analyse how regulations, legal frameworks and policies affect the 
functioning of organisations, and try to assess the impact of coordination and governance of 
inter-organisational relations. 
Hence, in public governance three distinct venues can be differentiated to trace 
capacity: (a) the capacity of decision-makers (i.e. managers and leaders of organisations), (b) 
the capacity of the organisation, and (c) the capacity existing in the surrounding environment 
of the organisation. Although each venue- or ‘levels of capacity’- has different characteristics 
to be considered, they are conjoint and changes in one level has profound effects on other 
levels as well. Therefore, a comprehensive theoretical framework of local governance 
capacity should include all these different levels.  
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Figure 2.1 An analytical illustration for levels of capacity in governance 
 
Source: Personal elaboration  
Using this general understanding of governance capacity, the aim in this part is to 
identify first the underlying features of each level of capacity and later the capabilities 
referring to better governance under theoretical expectations. 
a. Managerial capacity: 
As mentioned previously, managerial capacity primarily focuses on the abilities and 
skills of the manager. In an early study, Honadle & Howitt (1986) explain a wide list of 
abilities that managerial capacity comprises. According to them, managerial capacity includes 
the ability of identifying problems and developing policies to solve these problems; 
conceiving programs for the implementation of the policies; attracting and absorbing 
financial, human, material and informational resources; managing these resources; and 
evaluating the activities for future guidance. In other words, managerial capacity conveys all 
competences pertaining to a manager which are required to bring the organisation into 
success.  
Not all definitions on managerial capacity put the weight on the shoulders of the 
manager. According to Ingraham & Kneedler (2000:294), government’s managerial capacity 
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relies on ‘management subsystems’ driving the management of financial, human, material, 
and informational capital of the organisation. Nevertheless, the functioning of these 
management subsystems relies on environmental factors (e.g. characteristics of constituent 
populations and socioeconomic conditions) and qualifications of managers such as effective 
leadership, use of information, allocation of resources and a ‘results focus’. Hence, in this 
definition, managerial capacity is formulated as an overarching ability of an organisation to 
allocate the necessary resources at the right time into the right place.  
Contrary to Ingraham & Kneedler, Raboca et al. (2010) underline that managerial 
capacities do not rely on qualifications of management subsystems alone but on the way these 
systems are integrated. According to them, there are three aspects determining the managerial 
capacities of a public organisation: (1) managerial capacity depends on the configuration, the 
processes and the activities connected to the managerial subsystems and to the link between 
them; (2) managerial capacity depends on the way these systems are integrated; (3) 
managerial capacity depends on a result-oriented managerial system. In other words, the 
components of management systems (i.e. the act of leading and the processes), the integration 
of management systems and an overall vision to produce intended outcomes underline the 
three essentials of the managerial capacity. In a synthesising manner, Raboca et al. (2010) 
suggest that managerial capacity are “those competencies, skills, aptitudes possessed by the 
leading factors in an institution and which are necessary for managing the activities and the 
internal processes from the institution successfully”.  
To sum up, these three different but complementary definitions provide different 
scopes for managerial capacity. Managerial capacity can be limited with the abilities of the 
manager or it can incorporate all managerial processes and systems .  
b. Organisational capacity: 
The literature on organisational capacity shows a great variation in terms of subject of 
study. Public bodies and governmental organisations, private sector organisations, voluntary 
and community based organisation have been units of analysis in different studies so far. 
Nevertheless, a review of literature on organisational capacity indicates usually similar 
aspects for organisational capacity. 
To start with, Honadle (1981) states that organisational capacity of a local government 
includes ‘the ability to forge effective links with other organisations; processes for solving 
problems; coordination among disparate functions; and mechanisms for institutional 
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learning’. Furthermore, she claims that the capacity of an organisation is not limited only with 
the inputs such as resources on personnel, revenue, information or community support. The 
real strength of an organisation lies in its capacity to attract and absorb resources.  
In another study on community development centers, Glickman and Servon (1998) 
define five major components of capacity: resources, effective leadership, an external helping 
network, specialised skills to undertake housing and development projects, and political 
resources. Similarly, Eisinger (2002) underlines five critical capacity elements; resources, 
effective leadership, skilled and sufficient staff, a certain level of institutionalisation, and links 
to the larger community environment. Again, Austin identifies five aspects for organisational 
capacity: normative vision (indicating missions, values and strategies); societal context (social 
space); requisite resources (human, financial, information…etc.); actors (institutions, 
networks, individuals) and functions required (planning, decision making…etc.)  
In a nutshell, organisational capacity, regardless of the type of organisation, 
incorporates internal and external dimensions of an organisation. Organisational capacity is 
not only about the resources, capital, structures, processes which are required for the 
organisation to function. Additionally, links with external environment and the relations with 
other organisations are equally important.  
c. Institutional capacity:  
There are different applications of institutional capacity in the literature. In some 
studies on local governments, institutional capacity corresponds to the local environment that 
the public organisation is operating. Other studies describe institutional capacity as the overall 
capacity of the institution wherein various organisations operate. Nevertheless, institutional 
capacity is perceived in general as the governability of the domain. In that sense, the most 
important aspect on institutional capacity is to understand to what extent the environment 
contributes to the organisation’s objectives. Especially, studies on local governments and 
institutional development underline the institutional capacity as an important aspect to be 
considered on capacity building programs.  
For instance, Gargan (1981) states that capacities of local governments rely at any 
point in time on the interaction between community expectations, community problems and 
community resources.  By this token, expectations involve ‘perceptions and attitudes on 
adequate levels of public services, appropriate styles of political leadership, and accepted 
ways of conducting public affairs.’ Resources include tangible elements such as money, 
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knowledge, administrative skills, private sector associations, neighbourhood organisations and 
political popularity but they are not limited to these. Problems, on the other hand, refer to the 
community specific issues which entail different preferences to accomplish the objectives. In 
short, Gargan proposes a definition for local government capacity as ‘a function of 
expectations, resources and problems’, and underlines that the local government capacity 
problem is ‘more a conceptual problem than a management practices and techniques one.’  
Chaskin (2001:292) notes three aspects on community capacity; the existence of 
resources, networks of relationships, and leadership in pursuing a community’s objectives. 
Cairns et al. (2005), on the other hand, underline the importance of ‘social capital’ which 
indicates the social ties between individuals and groups in the society, on capacity building 
efforts on communities.  
Cornell (2002) states that the three components for institutional capacity are; 
institutional authority (decision-making and control over assets, strategies, programs), 
institutional environment (the rules and incentives set up by any society), institutional 
effectiveness (administrative competence of the society).  
On all definitions, the governability of society, the existing formal and informal 
conditions regulating the social interactions, political culture and the compatibility of the 
organisation with these societal conditions appear as the key aspects for institutional capacity.  
2.3.5 Which capabilities does the local government need for local governance? 
The changing roles and ways of interactions in local governance have altered the 
capabilities needed by the local government regarding the managerial, organisational and 
institutional capacities. In this part, the roles, skills and qualifications associated with 
managerial, organisational and institutional levels of capacity in local government will be 
elaborated. 
a. Managerial capabilities for local governance 
The roles, which are associated with the public managers and head of local 
governments, have changed drastically parallel to the shift in governance. In traditional public 
administration, regardless of the political configuration, the head of local government was the 
agent of both central authority and citizens. The primary responsibility of local governments 
was to ensure the public service delivery and implementation of policies within the capacity 
of their organisations and assure the satisfaction of both principals. These sets of relations can 
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be named as a function in a two-dimensional system where the manager was an interlocutor 
for demand and supply relationship between central authority and citizens. Therefore, the 
capacity of local government was determined alongside the fruitful relationships with central 
authority. Nevertheless, these classical functions of local representatives have altered, first by 
NPM and later by the contributions of governance philosophy. More and more, the head of 
local government is expected to be an active, entrepreneurial and independent actor who can 
juggle among national, international and local actors to acquire the necessary capital to satisfy 
various private, public and civilian interests.  
Eventually, these new roles have necessitated new capabilities and skills to become 
competent. First of all, a new mode of leadership is required for local governance. The 
politically neutral, executive leaders are no longer satisfactory. The fragmented nature of local 
politics and conflicting interests demand stronger brokerage and linking abilities (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000; Bekkers et al., 2011). Therefore a strong leader is no longer one who can 
execute the policies relying on the legislative powers, but one who can create ‘safe places’ for 
the organisational and societal interactions. Naturally, these new responsibilities require new 
individual characteristics and abilities. According to Minnaar and Bekker (2005:141-2), great 
organisational leaders hold the following characteristics; a special charisma, self-belief that 
tends to bother on arrogance at times, the ability to move out a ‘comfort zone’ in order to shift 
traditional paradigms, the ability to question the status quo, which makes these people good 
innovators, an ability to convince others to follow them in pursuit of a new direction. 
Similarly, a strong leader for local governance is the one who can set the vision for others to 
follow, and in addition to it builds motivation and trust among contributing partners. 
Furthermore, a strong leader should acquire the necessary skills to face with challenges in 
volatile conditions and resolve the problems effectively arising by conflicting interests. 
Therefore, as John (2000:135) underlines from the governance perspective a strong leader is 
the one who is capable to lead the partnerships built by various actors. Many leaders, who 
lack the ability to empathise and to be imaginative, fail to be successful in their endeavour 
(Goss, 2001:193).  
Second, the reliance on legal and constitutional powers is no longer satisfactory for 
competency. As Pierre & Peters (2000:198) stated, these powers are replaced with 
‘entrepreneurial skills’, ‘political zeal’ and ‘brokerage abilities’. Hence, the source of 
legitimacy has become an important part of the debate. In this sense, Moore (1996) offers that 
successful managers should build legitimacies for their actions through managing 
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relationships with politicians and public. Likewise, Goss (2001: 161) states that managers 
should sponsor innovation, manage risk and legitimacy. 
Third, the type of knowledge sought by the managers has changed. Nowadays, 
reliance on professional knowledge like financial management, project management or human 
resources management is less and less sufficient to determine action (Goss, 2001:163). The 
knowledge on how to extract the resources and capacities of others and channel them into a 
socially valuable action is becoming more predominant (Goss, 2001:161). Unfortunately, 
these multidimensional conditions of governance are challenging many public servants who 
are used to work in straight lines and thus frequently fail to provide the knowledge sought by 
the managers. Hence, public managers should pioneer new education and training activities 
for their staff to enable self-directedness and self-driven learning (Du Plessis, 2008:134).  
Lastly, the previously explained two-dimensional sets of relations between central 
authority and citizens have turned into a multidimensional setting. In the current situation, 
neither the central authority has the monopoly on capital, nor are the demands directed 
through conventional sources. Citizens are taking part directly or collaboratively in decision-
making and implementation processes which are turning them into active shareholders rather 
than passive public service receivers. Therefore, new sort of responsibilities have emerged for 
head of local governments. On the one hand, Osborn (2009: 414) states that ‘stakeholder 
management’ is an important duty in new public governance. On the other hand, Voets & De 
Rynck (2011:209) argue that ‘boundary-scanning’ and ‘boundary-spanning’ activities are 
required to create inter-relations among various actors. In other words, head of local 
governments or public managers should bring information about their environment to their 
organisations and keep the other actors informed about their organisation. Voets & De Rynck 
define five distinct roles through which network managers can create innovative capacity to 
deal with inter-institutional challenges. These roles are ‘vision keeper’, ‘creative thinker’, 
‘network promoter’, ‘network champion’ and ‘network operator’.  A public leader should 
combine these different aspects or at least lead to create necessary organisational conditions to 
cover these responsibilities. 
 
b. Organisational capabilities for local governance 
The abovementioned capacities for managers are only applicable if they are backed 
with capable organisations. Some general characteristics of capable organisations are same for 
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all types of organisations. For instance, a capable organisation is usually well aligned with the 
overall strategy, has clear and simple tasks for employees, and acquires sufficient resources 
and effective working systems. Nevertheless, these classical capacity components are subject 
to change due to changing expectations from local governments. The introverted, socially 
detached local governments are no longer valid to be capable organisations. Local 
governments are expected to generate new tools and ways to interact with citizens, to be 
flexible and to be able to respond effectively on rapidly changing conditions. These features 
demand first and foremost, a fundamental change on the organisational behaviour. Hence, 
local governments should adopt effective means to ensure organisational learning and 
acquisition of knowledge.  
There are different approaches for organisational learning. One approach indicates that 
organisational learning starts from individual level, thus individual learning is essential for the 
organisations (Goss, 2001: 174). On the other hand, other scholars argue that collective action 
is the source of organisational knowledge (Argyris and Schön, 1996), and that the 
organisation should create suitable conditions through rewarding and encouraging the 
acquisition of knowledge.  Another possibility is that individuals can actively support 
organisational learning by sharing knowledge. However, one caveat here is that if individuals 
feel themselves competing with others, they will most probably use their knowledge to 
achieve supremacy over others thus this attempt will most likely be unsuccessful (Goss, 
2001:175). Considering all these different approaches, Goss (2001: 176-7) gives some 
examples where organisational learning can take place: 
• Deliberately giving managers and staff time to think and reflect. 
• Spending the development time not acquiring new skills but exploring the wider 
environment. 
• Valuing of diversity of perspective, experience and background. Including people in 
teams because of their difference. 
• Designing challenge and discussion processes into new initiatives and everyday work. 
• Including practice exchange into all day-to-day work, scheduling visits, job swaps, 
secondments as well as workshops and conferences. 
• Developing ‘creativity spaces’ either using the internet or intranets, or setting up 
improvisation or innovation workshops. 
• Accessing ideas from outside- turning data from users into easily accessible 
information; using user-consultants. 
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• Creating ‘learning laboratories’. 
• Storing knowledge in easily accessible ways. 
• Linking the organisation to other organisations’ data systems. 
• Ensuring easy access to the internet for work purposes- creating internal networks, 
intranets, chat lines, on-line discussions and problem-solving groups. 
• Building-in debriefing and reflection time to all meetings and projects. 
• Debriefing all projects and initiatives carefully; identifying learning points, sharing 
them and storing them to learn from next time. 
• Developing effective evaluation systems. 
Considering these various steps, Goss suggests several methods and techniques to increase 
organisational learning for local governance. Negotiation workshops, citizen juries, 
community workshops, interactive conferences and open-space events are suggested as some 
options where local people, politicians and managers can share their ideas on solutions for 
local problems (Goss, 2001:194). 
In addition to organisational learning and acquiring the necessary knowledge to adapt 
the conditions of local governance, organisations need to develop the means to seize required 
resources. Most importantly, acquisition of information and money are essential for the 
organisational capacity. An organisation has to obtain the necessary revenue bases to be able 
to respond to the expectations. Especially, the decentralisation of various services necessitates 
an adequate tax revenue base for local governments and the ability to generate income 
through commercial activities in private market. In cases where local administration lack 
revenue-raising capacity, local governments become dependent to central funding via direct 
and indirect transfer of capital. Moreover, Kroukamp & Lues (2008: 112) argue that the 
authority and the capacity in raising revenue is critical for better service provisions, and in 
addition, the imposition of taxes forces local governments to become more responsible. 
However, acquiring private investment is usually a challenge for local governments since they 
need to employ less coercive instruments and adopt less rigid political and administrative 
control to be attractive towards private investors. For instance, state institutions can lay 
regulatory policy instruments for private capital, but in a globalised economy this action could 
lead to reverse outcomes such as replacement of private investments into less hostile 
environments (Pierre &Peters, 2000: 204). Moreover, most of the time mobilising the 
resources from private sector requires inter-organisational and interpersonal trust to be 
developed beforehand (Reddy, 2008: 65).  
 71 
 
 The capital on information relies primarily on acquiring the technology and 
establishing the necessary instruments to gather information on residents’ needs and on 
partnerships with private companies. To oversee the contracts with private companies, public 
organisations need the necessary human capital to develop and adopt effective information 
systems, which should be supplemented with transparency to ensure feedbacks (Kettle, 2009: 
252). Similarly, feedbacks on citizens’ needs to rely on transparency in government activities. 
Thus, setting some certain standards of excellence in terms of accountability and transparency 
can facilitate the trust and eventually the feedback into government institutions 
(Charlesworth, Cook and Crozier, 2003: 13). 
 The management of these two capitals brought up another important element for 
organisational capacity which is the capacity to tackle with public-private partnerships and 
participations of citizens. According to Rhodes (1997:138-41) some key factors in partnership 
working include: ‘a clear strategic focus, strategic leadership and support, the importance of 
trust, organisations and people in partnerships, capacity for cooperation and mutualism, 
organisational complementarity, co-location and coterminosity, the value of action and 
outcome-oriented procedures’. Trafford and Proctor (2006:120) also identify some key 
elements for successful partnerships such as good communication, openness, effective 
planning, ethos and direction. Training the staff who takes part in partnerships, is also 
essential for successful partnerships. Especially, joint studies between involving parties can 
facilitate to develop a common vocabulary and understanding on how to work together 
(Mcquaid in Osborne, 2009: 140). In fact, governing the interactions with private sector and 
citizens is part of the discussion with ‘metagovernance’. Metagovernance can be described as 
governing the relations among governance actors. According to Jessop, governments can 
adopt several actions for metagovernance which can : 
• provide the ground rules for governance and the regulatory order in and through which 
governance partners can pursue their aims; 
• ensure the compatibility or coherence of different governance mechanisms and 
regimes; 
• act as the primary organiser of the dialogue among policy communities; 
• deploy a relative monopoly of organisational intelligence and information with which 
to shape cognitive expectations; 
• serve as a ‘ court of appeal’ for disputes arising within and over governance; 
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• seek to re-balance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in 
the interest of system integration and/or social cohesion; 
• try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of 
individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their 
implications for preferred strategies and tactics. (in eds. Stoker, 2000: 23) 
Last but not least, the organisational capacity relies on clear processes of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of governance services. Only the organisations 
with managerial and technological capabilities can provide the coordination of these 
processes.  
 
c. Institutional capabilities for local governance 
Effective partnerships and successful engagements with society are fundamental in 
local governance. However, there might be difficulties for local governments to engage with 
society and private sector if these actors lack the capacity to contribute as a shareholder. 
Hence, recently the enhancement of capacities in localities has become a priority in capacity 
building programmes. 
Nevertheless, there are multiple forms of capabilities that local governments should 
acquire under institutional capacity. Institutional capacity can be related to the ability of 
governance systems to build new institutions to create means of collaborations through formal 
and informal ways with society (see Matthiesen, 2002); to the creation of ‘micro political 
processes’ within neighbourhoods which can annihilate the processes which produce social 
exclusion (see Allen & Cars, 2002); to a style of policy making which relies on negotiation 
and persuasion which allows mutual learning (see Taylor, 2002); or to the capacity or 
organisations to create new relationships for engaging collective action (see Healey, 1998). A 
fair assumption shall include all these aspects as part of institutional capacity. Therefore, the 
abilities to engage and build relations, abilities to learn and use the knowledge or the abilities 
to build necessary institution to enable collective actions are some dimensions of institutional 
capacity in local governments.  
As in public organisations, being an active participant in institutional scale requires a 
learning process for adaptation. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental differences among 
societies which have detrimental impact on the learning process. For instance, having a prior 
culture of engagement with politics or trust in institutions facilitates the transition process. 
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The learning capacities of communities show variations depending on socio-cultural 
backgrounds. Yet, there are different actions to enhance learning capacities of communities. 
Basically, learning capacities of a region relies on the capacity of its members to participate 
into negotiation and co-operation processes with each other and with government 
organisations. Thus, most of the community capacity building programmes include supporting 
civil society organisations and building necessary skills among their staff, training facilitators, 
supporting entrepreneurship within communities and supporting community leaders (Goss, 
2001: 189-90). However, learning is not a linear process. Especially, for communities with 
lack of culture on participation and cooperation, a process of exploration and testing on 
participation is required to build self- aware, self-managing communities (Goss, 2001, 191). 
Similarly, De Visser (2005:133) underlines that the success of public participation does not 
depend on formal actions to regulate the system but instead on inculcating a culture of 
community participation by utilising innovation and creativity in actions. In a nutshell, 
building institutional capacity requires a process of learning for the community whereby 
experimenting and informal ways of interactions are necessary to enable sustainable 
participation.     
Following the learning process, the second important aspect in institutional capacity is 
the engagement of actors into cooperation and partnership projects. One essential element 
regarding this aspect is that the governance mechanism should provide the necessary 
conditions for actors to reach an agreement over their actions. Therefore, there is a need of a 
clear framework indicating the rules of engaging with each other. World Governance Survey 
(WGS) identifies six sub-components to assess the governance framework in different 
countries (Kjaer, 2004:169): 
1) Rules that shape the way citizens raise and become aware of public issues (civil society), 
2) Rules that shape the way issues are combined into policy by political institutions (political 
society), 
3) Rules that shape the way policies are made by government institutions (government), 
4) Rules that shape the way policies are administered and implemented by public servants 
(bureaucracy), 
5) Rules that shape the way state and market interact to promote development (economic 
society), 
6) Rules that shape the setting for resolution of disputes and conflicts. 
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This list gives a useful array of aspects for successful engagements in local 
governance. It is crucial for the actors to have certainty on roles and responsibilities. Actors in 
partnerships should have recognised and legitimate roles, and different identities and interests 
should be represented. Moreover, a clear framework is also essential to avoid possible 
coordination problems which can adversely affect effective partnerships.  
On the other hand, the incentives to participate in cooperative projects with political 
institutions should be tangible for both private and societal actors (Pierre & Peters, 2000: 
200). Thus, actors will be more enthusiastic on sustaining the partnerships. 
However, a core element which affects directly the engagement of actors is the mutual 
trust of actors towards each other. Trust is a crucial factor since it facilitates the cooperation 
and the flow of information between actors in networks (Klijn, 2009: 318). Likewise, Kale et 
al. (2000:218) argue that ‘relational capital’- i.e. the level of mutual trust that arises out of 
close interaction at the individual level between alliance partners- is an important strategic 
resource to ensure successful partnerships. Especially, considering the high level of failure 
rates6 among private-public partnerships, relational capital appears as a reliable resource 
against such failures (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Gulati et al. 2000; Osborne et al., 2009:194). 
Although trust in community is deeply intermingled with socio-cultural factors, informal 
interactions and ‘open networks’ seem operational tools to build trustworthy relations in local 
communities (Bekkers et al., 2011:211).  
The last dimension in institutional capacity is the ‘governability’ of the local 
community.  In the literature, it is possible to find various terms and definitions that address 
this society related dimension of institutional capacity. In fact, in many studies institutional 
capacity refers solely to the capacity existing in the society. Nevertheless, this dimension of 
institutional capacity relies on the assumption that certain social structures in a community are 
fundamental on its governance performance. One core concept in this discussion is created by 
Putnam (1994) with the term of ‘social capital’ which refers to “the features of social 
organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions’ (Putnam, 1994:167). According to Putnam, societies with 
limited social capital will likely perform poorly on democratic governance. Even though we 
have limited knowledge on how institutions affect the generation of social capital (Hooghe & 
Stolle, 2003), most of the literature on institutional capacity is drawn on various dimensions 
                                                            
6  Different authors give a range changing between 30-70 % of failure for public-private partnerships (see. 
Duysters et al. 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001; Overby, 2006; Klijn 2009:194) 
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of social capital. For instance, Car et al. (2002:54) build on this basis the concept of 
‘institutional capital’. According to them, institutional capital refers to the social capital in a 
governance context, and institutional capacity means ‘transforming, creating and mobilising 
the institutional capital of a place in the collective effort of shaping its future.’  In this 
definition, institutional capital links three essential elements for social interactions: 
‘knowledge resources’, ‘relational resources’ and ‘mobilisation capacity’. Knowledge 
resources refer to ‘the frames of reference, creativity and knowledgeability, the conceptions of 
place and identity relevant to governance’. Relational resources comprise ‘the resources of 
trust and co-operation contained in networks, the nature of bonding elements in them and 
networks to draw resource, rules and ideas into the effort of collective action.’ Mobilisation 
capacity, on the other hand, is the capacity of stakeholders in a locality to mobilise the 
knowledge and relational resources to act collectively for a common goal.  
 Finally, Cars et al. (2002:200-1) provide a comprehensive summary of list of factors 
which might have positive and negative influence on local institutional capacity. They cluster 
these factors as internal and external factors. According to this; 
a) factors that help to build local institutional capacity: 
- internal: ‘shared intellectual, social and political capital, which is expressed in the ability to 
widen the search for consensus beyond the immediate issue, grounded in understanding of 
basic community values and perceptions; sufficient trust in other stakeholders to negotiate 
trade-offs in the confidence that other parties will deliver on their commitments; 
organisational and resource support for continuing contact, basic information and 
collaborative responses to external challenges; 
- external: a style of government that recognises and rewards ‘joined-up thinking’ and local 
collaborative effort.’ 
b) factors that tend to destroy local institutional capacity: 
- internal: lack of investment of time and staff resource in building social and political 
relationships between local stakeholders and developing common information bases; 
collaboration narrowly focused on specific issues; lack of a strong base in community values; 
- external: a top-down style of government in which connections across departmental 
boundaries are not recognised; appraisal and performance measurement regimes which 
allocate funds on the basis of sectional and short-run outputs rather than strategic and cross-
sectoral outcomes. 
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d. Summary 
This concluding part gives an array of features, competences and abilities associated 
with local governance capacity in managerial, organisational and institutional levels. In a 
nutshell, for successful local governance, actors need cooperation, coordination, mutual 
learning, and joint reaction to changing conditions. These overarching functions demand new 
abilities and acquisitions of new competences with regards to the material and human 
resources, knowledge, regulatory frameworks, information systems, individual qualifications 
and socio-cultural conditions in local framework. The Table 2.2 presents the list of 
capabilities associated with high local governance capacity. 
Table 2.2 List of capabilities for local governance 
Managerial capabilities Personal skills such as being entrepreneurial, politically active, 
visionary, empathiser, creative and imaginative; 
The personal knowledge on how to extract resources; 
Ability to face challenges in volatile conditions. 
Leadership which sponsor innovation, pioneer new education and 
training activities for staff to enable self-directedness and self-
driven learning;   
Clear and simple tasks for employees;   
Clear processes for planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation; 
Having a good communication between manager and staff. 
Leadership which promote boundary-spanning and boundary-
scanning; 
Leadership which can build legitimacy. 
Leadership with brokerage and linking abilities which promote 
interrelations among actors; 
Strategic leadership compliable with a strategic vision; 
Organisational 
capabilities 
Being well-aligned with the overall strategy; 
Sufficient human, financial and material resources; 
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Effective working systems; 
Capable informational & financial systems;  
Having enable conditions for organisational learning.  
Good communication mechanisms; 
Being transparent and accountable; 
Having links to external knowledge resources;  
A process of exploration and testing on participation 
Institutional 
capabilities 
Trust into private and state institutions; 
Trust into the members of the community; 
Having a culture of community participation and a strong base in 
community values; 
Being entrepreneurial. 
Mutually accepted rules on building and sustaining partnerships; 
Representation of different identities and interests; 
A framework which indicates rules of engagement with society;  
Clear incentives for cooperative projects. 
Shared intellectual, social and political capital  
Overarching 
capabilities 
Safe places for mutual interactions;   
Ground rules and regulatory order for governance; 
Mutual trust among actors in local governance;  
The means and actions to resolve disputes;  
Compatibility and coherence between different governance 
mechanisms;  
Legitimate and recognised roles for actors in partnerships;  
Informal interactions and open networks;  
Collaborative responses to external challenges  
 78 
 
 
2.4 The Relationship between Local Governance Capacity and 
Decentralisation in Local Governance 
This final section of this chapter brings together all the assumptions and findings 
derived from the literature on capacity and decentralisation in local governance. Firstly, an 
operational analytical model will be constructed to study local governance capacity where the 
aim will be to correspond the expectations from local government in terms of governance 
with the managerial, organisation and institutional capabilities associated with local 
governance. Secondly, on the basis of the analytical model hypotheses will be derived to 
explain the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation in local 
governance.  
 
2.4.1 An analytical model for local governance capacity  
 In this research, local governance is perceived close to the Pierre& Peters’ definition 
as ‘steering the actors in localities in order to cover the service provision and demands of 
citizens, whereas the local government is the primus inter pares’. However, this theoretical 
stance towards local governance does not exclude the role of other actors by limiting their 
functions as passive bystanders steered by the local government, but also takes into account 
their relational position. Thus, a model should incorporate both the capacity dimensions of 
local government as well as the institutional surrounding of the local government. 
This theoretical approach towards governance holds the local government responsible 
for mobilising the resources from the actors in locality and channelling them wisely to the 
needs of the public. Hence, three fundamental functions are expected from local government; 
(1) mobilising the resources, (2) decision-making and (3) implementation.  
The capabilities deemed for local governance capacity can be clustered under seven 
categories. (1) Financial capabilities, (2) Material capabilities, (3) Communication 
capabilities, (4) Planning capabilities, (5) Managerial capabilities, (6) Human resource 
capabilities, and (7) Socio-economic capabilities or local capabilities. The last category is not 
under the domain of local government but it reflects the socio-economic capabilities of the 
surrounding environment.  
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In reference to the Table 2.2., financial capabilities incorporate the sufficient financial 
resources as well as the means to extract the financial resources. Similarly, material 
capabilities incorporate sufficient material resources and effective means to acquire the 
necessary equipment for service delivery.  Communication capabilities include the means, 
processes and systems for the exchange of the information between the managers, the 
organisation and the other institutions in locality. Planning capabilities refer to the methods 
and processes to strategise between the actions, goals and the financial means of the local 
government. Managerial capabilities refer to the leadership qualities of managers as well the 
features of the management systems and methods to ensure the effective delivery of actions. 
Finally, human resource capabilities pertain to the qualitative and quantitative features of the 
personnel as well the means to enhance the abilities of the personnel.   
In fact, the three functions designated to the local government for local governance 
correspond largely to the abovementioned six categories of capabilities for local governance, 
thus creating the basis to build up the analytical model for local governance capacity. In a 
nutshell, ‘mobilising the resources’ pertains to the financial and material capabilities; 
‘decision-making’ pertains to planning and communication capabilities; and ‘implementation’ 
pertains to human resource and managerial capabilities.  
Hence, four subcategories can be identified to grasp capacities in local governance 
including the socio-economic dimension of the surrounding environment: (1) mobilisation 
capacity; (2) decision-making capacity; (3) implementation capacity; (4) local capacity. Since 
the first three functional capacities are part of the local government’s acts and responsibilities 
in terms of local governance, they are categorised under ‘local governance capacity’. The 
relational approach towards governance necessitates the local capacity as part of the 
capacities in local governance but it is not part of the local government’s domain and should 
be categorised on its own.   
Mobilisation capacity focuses on the abilities and means of the local government in 
mobilising the financial and material resources needed for services and functions. Three sub-
areas are defined according to the stages in mobilising the resources; (1) the ability in 
bringing in the financial resources for purchasing, (2) the capability in channelling the 
financial resources for the purchasing goods and services, (3) the adequacy in financial and 
material means for municipal functions.  
Decision-making capacity indicates the ability in deciding on how to allocate and 
where to allocate the mobilised resources. The former is a clear indication of planning 
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capabilities. On the other hand, the best decision on where to allocate the resources can only 
be attained with adequate and effective means of information. Therefore, decision-making 
capacity should bring together capacity components regarding the planning and 
communication aspects of local governance.  
For a higher capacity in implementation, local governments require higher capacities 
in management and human resources. The managerial dimension incorporates the individual 
skills and abilities of the managers, as well as management practices to increase performance 
in the organisation. Education, experience, collaboration and initiative taking in management 
and management practices for higher performances are the foci in managerial dimension. 
Additionally, successful implementation also relies on the quality and the sufficiency of the 
municipal personnel 
Figure 2.2 An analytical model for local governance capacity 
 
 
2.4.2 The relationship between local capacity, local governance capacity and 
decentralisation in local governance 
 This research departs from two research questions (1) how should policy makers 
decide on the degree of decentralisation in order to get the best outcome on local governance, 
and (2) how do the capacities existing in local government and in locality affect this outcome. 
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decentralisation leads to better governance and instead a pareto optimum is foreseen to ensure 
the best outcome in governance. It is assumed that if the conditions, which determine the 
success in decentralised local governance can be understood, the pareto optimum in 
decentralisation can be designated.  
With regards to the relationship between decentralisation and capacity, there are two 
prevailing debates in the literature. First, whether decentralisation leads to an increase in 
capacities or certain capacities are preconditioned for the success of decentralisation. Second, 
how varying degrees of capacity affect decentralisation? Actually, the first debate is partly 
related with the conceptual feature of the capacity, as capacity is not a static concept and it 
can change in time due to exogenous and endogenous driven factors. Hence, it is highly likely 
both arguments are valid in the sense that once decentralisation takes place, local government 
will develop certain capacities for successful decentralisation while local governments with 
already existing capacities will perform better in terms of governance. In fact, both debates 
boil down to the primary question of ‘which capacities are associated with decentralisation?’ 
Only after determining the capacities associated with decentralisation, the questions ‘how 
varying degrees of capacity affect decentralisation?’ or ‘how changes in capacities affect the 
outcome in decentralisation?’ can satisfactorily be addressed. 
 The literature review suggests that the conditions determining the outcome of 
decentralisation in local governance are expected to be associated with the local government’s 
capacities and the socio-economic conditions in the locality if the contextual conditions (i.e. 
socio-cultural and legal framework) are taken as ceteris paribus. Hence, any relation 
encountered between the capacities marked in Figure 2.2 and decentralisation in local 
governance, should shed light on the question when decentralisation leads to better 
governance. 
  In reference to the theoretical discussion between local governance capacity, local 
capacity and decentralisation in local governance, the following three hypotheses can be 
derived regarding the relationship; 
H1: Decentralisation is influenced by local governance capacity while the impact of 
local capacity is limited or insignificant on decentralisation. 
H2: Decentralisation is influenced both by local governance capacity and local 
capacity significantly, and both capacities independently affect decentralisation 
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H3: Decentralisation is influenced by local capacity while the impact of local 
governance capacity apart is limited or insignificant 
The H1 suggests that there is not a direct relationship between local capacity and 
decentralisation where the impact of local capacity is only effective via its influence on local 
governance capacity. In H1, local governance capacity is an intervening variable between 
local capacity and decentralisation. Therefore, local capacity influences local governance 
capacity but not directly decentralisation.   
H2 suggests that local capacity has also a direct relationship with decentralisation, and 
in this case the level of local capacity would affect the impact of local governance capacity on 
decentralisation.  
If H1 represents the reality, a decision on decentralisation should depend on the 
assessment of the capacities in local government. In this scenario, higher decentralisation can 
lead to better governance as long as there is enough local governance capacity regardless of 
the degree of local capacity. However, if H2 represents the reality, the socio-economic 
conditions in the locality should be a matter of concern on implementing decentralisation 
policies and on the following capacity building practices.  
Nevertheless, the literature does not exclude the possibility that the presumed 
relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation is shaped by the local 
capacity and the socio-economic conditions are the main determinant on decentralisation. The 
H3 would suggest that the relationship between local governance capacity and 
decentralisation is explained by the degree of local capacity, whereas the relationship between 
local governance capacity and decentralisation is only determined by the local capacity.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main emphasis has been setting out the theoretical framework for 
analysing the relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local governance. 
Governance, despite being a popular concept in political science, remains a puzzling concept 
due to its multiple meanings. In this dissertation, local governance has been defined as 
steering the actors in localities in order to cover the service provision and demands of citizens, 
whereas the local government is the primus inter pares. In this sense, local governance 
capacity is determined by the capabilities of local government in managerial, organisational 
 83 
 
and institutional levels which comprises financial, material, planning, communication, human 
resources and managerial dimensions. These dimensions are categorised analytically into 
three functions of local governance, i.e. mobilisation of resources, decision-making and 
implementation. Furthermore, the socio-economic capabilities existing in the surrounding 
environment is identified as the local capacity. Decentralisation, on the other hand, can refer 
to a process or a state to identify the discretion of local government in fiscal, administrative 
and political dimensions in comparison to central government. The theories on the 
relationship of decentralisation and local governance suggest that better local governance 
relies on the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in public service delivery and 
responsiveness on local expectations and this link can only be attained effectively if the local 
government is financially dependent on local resources and has the discretion to implement 
the decision on public services. Nevertheless, empirical findings in single country cases 
identified a variety of factors contesting this assumption and suggesting that country case 
specific conditions need to be taken into account.      
In the following chapter, the local administration system in Turkey and its 
implications on local governance capacity and decentralisation in local governance will be 
elaborated. The specific conditions in Turkey will provide the context to supplement the 
theoretical aspects given in this chapter and subsequently the measurement method for the 
research will be selected.  
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CHAPTER III- TURKISH LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
The third chapter contextualises the theoretical propositions on the relationship 
between decentralisation and capacity with the institutional and structural conditions of the 
Turkish local governance. The purpose of this chapter is not only to familiarise the reader 
with the features of local governance in Turkey, but also to demarcate the country specific 
factors which might affect the relationship between decentralisation and capacity in local 
governance.   
The chapter starts with an overview of Turkish public administration system. It sheds 
light on the historical evolution of the local government system in Turkey and elaborates the 
laws regulating the local government system. A further emphasis will be given on local 
administration reforms after 2002 which reshaped the local government system. The focus 
will be on the novelties brought by the reform process and their implication in 
decentralisation. The subsequent parts will focus on the local capacity and local governance 
capacity in Turkish case by elaborating respectively the non-state actors in the locality and the 
capabilities in the local administrations. 
 
3.2 An Overview of Turkish Public Administration 
The Turkish public administration system is established on the basis of a strong central 
authority which presides over localities through a tutelage relation. This system is usually 
known in public administration literature as ‘Napoleonic’ administrative tradition (Peters, 
2008). Some general features of this administrative model are a highly centralised state 
structure, dependency on deconcentrated central field agencies, and constitutional status of 
local administration bodies (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991). 
Turkey is a unitary state and has two tiers of administration; the central and the local 
administration. In 1999, as part of the EU membership process, regional development 
agencies have been created based on NUTS system. However, these agencies do not have 
administrative competences, and constitutionally they are under the jurisdiction of central 
authority.  
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The Turkish administrative scheme is divided into 81 provinces which are governed 
by a governor who is appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The governor is the highest 
marked appointee of the central authority in provinces and its main function is to channel 
between locality and the central authority. Albeit once being the highest decision making 
authority in provinces, the governor has now a more regulatory position on local issues rather 
than being the final decision-making authority. Provinces are subdivided into districts which 
are governed by appointed kaymakams. Local administrations in provinces are represented by 
the elected local authorities. The principal local administrations are the municipalities. The 
other local administrations are the Special Provincial Administrations (SPAs) and Villages. 
Municipalities are the backbone of local government system in Turkey, with 83.9 % of 
Turkish population (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2012) lives in municipalities or metropolitan 
municipalities. There are in total 2950 municipalities in Turkey. Sixteen of them are 
metropolitan municipalities which have particular jurisdictional powers and structures 
comparing to others. Yet, all municipalities share the same responsibilities on providing 
public services in their jurisdiction. Metropolitan municipalities are established in 1984 for 
larger urban areas where the population exceeds 750.000 inhabitants. In contrast to other 
municipalities, metropolitan municipalities have two-tiers of administration in which the 
metropolitan administration (second tier) is vested with the responsibility of coordinating the 
district municipalities (first tier).  
SPAs are public bodies which mostly operate in rural areas outside the jurisdiction of 
municipalities for the provision of services such as construction of roads, infrastructure, 
schools and health facilities. SPAs are established following the French example of 
département system. The main legislative body of the SPA is an elected provincial council but 
the SPA is headed by the governor. Thus, for many years, the status of SPAs has been 
contested as a local government unit since the governor’s direct involvement on decision-
making process. Only with recent legislative changes, the status of the governor has been 
deprived from an administrative to a regulatory position. Villages, on the other hand, are the 
local administration bodies of small communities in rural areas. They are governed by an 
elected alderman’s council and an elected muhtar. Although villages are recognised as public 
organisations subject to the law on villages (issued in 1924), they don’t have allocated 
financial sources to carry out their own services. Therefore, all village services are delivered 
by SPAs. The legal framework for each consecutive body is defined by separate laws and 
determined by general principles on local administrations in the constitution.  
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In the Turkish constitution, there are two main principles which determine the 
functioning of local administration system. The crucial one is ‘integral unity in 
administration’ principle which enables a strong tutelage relation between central authority 
and local government. The second principle, ‘decentralisation’, refers to the allocation of 
power to public bodies in functional and territorial bases (TODAIE, 2007:13).  The territorial 
bodies are elected public bodies which are established to cover the needs of habitants in a 
geographically defined territory (Gözler, 2003:125). These bodies are named as ‘local 
administrations’. There are four different types of local administrations; i.e. Special Provincial 
Administration, Municipality, Metropolitan Municipality and Village.  
The functional bodies, on the other hand, are public corporate bodies, which are 
established outside of central hierarchy to cover scientific, economic, trade, social or technical 
purposes which require a specialised expertise (TODAIE, 2007:13). Thus, on the functional 
public bodies, ‘decentralisation’ corresponds to service purposes not to a territorial entity. 
Figure 3.1: Public Authorities according to ‘decentralisation principle’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TODAIE, 2007:13 
 
3.3 The Evolution of Turkish Local Government 
The Turkish public administration system is characterised by the strong bureaucratic 
administrative tradition which is inherited from the Ottoman era (Ökmen & Yılmaz, 2004). 
The current system took its roots during the modernisation process of the Ottoman Empire in 
the mid-19th century7. In this period, alongside with the transformation to an administrative 
monarchy, the local administrations earned legal and constitutional statuses. The implemented 
                                                            
7 The first municipality is established in 1855 following the Crimean War (Keleş, 2011:136) 
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changes during this era were largely preserved in the new Turkish republic as well. In the late 
period of the Ottoman Empire, two schools of thought have emerged within the governing 
Ittihat ve Terakki8 Party. The first group, headed by Ahmet Riza, was favouring an 
authoritarian modernisation led by the central authority. The second group, headed by Prince 
Sabahaddin, was advocating a liberal modernisation by adopting political decentralisation and 
market economy. Eventually, the former became paramount in the ideological scene, and the 
centralist modernisation strategy turned into a state policy.  
The modernisation in the Ottoman Empire was an autocratic modernisation and the 
sole purpose was to prevent further dissolution of empire. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge the establishment of local administrations was as an act of embedding the 
central authority into localities to ensure collection of taxes and to restore order (Ortaylı, 
1995). At a time when the Western influence was decisive on the stability of the Empire, the 
solution of the policy makers was to introduce the European institutions and systems into the 
traditional administrative system (Ortaylı, 1999). The outcome was an amalgam of two 
different administrative systems (i.e. the traditional and the French system) and the conflict 
between different values and norms shaped the trajectory of bureaucratic evolution (Eryılmaz, 
2008:12). Unlike the European examples, the local administrations in the Empire had been 
created by a top-down strategy without having historical ties with the feudal past. In the old 
system, the local public services were covered by ‘qadi’s9 and by artisans’ guilds (Keleş, 
2011:135). Therefore, the local administration in Turkey has relatively a short past comparing 
to European counterparts, and a grass-root political evolution towards enhanced local rights 
was absent in the Turkish case.  
From the establishment of the republic in 1923 until 1945, Turkey was ruled as a one-
party state. Most of the ruling elite of the time originated from the Ittihat ve Terakki Party, 
and the continuity in modernisation strategy was prevalent. The general assumption was that 
statism and centralisation are needed in order for reforms to take root in the society (Eryılmaz, 
1997). Similar to the Ottoman period, the local administrations’ functions continued to be 
dependent on the consent of the central authority. A notable change occurred when first time 
separate legislations on local administrations took place in 1930s. Although the core functions 
did not change, the municipalities were delegated some limited rights such as on city planning 
(Tekeli, 1992). Beside these, in 1930’s, ‘étatism’ had been adopted as part of the development 
                                                            
8 Ittihat ve Terakki Party (Committee of Union and Progress) governed the Ottoman Empire between 1908-1918 
9 A type of Islamic judge, who is the highest authority in locality and responsible for settling the disputes and 
overseeing the public services. 
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strategy. National state planning was introduced and State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) were 
created to realise two major aims, nation building and industrialisation (Özcan, 2000). In a 
nutshell, this period can be seen as a peek point in centralist tendencies both in administration 
and in economics.  
The general elections in 1950 marked the end of the single party period, and a new 
party, the Democrat Party, stayed in power for a decade. The changing conditions on the 
social, economic and political environment motivated the new government to initiate a 
comprehensive structural reform in the existing system. The Democrat Party opposed 
“étatism”, and advocated that once private sector is set free from statist policies the economy 
would flourish (Heper, 1991). Notwithstanding, the SEEs continued to keep their central role 
on investments and the policies towards private sector had largely failed (Heper, 1991). 
Moreover, some competences of the local administrations were transferred to the newly 
established central institutions. Since the multi-party system brought political competition in 
the local level as well, the central authority tried to constrain local authorities through 
politically motivated regulations (Eryılmaz, 1995). Thus, some authors argue that the 
dependency of local administrations on the central authority has even increased (Ökmen, 
2008:52). Nevertheless, the shift towards free market economy enhanced the influence of 
local businessmen and land-owning elites in politics, and the capitalist development prevailed 
through private entrepreneurships and the alliance with the West and NATO (Özcan, 2000). 
The Democrat Party government was toppled from power with a military coup d’état in 1960. 
The 1961 constitution in the aftermath of the military intervention is esteemed by 
many because of its underlying democratic principles. For instance, the principle of 
decentralisation has been recognised by the constitution. Additionally, the central government 
has been held accountable on sustaining the required financial sources to the local authorities 
in compliance with their constitutional responsibilities (Ökmen, 2008: 52). The purpose was 
to secure the local administrations from the frequent direct interventions by the central 
authority. However, the dependency of municipalities on central authority endured despite 
enhanced legal rights. The main reason was that municipalities failed to cover the local 
services due to financial incapacities. In this sense, some scholars argue that governments 
confined the financial sources to local administrations as a control mechanism (Ökmen, 
2008:53). For others, the central authority has failed to cope with increased demands from 
municipalities whose expenditures have been augmented due to rapid urban growth. Hence, 
municipalities remained politically and economically weak (Güler, 1992).  
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In the 1970s, the municipalities have increased their demands towards more public 
participation and political freedom in the municipal government. The municipalities led by 
social democrats especially pioneered this campaign. The campaign triggered a hot political 
debate due to the political polarisation between the right wing parties controlling the central 
government and the social democrats which were in control of major cities. Additionally, the 
shift in population from rural to urban areas empowered the position of municipalities. In 
return, the Ministry of Local Administrations has been established for a short period from 
January 1978 to November 1979. The principal responsibility of the Ministry was to enhance 
the financial and administrative capacities of municipalities and to reconcile their demands 
with the central authority. Although there are various pro- and against arguments on the 
purpose and function of the Ministry, the need to open a ministry focusing only to the needs 
of local administrations proved the increasing importance of local administrations in Turkish 
politics (Keleş, 2011:475). Nevertheless, the worsening economic conditions at the end of 
1970s and violent clashes between left and right wing groups paved way to hyperinflation, 
political instability and street terror, and eventually to another coup d’état in 1980. 
Following the coup d’état in 1980, a new constitution came into force in 1982. Despite 
numerous amendments, this constitution is still the principal document in Turkey. The 1982 
constitution is marked by many as an undemocratic constitution which re-established the 
central control on local administrations. If we compare the constitutions of 1961 and 1982, the 
principal differences in terms of local politics can be seen in the following aspects (Keleş, 
2011: 145-147); 
1) The administrative tutelage of the central authority on local administrations is 
constitutionalised. Even though an unwritten administrative tutelage relationship existed 
previously, with the 1982 document the administrative tutelage received a legal recognition.  
2) A special local administration structure is envisaged for bigger municipalities, which 
eventually led to the formation of metropolitan municipalities. 
3) A special right was granted to the Ministry of Interior to discharge the mayor if there is a 
crime charge against the mayor or an on-going prosecution against the municipality. This 
right has been invoked on some occasions for partisan displacements of mayors. Nevertheless, 
there are examples of court cases which convicted these partisan changes as illegal and 
reversed the judgement of the Ministry (Keleş, 2011:147). 
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4) The establishment of union of municipalities has been conditioned onto the consent of the 
central authority.  
It is evident, that the 1982 constitution was an attempt to re-establish the control of the 
central authority in local organisations and more generally in society. Despite the rigid 
formulation of the constitution, the 1980s have witnessed liberal policies both in economics 
and politics which reduced the role of the state gradually. 
First of all, the economic crisis in the early years of 1980s called for the reassessment 
of economic policies. The first general elections after the coup d’état had been concluded with 
the landslide victory of Motherlands Party (ANAP), which predominantly advocated liberal 
economic policies. A radical policy reorientation took place, e.g. from import substitution to 
export promotion; from interventionism to market forces; and from the promotion of SEE’s to 
the promotion of private sector. Furthermore, the state’s role in economy was reduced with 
the privatisation of some SEE’s. However, the SEE reform had largely failed, because the 
legal, institutional, and political base for privatisation was missing (Kjellström, 1990). 
Especially, the foreign sales had become a contentious political issue. In addition, the block 
sales of some SEE’s were cancelled by the court order on the grounds of illegality. 
In 1984 the Metropolitan Municipalities Act was introduced to cope with the pressure 
from rapid urban growth. With this act the roles and responsibilities of small municipalities 
and districts, and their relationships with the metropolitan municipality were defined. 
Consequently, the influence of local elected municipalities on policy-making increased. 
Furthermore, in 1987, Turkey signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government10.  
The biggest change concerning municipalities occurred with the devolution of the 
urban planning to municipalities. Municipalities were allowed to deliver building permits with 
the regulation in 1985. Yet, this new function of municipalities raised severe criticisms by 
increasing corruption and misuse in planning. For many, this function has turned into ‘an 
instrument of local patronage and political mediation’ (Marcou, 2006). 
                                                            
10 The Charter was opened for signature by the Council of Europe's member states on 15 October 1985. Turkey 
signed the charter in 1987, but it became part of the jurisdiction only after 1993. Turkey made reservations to 7 
articles in the Chart. These reservations are the following; Article 4.6: ‘the manner and timing of consultation 
should be such that the local authorities have a real possibility to exercise influence’; Article 6.1: ‘local 
authorities must be able to order their own administrative structures to take account of local circumstances and 
administrative efficiency’; Article 7.3: ‘disqualification from the holding of local elective office should only be 
based on objective legal criteria and not on ad hoc decisions’; Article 8.3: ‘according to principle of 
proportionality, the controlling authority, in exercising its prerogatives, is obliged to use the method which 
affects local autonomy the least’; Article 9.4, 9.6 and 9.7 ‘the rules and conditions on the allocation of financial 
resources to local autorities’; Article 10.2 and 10.3; ‘rules and conditions on forming associations between local 
authorities’; Article 11.1: ‘access by a local authority to a properly constituted court of law’ 
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In a nutshell, in 1980s, decentralisation and privatisation policies have gained 
popularity in line with the global trend. Important structural changes have been initiated 
which altered the state-controlled development policy towards a more liberal system. Several 
local services were privatised or encouraged to be privatised.  
Nevertheless, the pace of reforms in the administrative system had declined 
considerably in 1990s, largely driven by three dynamics; the lack of political stability and 
instability among coalition governments; the armed conflict with Kurdish insurgents11 had 
reached its climax and underpinned centralist tendencies; and relations with the EU had lost 
momentum in the aftermaths of Turkey’s full membership application in 1987. The impact of 
the EU was relatively limited until the Helsinki Conference in 1999 where Turkey was 
granted candidate status.  
In late 1990s and early 2000s, the trajectory has changed parallel to the changes in the 
abovementioned factors. The EU candidate status, military achievements against PKK and 
most importantly the 1999 and 2001 economic crises gave impetus to reform studies on public 
administration system. Hence, the draft acts in 1999 and 2001 were prepared as part of a 
comprehensive plan to restructure the public administration system. In this frame, the draft act 
in 1999 aimed an enhanced administrative and fiscal decentralisation in local services 
(Ökmen, 2008). The draft proclaimed new responsibilities and competences for local 
administrations and an increase from 15 to 35 % on local administrations’ share in overall 
public expenditures. The revised version in 2001 detailed the issues of reallocation of 
responsibilities, competences and financial sources between the centre and local 
administrations. Most importantly, the subsidiarity principle was recognised as the basis of 
the public service delivery.  
Notwithstanding, the political turmoil in the aftermaths of the severe economic crisis 
in 2001 impeded the coalition government to enact the draft acts. The coalition government 
was replaced in November 2002, by the one party government of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP). 
Almost after 15 years of coalition governments and political instability, AKP came to 
power at a time when the candidate status of Turkey for the EU membership had already been 
proclaimed, the devastating PKK threat was at the lowest level since 1980’s and after the 
serious economic crisis in 2001, the signals for an upwards trend on economic growth were 
                                                            
11 Namely, with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation internationally 
by a number of states and organisations, including the United States, UN,  NATO and the EU. (not by the UN)  
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evident. The convenient conditions consolidated with a strong discourse for the EU 
membership facilitated a swift reform process until the start of the EU membership 
negotiations in September 2005.  
As part of the reform process, new laws on local administrations were enacted, e.g. 
‘Special Provincial Administration Law’, ‘Municipality Law’, ‘Metropolitan Municipality 
Law’ and ‘Local Administration Unions Law’. Additionally, ‘Public Financial Management 
and Control Law’, ‘Law on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of Development 
Agencies’ and ‘Law on Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfer Shares across Special 
Provincial Administrations and Municipalities’ were implemented to regulate the financial 
means of local administrations. Through the regulations, structural, functional and financial 
dimensions of local administrations, as well as the general principles of public administration 
system, were reshaped from an administrative model towards a regulatory managerial model. 
Decentralisation, transparency, participation, efficiency and effectiveness in government 
services were presented as the underpinning principles in the reform process. The field 
agencies of many ministries have been disbanded in order to devolve their functions to local 
administrations. The financial and administrative autonomy of local administrations have 
been guaranteed with legal adjustments. Moreover, the legal status of some public bodies such 
as development agencies and union of municipalities have been recognised. 
 
3.4 New Regulations on Local Administrations  
The reforms during AKP government brought new legal statuses and enhanced 
administrative and financial competences for local administrations. In this part, the new 
regulations will be examined by elaborating the new competences and functions of local 
administrations. Before dwelling in the analysis, a short overview will be presented of the 
reform process and its influential factors 
3.4.1 Overview of the local government reform process  
The AKP announced the ‘Urgent Action Plan’ short after the elections with the aim to 
initiate the economic and social transformation of the country. In compliance with the plan, 
the official programme on the reform strategy was declared in March 2003. The outcome of 
the reform process is articulated as ‘efficient, participative, decentralised and transparent 
public management system’.  
 93 
 
A threefold reform strategy has been designed including the changes in the principles 
of the public administration system, in local administration laws and in the public personnel 
regime (Erdoğdu, 2003). First, in December 2003, the draft act n°5227 namely ‘Law on Basic 
Principles and Reorganisation of Public Administration’ was presented to the national 
assembly. The act was formulated to set the legal basis for the subsequent reforms. The 
underlying aspects of the act are listed as following; 
• Performance based system and strategy planning are set as essentials for all public 
administration bodies. 
• Service delivery is rearranged on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Additionally, 
local authorities put responsible for all local areas where the jurisdiction is not 
specified in the constitution.  
• Duties and competences regarding the services on health, tourism and culture, forest 
and environment, agriculture and village affairs, social care and children protection, 
youth and sports, industry and public works are transferred from the provincial 
organisations of ministries to municipalities, and to the SPAs for areas outside of the 
borders of municipalities. The provincial administrations of the respective ministries 
are abolished.  
• State enterprises providing the services which are already covered by private 
enterprises are decided to be privatised or shut down.  
• Changes in public personnel regime, working procedures of local assemblies and 
regional development agencies are announced to take place in subsequent acts.  
The draft act was reviewed by the commissions in the assembly and some provisions 
had been changed. The most important change took place on devolution of powers concerning 
education services. In the revised draft, the devolution of education services to SPAs has been 
removed. The explanation was that the SPAs lack the sufficient capacity to cover the required 
services (Türkoğlu, 2004). The revised draft act was approved by the assembly in July 2004. 
However, the act was vetoed partially by the President on the basis that some provisions do 
not comply with ‘integral unity in administration’ principle. The President sent the draft back 
to the assembly for further review. According to the constitution, national assembly has the 
right to send back the act without a single change. In this case, the President has two choices, 
either to promulgate the act or to refer the law to the Constitutional Court. However, the 
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assembly did not send the act back to the president and even after the change in the 
presidency12, the act is still on hold in the national assembly.  
The 5227 numbered Public Administration Basic Law was a road map of public 
management reform process rather than a detailed reform act. The rules on allocation of 
resources between central and local authorities and auditing of local administrations have 
been some of the unrevealed issues (TESEV, 2004). The draft act also announced that the 
uncovered issues would be complemented with additional laws. Nevertheless, the reform 
strategy of the government has changed after the veto of the president, and instead of a 
comprehensive piece of legislation, separate laws such as ‘Special Provincial Administration 
Law’, ‘Municipality Law’, ‘Metropolitan Municipality Law’, ‘Local Administration Unions 
Law’, ‘Public Financial Management and Control Law’, and ‘Law on the Establishment, 
Coordination and Duties of Development Agencies’ were enacted subsequently in following 
three years..  
In June 2006, the deputy Prime Minister, Mehmet A. Şahin assessed the reform 
performance of the government by underlining that ‘32 out of 45 indicated reforms in the 
Urgent Action Plan’ have been realised within three years. Reforms on ‘redefining liabilities 
and competences of central authority’, ‘empowering financial structure of local 
administrations’, ’empowering human sources of local administrations’, ‘transferring some 
provincial organisations and their personnel to provincial administrations’, are mentioned as 
non-accomplished objectives related to public management. In the document, the veto of the 
President on the Public Administration Basic Law is underlined as an important reason why 
the rest of the anticipated laws had not been enacted. However, the stagnation on reform 
process despite the change of the president contests the reliability of the argument.  
Indeed, the political will for change has been in obvious decline since 2005, for a 
variety of reasons. For example, 2007 was an election year, and public management reform 
was definitely not a priority in the run-up to the public vote. Another potential reason is that 
after 2006, security became an urgent issue in domestic politics. PKK assaults began to ramp 
up following relatively peaceful years after the capture of the head of the organisation in 
1999. Since most of southeastern and eastern Turkey is populated largely by Kurdish citizens, 
the already heated political discussions around the fear of segregation made the government 
even more reluctant to take further political action towards decentralisation. Moreover, the 
                                                            
12	The current president Abdullah Gül was a former minister in the AKP government.	
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EU membership process appears as another factor in the pace of the reform process. The 
golden years of reform period, 2002–2005, were motivated by the objective of starting the 
membership negotiation process, which finally began in September 2005. 
Notwithstanding, there were new laws on local governments enacted after 2006. 
Basically, these laws were meant to fix the emergent contradictions following the first phase 
of the reform process in the years 2003-2005. Capacity problems, redundant administrations, 
overlapping competences between local-local or central-local administrations, and 
coordination problems were some of the vital issues. Hence, in a nutshell the local 
administration reform process during AKP government can be described as follows; 
1st Phase: Structural Reforms (2003-2005) 
• Structural Change in Public Administration System 
• Increased financial and administrative autonomy for local government 
• Transfer of service responsibilities from central authority to local government 
• New management practices & values (e.g. performance based budget planning, 
strategic plans, ex-ante control and ex-post auditing, financial transparency, 
effectiveness, efficiency and accountability) 
• From tutelage to coordination between central and local authority 
 2nd Phase: Revisions and Adaptations (2006 onwards)  
• Fixing the contradictions in the post-reform area. (e.g. capacity problems, overlapping 
competences, redundant administrations, coordination problems…) 
• More streamlined and larger metropolitan municipalities 
• Less number of municipalities with larger economies of scales. 
• Abolishment of redundant local administrations such as first-tier municipalities or 
SPAs in metropolitan municipalities. 
  
3.4.2 New Laws on Local Administrations 
In this part, the laws affecting the local administration system will be examined. The 
emphasis will be on administrative and functional regulations of each law, and the 
way/degree/form it affects the local administration structure and competences. 
 
a) 5018 coded Public Financial Management and Control Law 
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The law was enacted in December 2003. It regulates the management of public 
sources, their related institutions and the management process. The new standards and 
processes are; 
• The functioning of the public financial management, rules on budgeting, accounting, 
reporting of financial transactions and financial control are reorganised. 
• Financial transparency, accountability, effective acquisition and efficient use of public 
resources have become essentials on the public management. 
• Initiative-taking among public servants and internal control system for public 
institutions is encouraged.  
• Ex-ante control and ex-post auditing  
• All public bodies are held responsible to prepare strategy plans and publish financial 
statistics. Additionally, the new law introduces performance based budgeting 
b) 5393 coded Municipality Law (the revived 5272 law) 
The initial draft coded 5272 was presented at the national assembly in 2003, but it was 
annulled by the Constitutional Court on the basis of the problems with the formality on some 
provisions. The revised draft was approved by the President and was enacted in July 2005. 
Yet, the President brought a lawsuit to the Court to annul the provision about the pre-
elementary schools. The Court judged the annulment of the provision in 2007. 
According to the enacted law, reforms on municipalities are the followings; 
• Municipality is redefined as “a corporation established in the statute of public legal 
entity having powers of self-government (autonomous) both administratively and 
financially, to meet the local and common requirements of the county inhabitants and 
the decision maker of which is elected by the electors.”13 Thus, administrative and 
fiscal autonomy of municipalities have become part of the constitution.  
• The minimum required population to establish a municipality is increased from 2000 
to 5000 residents. Moreover, the meeting schedule of municipality council has been 
rearranged from three times per year to once per month.  
                                                            
13 Translation is taken from the following website, www.turkishlaws.com .  
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• Smallest local districts called mahalle’s have been added to municipal jurisdiction. In 
return, municipalities have become responsible for the performance of services in 
mahalles. 
• New additional services on geographical and urban data systems, environment and 
environmental health, forestry, parks and green areas, cultural and artworks, tourism, 
youth and sport activities, social and aid services, as well as services aimed at the 
development of economy and commerce. Furthermore, opening and operating of pre-
elementary school education centres and health facilities has become part of the 
liabilities.14 In this frame, provincial administrations of some ministries have been 
transferred to municipalities. In the absence of delegation of duties and services to 
other public institutions and corporations, municipalities may undertake additional 
liabilities. Since a sequence on service priorities is not defined as in the previous law, 
discretionary power of municipalities has been increased (Eryılmaz, 2008). 
• Efficiency and effectiveness on personnel management, financial and performance-
based auditing, and participation of non-state actors to the meetings of specialised 
committees are new processes for municipalities. 
 
c) 5216 coded Metropolitan Municipality Law 
The law was enacted in July 2004. The opposition party sent a couple of annulment 
cases to the Court15 and as a consequence only some minor changes were adopted. The new 
law brings the following changes to metropolitan municipalities; 
• Administrative and financial autonomy of the metropolitan municipalities is 
guaranteed under the public law. 
• The law strengthens the metropolitan municipalities over district municipalities by 
extending the list of functions regarding the investment programmes, budget, planning 
authority, police services, business permits...etc. The functions of first-tier 
municipalities are restricted with local land use planning, programming on specific 
activities and management of service delivery in their districts (Marcou, 2006).  
                                                            
14 This provision was annulled by the Constitutional Court in 24.01.2007. The official statement is 
‘Acknowledging pre-elementary education part of national education, it cannot be a local demand, thus as a local 
authority, municipalities cannot be in charge of these services.’  
15 Republican People’s Party (CHP)	
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• Instead of a tutelage relationship with first-tier municipalities16, a coordinative role is 
assumed for metropolitan municipalities. An indirect financial control of lower-tier 
municipalities is prevented by abandoning the input-based budget auditing (Kaplan, 
2005). However, the supervisory power of the metropolitan municipality over district 
municipalities, especially in planning activities, has been extended (Marcou, 2006). 
• Metropolitan municipalities are authorised to establish companies in line with their 
responsibilities.  In addition, they are allowed to devolve the managerial rights on 
enterprises owned by municipalities, such as parking garages or selling stands, to other 
companies in certain conditions. 
 
d) 5302 coded Special Provincial Administration Law 
The first draft was presented to the assembly in March 2004. It was vetoed partially by 
the President on the basis of ‘integral unity in administration’ principle. The revised draft was 
enacted in February 2005. It was brought by the President to the Constitutional Court, which 
decided in 2007 that the law is not unconstitutional by pointing the ex-ante control.  
• The most fundamental change is implemented on the administrative structure of SPAs. 
In the administrative hierarchy of the SPA, the governor is the head of administration. 
Yet, since the governor is not an elected figure but an appointed one, the status of 
SPAs as local governments was disputed for long (Güler,2003). With new regulations, 
the governor is divested of the position as president of the provincial assembly. The 
council is empowered to elect its president, and some of the governor’s liabilities are 
devolved to the president. Yet, the administration remains under the authority of the 
governor, who chairs the executive committee. Furthermore, SPAs’ financial and 
administrative autonomy have become part of the constitution like other local 
administrations. Hence, the direct control of the central authority on the SPA has 
reduced.  
• Responsibilities and authorities of SPAs increased akin to the municipalities. Yet, their 
authority on education services declined (Göksu, Aydın & Güney, 2009: 28). Since in 
previous arrangements SPAs were operating under the direct control of the central 
                                                            
16	 First-tier municipalities are established inside the metropolitan municipal borders and they have the same 
competences with the district municipalities. Their difference from district municipalities is that the first-tier 
municipalities cannot have territories outside the metropolitan municipal borders.	
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authority, the education services were carried out through SPAs under the authority of 
the Ministry of Education. However, as mentioned above, the education services are 
not devolved to the local administrations. Therefore, in the new law, SPAs are only in 
charge of construction and maintenance of elementary and secondary schools.  
• The meeting schedule of provincial assembly is rearranged to once a month instead of 
twice a year. The governor is allowed to delegate some of his responsibilities to 
district municipalities or to other units within SPAs. Additionally, committee members 
are authorised to suggest agenda items. In the previous law, the duty was only 
delegated to the governor. 
• Norm cadre system, performance auditing, transparency and more flexibility on 
management have become part of the SPA’s management.  
 
e) 5355 coded Local Administration Unions Law  
The opposition party brought a lawsuit for the annulment of some provisions of this 
law. The Court rejected all annulment requests and the law was enacted in May 2005. The law 
defines the local administration unions as functional bodies established by local 
administrations to cooperate over an objective. The most important revision on the law is that 
local administration unions gained a legal status under public law. The union of local 
administrations can carry out the functions which are delegated to them by member 
municipalities. There is not a certain list of functions to be delegated to the unions, but for 
cross-border projects related with ecology and water management, municipalities are obliged 
to participate at a union for the purpose of the project. Beside this, the law does not contain 
revisions on the administrative autonomy or liabilities of the unions. 
 
f) 5449 nº Law on the Establishment, Coordination and Duties of Development Agencies 
The law is enacted in January 2006. The opposition party brought a lawsuit for the 
annulment of some provisions. The argument was basically that the agencies are authorities 
for a new tier in administrative structure (i.e. regions), which is not defined in the 
Constitution. The Court rejected all annulment requests by assessing that the agencies are on 
functional public authority status.  
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As declared in the Urgent Action Plan, the regional development agencies (RDA) were 
established in order to develop and implement development strategies for NUTS II level 
statistical regions which were created in 2002. The law granted a functional public authority 
status to RDAs anticipating a sustainable regional growth on a competitive basis. The law 
diminished the monopoly of State Planning Organisation (SPO) on development planning 
(Bağlı, 2008, p. 205). Nonetheless, the development agencies were meant to operate under the 
coordination of the SPO. When the SPO transformed into the Ministry of Development, its 
coordination function on RDAs has been delegated alongside with to the Ministry. Hence, the 
disputed status of RDAs is solved for good as being formally part of the central government 
structure. 
 
g) 5779 nº Law on Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfer Shares across Special Provincial 
Administrations and Municipalities  
The law was enacted in July 2008 and it regulates the financial situation of local 
administrations to match with their new functional responsibilities. Before this legislation, the 
intergovernmental transfer system was based on the population criterion for both SPAs and 
municipalities. This legislation has changed the transfer formula for SPAs by reducing the 
weight of population criterion to 50 % and adding other criteria: geographic size (10%), 
number of villages (10%), rural population (15%) and development index (15%). For 
municipalities it reduced the weight of population criterion to 80 % and added another 
criterion based on development index (20%) to the transfer formula (Tosun & Yılmaz, 2008). 
An increase of  28% on local administrations’ revenues is anticipated with the enactment of 
the law (TEPAV, 2006)17. 
 
h) 5747 nº Law on Establishment of District Municipalities within the Metropolitan Municipal 
Borders  
 The act is approved in March 2008. With this law, first-tier municipalities were 
abolished and municipalities with population less than 2000 residents were downgraded to 
mahalles or villages. The law streamlined the local government system by removing the 
overlapping jurisdictions between first-tier and district municipalities and abolishing small 
municipalities lacking economies of scale and capacities to provide municipal services. 
                                                            
17 In fact, the change on local service revenues complies with the foreseen percentage. 
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g) 6360 nº Law on Establishment of 13 New Metropolitan Municipalities and 26 district 
municipalities.  
 The law is enacted in November 2012.  13 provincial municipalities with a population 
above 750.000 residents were granted the metropolitan municipality status alongside with 
their district municipalities. Furthermore, the municipal borders of metropolitan 
municipalities were adjusted to the provincial borders, and thus all municipalities outside the 
metropolitan municipality borders turned into district municipalities. Until this law, the 
borders of metropolitan municipalities varied in each case according to the size of the urban 
area. For Istanbul and Kocaeli, the metropolitan municipal borders had already been equal to 
the provincial borders. Furthermore, all SPAs within the provinces of metropolitan 
municipalities were abolished as all rural areas in the province were put under the jurisdiction 
of the metropolitan municipality. Replacing SPAs, new administrative units called ‘Unit of 
Monitoring Investment and Coordination’ were established as provincial agents of central 
government as part of the Ministry of Interior.  
  
3.4.3 Evaluation of the local government reforms 
 
As part of the reform process, structural, functional, and financial dimensions of local 
administration have been reshaped to move towards a more decentralised system; the field 
agencies of many ministries have devolved their functions to local administration. The 
financial and administrative autonomy of local administration have been guaranteed in law. 
Moreover, the legal status of public bodies such as development agencies and unions of 
municipalities has been recognised. 
There is a caveat, however, in that these reforms were not intended to alter the 
imbalance that exists in the balance of power between central and local authorities.18 It is 
necessary to acknowledge the introduction of the above laws as a shift in the state 
administrative system. For instance, the Public Financial Management and Control Law holds 
all public bodies responsible for strategic planning, and foresees ex-ante control and ex-post 
auditing. Additionally, this legislation has introduced performance-based budgeting to all 
public bodies. Therefore, a proper description of this decentralisation process could be ‘the 
                                                            
18 According to OECD reports, the imbalance between central and local administrations in employment of public 
servants and revenues did not alter drastically despite legal adjustments (Government at Glance 2009). 
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reallocation of competencies and responsibilities between the central and local 
administrations as part of the state reform on the basis of the New Public Management 
principles.’ It is evident that local administration’s legislative status and competencies have 
improved significantly as a result of the reform agenda. Nevertheless, this change is not a 
mere transfer of power from central to local but a simultaneous change in both central and 
local administration where the administrative state model has been transformed into one that 
is regulatory/managerial.  
 The decentralisation reforms were intended to be instrumental in the anticipated 
transformation of the administrative system. However, in practice, several paradoxes have 
emerged due to contradicting factors at legal, political, managerial, and societal levels, which 
not only shaped the path and nature of decentralisation but also affected the transformation to 
the managerial state model. 
First, although the initial aim was reform, the outcome can be described only as a 
tweak of the existing legal framework in order to correspond with the implemented changes. 
As noted above, the constitution defines a tutelage relationship where the central authority 
delegates the required competencies and resources to the local administration. This definition, 
especially the clause on the “integral unity in administration,” has been instrumental in 
several lawsuits in the Turkish Constitutional Court aimed at annulling the decentralisation 
acts. The Court rejected most of the cases by stating that the “integral unity in administration” 
implies the center can delegate some of its responsibilities to local administration as long as 
the “administrative tutelage” is preserved. In other words, the administrative and financial 
autonomy allocated to local administration is evaluated not as devolution but as delegation. 
However, this perception goes against the philosophy of the anticipated system, because the 
center preserves actual decision-making authority despite the local administration’s 
administrative and financial autonomy. On the other hand, the European Charter on Local 
Self-Government, which was ratified by Turkey in 1993, has already accepted the subsidiarity 
principle (see Article 4), which appears both in the Public Administration Basic Law and in 
other local administration laws. However, in these court cases the phrase quoted above is 
considered to be unconstitutional and contrary to the tutelage relationship between central and 
local government. Since international laws are binding and cannot be taken to the 
Constitutional Court, this creates a legal contradiction according to some scholars (Keleş 
2011: 511). Consequently the legal framework – and primarily the constitution – is important 
sources of conflict in practice.  
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Second, bureaucratic resistance and political polarisation between state institutions has 
crippled the reform process. As mentioned above, several cases against the decentralisation 
acts were brought to the Constitutional Court by the President and the official opposition. The 
motivation behind the lawsuits seemed mostly ideological or political, and the foreseen 
changes were perceived as ‘a threat for the existence of the state.’ Most of these cases have 
already been rejected by the Court, or could cause only minor changes in the revised laws. 
However, in two instances, the allegations of being “unconstitutional” in addition to other 
opposition resulted in drastic changes to existing legislation. The first was the abolishment of 
the Public Administration Basic Law following the veto of the President, and the other was 
the removal of education from devolved services in the drafted laws regarding the remit of 
local authorities. The former was initiated as an umbrella law in 2003 to establish the 
essentials of the anticipated system. The draft law described “a transparent, participatory and 
accountable system where public services are provided rapidly, effectively, efficiently and in 
quality,” and introduced new management tools such as performance-based budgeting and 
strategic planning for the public administration. Although subsequent laws have been 
formulated based on these principles, for many the absence of this umbrella law has resulted 
in inconsistencies. The devolution of education services to local administration drew huge 
criticisms from opposition groups as being too vital a service to be taken out of state control. 
Distrust in local administration’s ability to ensure secular and ‘national’ education 
underpinned the counterarguments. On the other hand, the reform process was enforced only 
by the government and a small clique of elite civil servants; reforms were not embraced by 
outside actors and the participation of civil society and the academic world in the reform 
process was limited (TEPAV 2006). Consequently, political polarisation and fear of 
segregation focused debate on legislation rather than on the actual impact public services on 
daily life and this had a negative impact on public support for, and awareness of, the reform 
process. 
Third, lack of capacity and adaptation problems led to a management deficit (UNDP 
2008) that has hampered local administrations’ ability to make full use of the authority given 
to them. Indeed, many local authorities were incapable of performing the new responsibilities 
and managerial tasks introduced with the new laws. One major criticism is the lack of 
financial means and inability to levy sufficient taxes in local government. In fact, the later 
reforms were largely designed to enhance the financial capacity of local government. 
Notwithstanding to the new reforms, the financial outlook in local government did not change 
 104 
 
drastically, as more than half of all local revenue still originates from the central revenue 
sources. The weight of central revenue sources is even higher in smaller municipalities and 
SPAs. This problem was partly addressed with the reduction in the number of municipalities 
and SPAs. Furthermore, due to time constraints, the earlier strategic plans were prepared 
without the participatory elements stipulated by law. In some cases, the strategic planning task 
was contracted out to external actors (TEPAV 2006). That said, it appears that in some cases 
local administrations were averse to exercising the authority granted to them. For instance, it 
was noted that municipalities avoid taking responsibility for traffic commissions4 and prefer 
to let the old system prevail (TEPAV 2006). Recently, capacity-building projects have been 
emerging as the priority for the government. In this framework, a number of such projects and 
training programs are planned in conjunction with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the EU as part of the second Local Administration Reform 
Programme (LAR II).  
 
3.5 The Discretion of the Central Government over Local Administrations 
in Turkey 
The central government has some discretionary power over local administrations and 
analysing the extent of this power is important to map the factors affecting local governance. 
In this part, the administrative, political and financial dimensions of this relation will be 
examined. The administrative dimension is about the supervision and control responsibilities 
of the central authorities over local government. The political dimension focuses on  the 
competition of the political parties over local administrations and its impact on local 
governance. The financial dimension sheds light on the extent that local revenues rely on the 
consent of the central government, and the financial means of the central government to exert 
influence in local governance. 
 
3.5.1 Discretion on administrative dimension 
According to the constitution, the central government controls and oversees the 
functions of local authorities to ensure ‘the functioning of public services, securing uniform 
public service, safeguarding public interest and meeting local needs in an appropriate manner’ 
(par.5, Art 127). There are three areas where the central authority exercises control and 
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oversight over local administrations: administrative, budgetary and financial issues (World 
Bank, 2004). This exercise of power is realised through the requirements of local acts, 
decisions, local and regional plans, budgets and financial statements (Marcou, 2006). 
There are three articles in the constitution which regulate the basis of relations 
between central and local authority, namely article 123r, 126t and 127t. These articles 
constitute the principles in which the administrative units operate. 
The 123rd article states that: “The administration forms a whole with regard to its 
structure and functions, and shall be regulated by law. The organisation and functions of the 
administration are based on the principles of centralisation and local administration19. Public 
corporate bodies shall be established only by law, or by the authority expressly granted by 
law.” This sentence needs some clarification. These principles refer to the source of 
administration. In other words, there are two types of public administrations in Turkey, and 
these are the central and local administrations. The relation between the central and local 
administrative bodies is described in detail in Article 127. In addition, the article states that 
the public administrations can only be established and regulated by law. 
The 126th article of the Constitution describes the foundation of the central 
administrative structure; “In terms of central administrative structure, Turkey is divided into 
provinces on the basis of geographical situation and economic conditions, and public service 
requirements; provinces are further divided into lower levels of administrative districts. The 
administration of the provinces is based on the principle of deconcentration20. Central 
administrative organisations comprising several provinces may be established to ensure 
efficiency and coordination of public services. The functions and powers of these 
organisations shall be regulated by law”. The important point on this article is that 
‘deconcentration’ constitutes the relation between the provincial organisations and central 
administrations. 
Article 127 defines the functioning of the local administrations as followed:  
“Local administrative bodies are public corporate entities established to meet the 
common local needs of the inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, 
                                                            
19 The translation of the articles is taken from the official website of the constitution. www.anayasa.gov.tr. The 
principle of ‘centralisation’ refers to the ‘integral unity in administration’ and ‘local administration’ refers to the 
principle of ‘decentralisation’. 
20 In the original document, this term is called ‘yetki genişliği’ which means ‘deconcentration’. Although, in the 
English document, this term is translated as the ‘devolution of wider powers’, it clearly stands for 
‘deconcentration’.  
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whose decision making organs are elected by the electorate described in law, and 
whose principles of structure are also determined by law. The formation, duties and 
powers of the local authorities shall be regulated by law in accordance with the 
principle of decentralisation...The central administration has the power of 
administrative trusteeship over the local governments in the framework of principles 
and procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring the functioning of local 
services in conformity with the principle of the integral unity of the administration, 
securing uniform public service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting local 
needs, in an appropriate manner. The formation of local administrative bodies into a 
union with the permission of the Council of Ministers for the purpose of performing 
specific public services; and the functions, powers, financial and security 
arrangements of these unions, and their reciprocal ties and relations with the central 
administration, shall be regulated by law. These administrative bodies shall be 
allocated financial resources in proportion to their functions”.  
It is clear that the Constitution foresees a tutelage relation between the central and 
local administrations to sustain the integral unity in the public administration. According to 
paragraph 4, the Minister of Interior may remove the elected mayor and personnel of local 
administrations from the office in case of ‘offence related to their duties’. Furthermore,  
‘administrative trusteeship’ delineates decentralisation within deconcentration as proved by 
the decree of Constitutional Court. 
The administrative tutelage of central authority over local administration has been 
notably reduced (except in village administrations) through the new laws on local 
administrations. In terms of administrative aspects of supervision, the most important change 
occurred on the discretion of the governor over local administrations. The most striking 
change is the final decision-making authority of the governor over municipalities on the key 
issues (e.g. the budget) has been replaced to a regulatory position. According to the new 
municipal law, the central authority can exercise its discretionary power on the following 
circumstances;  
• The municipalities require the consent of the governor on territorial changes regarding 
the borders of municipalities and neighbourhood administrations (mahalles).  
• The veto power of the governor on municipal decisions, including the general budget, 
has been abolished with the new law. However, all municipal decisions require to be 
sent to the governor in seven days to become valid. Moreover, the governor has the 
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right to litigate the case to an administrative court within ten days following the 
decision.   
• In case of serious disturbances in public services, and if the mayor is not able to 
overcome the problems, the Ministry of Interior delegates the responsibility to the 
governor to re-establish the order.  
• To appoint the general secretary in the metropolitan municipalities, the consent of the 
Ministry of Interior is required.  
• The mayor can be removed from the post by the decision of the Council of State21. 
Additionally, the Ministry of Interior can remove the elected members of 
municipalities on the basis of the Article 127 in the constitution (Keleş, 2011:402).  
Furthermore, the new law on SPAs has altered the overarching authority of central 
administrations on SPAs. Prior to this law, the governor was the president of the decision-
making body, the provincial assembly, and therefore had direct impact on decisions. With the 
new laws, the governor is no longer the president of the assembly, but since it is the head of 
executive committee in the SPA, the assembly is obliged to discuss the issues which are 
brought up by the governor. Moreover, the governor can send back decisions to the assembly 
for reconsideration and in case of disputes has the right to litigate the case to the 
administrative court.  
Moreover, a complete change has occurred on the supervision and control mechanisms 
of the central authority over local administrations. In the previous system, the control 
mechanism was functioning through the prior approval of deliberations of municipal councils 
and of the budget by the governor. Additionally, the Minister of Interior had the right to 
cancel other decisions taken by local governments. Financial control, on the other hand, was 
exercised by the Court of Accounts. The new system replaces this control mechanism with 
modern auditing practices. This system foresees an internal audit through the selected figures 
from the municipal council or external private auditors, and ex-post external audit by the 
Court of Accounts. The purpose of this new system is to enhance performance functions in 
public services.  
The essential purpose of the new internal control mechanism is to foster municipal 
capacities in public services (Baltacı & Yilmaz, 2006).  Two means of internal control are 
described in the law on public financial management. One of them is through the internal 
                                                            
21 This is the supreme court for administrative justice. 
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auditors. Since the internal auditors are selected by the mayor, their neutrality is an issue of 
question.  The other internal control mechanism is through the supervisory committee whose 
members are selected from the municipal council and/or from specialised independent 
institutions. The supervisory committee presents its report to the municipal council. 
The external control mechanism is conducted by the Court of Accounts and the 
Ministry of Interior. The ministry is in charge of overseeing the administrative unity of 
activities. The Court of Accounts, on the other hand, controls the financial accounts and 
supervises performance management of local administrations.   
The financial control is the most effective control mechanism on municipalities, 
especially for those municipalities with limited financial resources (Ekici & Toker, 2005). 
There are different means for central authority to exert the financial control. First of all, some 
financial aids are allocated on the basis of conditionality. These aids are not subject of 
objective criteria and cannot be utilised outside the allocation purposes. Secondly, in case of 
corruption charges, the mayor or the Ministry of Interior, with the consent of the Prime 
Minister, can call for investigation of all accounts of the charged municipality. 
In sum, the new laws are in favour of the local administrations by reducing the 
administrative discretion of central authority. Yet, there are criticisms arguing some 
provisions are supplementing the discretion of the Ministry of Interior on local 
administrations. For instance, Marcou (2006) claims that according to the article 30(b) of the 
new municipal law, the Ministry of Interior can request the Council of State to dissolve the 
municipal council without a need of investigation or prosecution, if the later ‘has taken 
decisions on political issues not related to the functions conferred on the municipality’. In that 
case, the Council of State shall decide on the fate of the municipal council within one month 
from the request. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior can ask the Council of State to postpone 
any new meeting of the municipal council until the final decision. Therefore, their argument is 
that the new provision can be an instrument for the minister to apply pressure upon local 
governments. 
Considering the strengthening position of the Ministry of Interior, it can be argued that 
the changes in laws partly foresee a shift in administrative control mechanism. The new 
system empowers the position of the elected central and local figures while reducing the 
discretion of appointed bureaucrats in administration. However, this shift brings the political 
dimension of relations to the forefront which is discernible through rather indirect actions. For 
instance, the political parties who are controlling the central government are more inclined to 
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apply strict control over the financial resources of the municipalities governed by other 
political parties. Other than that, the central government is usually easier to pursue 
investigations over the municipalities of opposition parties on the basis of corruption charges. 
These ‘indirect’ ways of intervening into local administrations will be discussed more 
thoroughly as part of the political and financial aspect of the relations. 
 
3.5.2 Political Discretion 
The growing political importance of municipalities has altered gradually the relations 
with the central authority. Controlling municipalities, especially metropolitan municipalities, 
has become critical objectives for political parties. There are several reasons for it. First of all, 
more than 80 % of the overall population is living in municipal jurisdictions. Hence, the 
municipalities have a better reach to a majority of electorates. Secondly, most of the political 
parties in Turkey, assign their candidates for municipal elections through the central executive 
board’s decision. Therefore, the mayors are closely attached to the party politics for future 
political career. This direct impact on municipal candidates also affects the perceptions of 
electorates on general elections. For instance, the poor performance of social democrats in 
Istanbul metropolitan municipality in early 1990s was punished in the next general elections 
by the drop-off in their votes22. On the contrary, the social aids spearheaded by the 
municipalities governed by conservative, religious political parties were instrumental on the 
election victory of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1995. Thirdly, the municipalities are 
usually perceived by the politicians as a showcase to promote their own political career. The 
Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan, for instance, was the mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 
and his acclaimed performance prepared the ground for his future political career.  
Because of all the reasons listed above, political actions via municipalities are popular 
political means for political parties to outmanoeuvre each other. There are various examples 
of the pressure from central government towards the municipalities controlled by opposition 
parties. Especially, the dependency of municipalities on the central government in terms of 
investments and economic development have been articulated frequently in different local 
elections to promote the local candidates supported by the political party(ies) in the 
government (Keleş, 2011: 410). On the other hand, Tekeli (2004) points outs another type of 
                                                            
22	 In the general elections of 1991, the Social Democrat Public Party (SDHP) won 21% of the votes. In the 
following elections in 1995, only 11% of votes were gained by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which 
succeeded SDHP.	
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political tension between the elected local party members, the mayor of the municipality and 
the members of the national assembly. According to the law, the mayors are not allowed to be 
the head of the political parties in localities. Thus, the attempts of local party members to use 
municipalities for their own political agendas, occasionally leads to tensions with the mayor 
who is responsible for urban politics.  
Furthermore, corruption investigations towards local administrations governed by 
opposition parties are often perceived as part of political struggles. A recent example is the 
case of corruption charges upheld against the municipalities during the AKP government. In 
following 3 years after 2009 local elections, 945 out of 2947 municipalities have been 
prosecuted with the corruption charges. It is striking that even thought most of them belong to 
AKP municipalities, the distribution of charges among the political parties is rather 
unbalanced. While 25% of AKP municipalities were prosecuted, 50% of CHP and BDP 
municipalities, and 1/3 of MHP municipalities has been subject of investigations23.  
In sum, political struggles among political parties constitute an important dimension of 
the relations between the central and local authorities. Therefore, it is essential to take into 
account the distribution of political parties among municipalities while assessing the choices 
made by municipalities on public services.  
 
3.5.3 Financial Discretion 
A major part of political discretion of central authority is embedded into the financial 
aspects of relations. Local governments are highly dependent on the general budget. 
Therefore, transfer of shares and loans from central authority have been subject of criticism as 
the means of political control on local administrations.  
Local governments have four different sources of income: (1) local revenues, (2) 
shared taxes, (3) grants and transfers from central government, and (4) loans. Among the 
income sources, only local revenues are collected directly by the local administrations. Shared 
taxes are basically distributed as transfers from the central budget. The rest, grants and aids, 
are allocated from the central budget with the consent of the central authority. The grants and 
                                                            
23 The distribution of charges among the political parties in the assembly is as following: AKP 406, CHP 271, 
MHP 131, BDP 50, the rest 123 (Günaydın, 2012). 
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aids from central government are the main source of revenues for SPAs and the Union of 
Municipalities24.  
General tax revenues are transferred to local administrations based on the following 
calculation: 
• 2.85 % to municipalities outside of metropolitan municipalities, according to 
population and development criteria25  
• 2.50 % to the district municipalities of metropolitan municipalities  
• 1.15 % to the SPAs according to the population, geographic size, number of villages, 
rural population and development index. 
• 5 % of general taxes collected within the metropolitan municipality borders and an 
additional 30 % of the shared taxes allocated for the district municipalities will be 
transferred to metropolitan municipalities. 
There are two channels for local administrations to reach the share in general 
revenues. While the Ministry of Finance allocates the 5 % share of metropolitan 
municipalities, the other local administrations receive their shares from Bank of Provinces26 
(İller Bankası). The Bank of Provinces also provides grants and loans for local 
administrations through the fund of local administrations where 3.53 %27 of the general tax 
revenue is reserved for this purpose. The problem with reaching the funds is the Bank 
withholds a 2 % management fee and also exercises control over capital investment grants 
and loan financing (LAR II report on Turkey, 2011). 
According to the old Municipal Income Law28, municipalities did not have any 
taxation authority. Their income was dependent on the shares from some certain taxes which 
were distributed through the Bank of Provinces. From 1981 onwards, municipalities were 
allowed gradually some taxation power. Moreover, the financial system based on the shares 
from certain taxes has been replaced with predetermined percentage from overall budget to 
                                                            
24 See the Appendices 
25 Provinces/districts are divided into five development categories: there are 363 municipalities in the first group 
(least developed) which gets 23% of 20% and 673 municipalities in the 5th group (most developed) which gets 
17% of 20%. Then a municipality in each group receives its share proportional to its population within the group 
(Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
26	The Bank of Provinces is established as a public corporate body in 1933 to provide financial and technical 
assistance to local administrations. The stakeholders of the bank are SPAs and municipalities. The bank has 
obtained a private corporate status in 2011 under the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation.		
27	This fund is shared as following; 3% to Fund of Municipalities, 0.28% to Fund of SPAs and 0.25% to Fund of 
General Directorate of Local Administrations.	
28	The law was enacted in 1948. 
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the local administrations. In 1984, this percentage has been designated as 10.30 %. However, 
this number has decreased gradually in the last 30 years with subsequent regulations to the 
level of 4.53 % in 2001 (Keleş, 2011: 357). The recent reforms have improved this situation 
only slightly. Especially, the gravity of the population criteria on shared taxes causes 
inequalities both in regional and provincial level. Municipalities with bigger population and 
development level can levy higher income with local resources whereas for some others the 
personnel cost can surpass their local revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).  
There is a control mechanism by the central authority on local debts. Municipalities 
and affiliated corporate organisations, whose half of the capital is controlled by the 
municipality, require the consent of the Ministry of Interior to take up domestic loans 
exceeding over 10 % of their determined budgets. Furthermore, loans from external sources 
require the consent of the Treasury.  
Comparing to other OECD countries, Turkey has one of the lowest ratio of the local 
tax revenue according to GDP29. Furthermore, only limited taxation autonomy is given to 
local administrations. According to 2011 data, 78% of local taxes are based on tax-sharing in 
which the revenue sharing can be changed unilaterally by the central government, whereas for 
the rest of the local taxes the central government set the rate and the base of the local tax (see 
OECD Tax Autonomy statistics). In Turkey, there are seven taxes assigned to municipalities 
(i.e. environment cleaning, advertising, communication, electricity and liquid petroleum gas 
consumption, fire insurance, entertainment and property taxes), and only in property taxes the 
municipalities have the discretion on tax level. On the other hand, SPAs do not have any 
taxation authority; they receive only a share from the real estate tax. 
The real level of fiscal decentralisation is not only determined by the size of the central 
revenue in local revenues but also by the central control over the allocated funds 
(discretionary or mandatory); the fiscal requirements on the recipient local governments 
(matching or nonmatching); the local spending autonomy (earmarked or non-earmarked 
(Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). In this sense, Turkey is one of the few OECD countries where the 
intergovernmental transfer shares are categorised only as discretionary. According to the 2010 
data, 58 % of earmarked transfer shares from general budget are all categorised as 
discretionary and non-matching and the rest of intergovernmental shares are categorised as 
not earmarked and discretionary (see OECD statistics on Intergovernmental Grants by Type-
                                                            
29	According to the 2013 data, local tax revenues correspond to 2.6 % of the GDP whereas the OECD average is 
3.9 (see OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2014)	
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percentage of total grants revenue). These data indicate that despite the formula-based new 
arrangements, the transfer shares from the general budget depend on the central government’s 
discretion. Thus the own source revenues are the only budget items to be considered in terms 
of financial autonomy in local government  
 
3.6 Non-state actors in local governance 
The purpose of this part is to shed light on the involvement of non-state actors (i.e. 
citizens, private sector and civil society organisations) in local governance. The means of 
participation, the willingness to participate and the factors affecting their involvement will be 
the focal points of analysis.  
 
3.6.1 Citizen participation in local governance  
The participation of non-state organisations and citizens in local governance is 
relatively limited in Turkey. Largely, their functions are limited to consultancy rather than 
actual decision-making or policy implementation.  
There are basically three means for citizens to participate in local governance 
mechanism: mahalles, urban councils and special committees of the municipal council. 
Additionally, regional development agencies can be considered as another way where non-
state actors can be involved in local governance mechanism. 
Neighbourhoods are governed in Turkey with a traditional institution called mahalle, 
which is headed by the locally elected muhtar. Muhtars are elected by the fellow residents of 
a neighbourhood to organise the basic bureaucratic functions in the mahalle. Some of the 
responsibilities of the muhtar comprise registering the residents, providing IDs and birth 
certificates. At this point, it is important to explain that the function of the muhtar in mahalles 
is different from the muhtars in the villages. Muhtars in villages are highest civil servants in 
villages and they have compulsory tasks to provide the basic needs in public services, whereas 
muhtars in the cities have only responsibilities on official paper works. 
The new provision in municipal law enhanced the function of the muhtar in local 
governance by allowing them to participate in the special committees of the municipal council 
to express opinions on locally related issues. It is expected from the muhtar to operate as a 
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linkage between the neighbourhoods and municipal decision-making mechanism (Marcou, 
2006). Furthermore, the muhtar is also a member of urban councils.  
The second institution for citizen participation is a rather recent formation which is 
called ‘urban councils’. Urban councils are formed in 2006 inspired by the Local Agenda 21 
programme of the UNDP. Urban councils are ideal examples described by governance 
literature as they serve as a platform to exchange ideas among the urban stakeholders. The 
members include the representative of the central authority in localities (governor or district 
governor), the representative of the mayor, representatives of public institutions, muhtars, 
representatives of political parties, representatives from the city universities, representatives 
of trade and labour unions and other civil society organisations. Their core functions are 
improving the democratic participation in urban governance, supporting sustainable 
development by preparing plans and strategies, supporting civil society institutions in the 
locality, supporting the active participation of different social groups in the local decision-
making mechanism such as youth, elders and women. Although the legislation depicts a wide 
array of governance functions for the urban councils, their actual participation is limited with 
providing opinions to be discussed in the municipal council.  
The third means for participation are the special committees in the municipal 
assemblies. Muhtars, representatives of public law professional organisations, universities and 
civil society organisations can participate without voting rights in the special committees to 
express opinions. The reports prepared by these commissions are presented to the municipal 
assemblies whose meeting are open now to the public following the changes in municipal law.   
Albeit not being a local organisation, regional development agencies (RDAs) are other 
forms of governance institutions in Turkey. RDAs contribute to local governance by fostering 
the cooperation between public, private and civil society organisations on regional 
development. The organisational structure of RDAs consists of a development council, an 
administrative board and a general secretariat. The development council is the advisory body 
and it is composed of representatives of public and private sector and civil society 
organisations. Another function of the development councils is strengthening the bonds 
among the stakeholders and ensuring their participation in economic development. The 
development council advises to the administrative committee which is the decision-making 
body and headed by the governor of one of the constituting provinces in the NUTS-1 area. 
Unlike other examples so far, members of private and civil society institutions are allowed to 
participate in the administrative committee. Thus, RDAs can be perceived as the only 
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compelling example of a fully-fledged governance institution. Its activities are subject to 
private law which provides a considerable flexibility on their functioning. However, the 
central discretion is still eminent on the selection of the participating non-state organisations. 
Therefore, the representation of local interests is a subject of dispute.  
 
3.6.2 Private sector organisations in local governance  
           The regulations on public-private partnership (PPP) in Turkey are initiated relatively in 
an early period comparing to other countries (Tekin, 2010). The law no. 2886 on the State 
Bidding Law set a new framework for public procurement in 1984, and the subsequent law 
no. 3096 enabled the private sector involvement into power plant projects (Tekin, 2010). 
However, the first concrete example of a PPP model was implemented with the general law 
on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in 1994. This law allowed private sector involvement in 
areas of transportation, energy and water supply and treatment (Tekin, 2010).   
             The legal framework for public procurement has been reformed in 2002 with the 
Public Tender Law numbered 4732 and the Public Tender Agreements Law numbered 4735 
to harmonise the legislation with international and the EU standards (GLG, 2011). The legal 
changes on public tendering implemented the standards and procurement instruments (e.g. 
framework agreements, electronic procurement and electronic auction) inaugurated with the 
EU directives on public procurement. However, some differences still remain according to the 
expert opinions including the areas of ‘types of contracts, use of restricted procedure, 
application of negotiated procedures and direct procurement, methods for estimating the value 
of contracts and aggregating contracts, technical specifications and standards, publication of 
procurement notices, procedure and criteria for qualification of participants, procedure and 
criteria for contract award (selection of the best tender), existence of national preferences, and 
restriction of foreign-company participation’ (GLG, 2011). A recent legislative study 
prepared by the Ministry of Development (the draft law on PPP) targets the shortcomings on 
current tendering standards and introduces a legal framework for PPP (GLG, 2011). Some 
innovations introduced with the draft law include a legal definition of the PPP, standards and 
rules for establishment of a PPP, resolution of disputes, tendering, risk-sharing and an 
implementing role in the PPP project cycle (GLG, 2011). 
             Although the legislations on PPP models have a longer past in Turkey, there is neither 
a PPP specific law nor one single supervising governmental authority on PPPs (GLG, 2011). 
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Several legislations have been implemented to provide a legislative ground to different types 
of PPPs in Turkey. In total, there are five different models of public-private cooperation in 
Turkey; Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Operate (BT), Transfer of Operational Rights 
(TOR), Long Term Rent (LTR) and Built-Rent-Transfer (BRT). The implementation and 
planning of PPPs incorporate different functions by several state institutions. In this sense, 
State Planning Organisation (SPO) does the macro-economic planning, the Treasury secures 
the state guaranties, the Ministry of Finance deals with the budgetary issues and Public 
Procurement Agency supervises the tenders (Tekin, 2010). PPPs can be formed by the 
Privatisation Administration through TOR, BOT and other concessions; by the line ministries 
through BOT, BO, BRT and TOR; by the municipalities through BOT, BO and other 
concessions (Tekin, 2010). 
             There is a close relation between PPPs and privatisation projects in Turkey. In many 
privatisation processes, PPP mechanisms are integrated as part of the privatisation project 
(Tekin, 2010). The transactions for privatisation are regulated according to the Privatisation 
Law n° 4046. In the law, two methods are defined for privatisation process. The first one is 
through bargaining negotiations which are held separately with each eligible bidder. The 
second method is through the auction procedure. The Privatisation Administration applies 
usually the former as an initial stage to consider different bids before awarding the tender with 
the auction procedure (GLG, 2011). In terms of privatisation in public services, municipalities 
can cooperate with private entities by incorporating for capital investment and contracting out 
public service provisions (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). The laws on local administrations authorise 
the municipal councils and general city councils to establish corporate entities, to grant 
concessions, to use BOTs and to privatise public service provisions. The Privatisation Law 
allows the granting of operation rights in infrastructure facilities to private entities up to 49 
years. The areas allowed for private sector cooperation include as provision of drinking water, 
wastewater management, public transportation and solid waste management. Concessions can 
be granted in these areas with the consent of the Council of State and approval of the Ministry 
of Interior (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
            In general, PPPs are mainly concentrated on energy (e.g. electric production and 
distribution companies) and transportation sectors (e.g. motorways, bridges, airports and 
ports). Especially, in energy sector nearly a quarter of the total electric generation in Turkey is 
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produced through PPPs (Tekin, 2010), while  the biggest privatisation projects30 have been 
completed  during the AKP period. During 2005-2006, the biggest revenue from 
privatisations is collected. Among many of the privatised companies, Turkish Airlines, Tüpraş 
(gas), Erdemir (steel & coal), Türk Telekom (communication) are the biggest enterprises in 
their sectors.  
             Nevertheless, the PPPs are not widespread at the local level (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
The report prepared by the Local Administration Reform programme in Turkey explains the 
reasons for limited private-public cooperation to be  the following, 
• Differences in management culture between public and private sectors 
• Inadequate assessment of the tasks of the public and private sectors 
• The risks of the investment and the operation are not properly identified and shared 
• Lack of administrative expertise at the local level to manage complex projects leads to 
mismatch in expectations and inadequate contractual obligations 
• The overall regulatory framework does not support transparent decision making, 
proper external audit, and design of exit strategies. The absence of a comprehensive 
legal framework and lack of institutional support from the central government hinder 
the wider usage of PPPs 
• The disorganised state of current regulations governing PPP models and the absence 
of any supervising governmental authority to guide public entities through this 
complex public service procurement mechanism 
• Additionally, certain difficulties for internationally bankable transactions exist under 
the current legal framework. There are ambiguities in contract negotiations and 
without a ‘build’ element in the project the only option for transferring an existing 
infrastructure facility to the private sector is through the rigid concession method 
(GLG, 2011). The main problem of the concession method is the strict interpretation 
of the Council of State’s on transaction conditions delimitates the viability of some 
projects. (GLG, 2011) 
  
                                                            
30 Around 8 billion $ in 2005-2006 and 5 billion $ in 2007-2008 are collected as privatisation revenues. (TR 
Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration)  
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3.6.3 Civil society organisations in local governance  
The appearance of civil society organisations as an actor in Turkish local governance 
system is a considerably recent phenomenon. Historically, the civil society organisations in 
Turkey were limited primarily with trust foundations (so called waqf), trade unions and 
business associations. However, an important change in the trajectory occurred following the 
1995 United Nations Human Settlements (Habitat II) conferences held in Istanbul. Especially, 
the launch of the Local Agenda 2131 programme in 1997 laid the foundations of civil society 
involvement in local governance.  
The first cases of collaboration between civil society organisations and governmental 
actors occurred after the earthquakes in 1999. The inadequacy of municipalities on search and 
rescue operations paved way for the collaboration with relevant civil society organisations.  
The EU candidacy in 1999 brought a new dynamism to the activities of civil society 
organisations, as well as their involvement in local governance. Especially, the EU grants 
allocated for civil society institutions boosted the number of new NGOs. The EU is a major 
supporter of CSOs in Turkey through various programmes and funds. The projects which are 
financed by the EU are largely focused on the fields of education, health care, urban 
development, and fight against poverty. Additionally, the Law on Associations has been 
renewed in 2005 which eased the rules on establishment and financial activities of civil 
society organisations. Thus, the association numbers are growing constantly since then 
following the decrease in 200432. According the Directorate of Associations’ statistics, most 
of the associations are concentrated in the most populous and developed cities33. Thus, it 
seems that there is a close correlation between the development level of the city and the 
number of associations existing in it.  
                                                            
31	The UNDP Turkey’s website explains the purpose of the Local Agenda 21 as followed: “In response to the 
global mandate as contained in Chapter 28 of Agenda 21, the Local Agenda 21 Program was launched in 1997 in 
Turkey under the auspices of UNDP Turkey and Capacity 21, and coordinated by IULA-EMME.  The 
programme, encompassing 59 partner cities as of October 2004, reflects a decentralised and enabling approach, 
based upon networking and collaboration among equal partners. Based on community participation, local 
stakeholder involvement, establishment of local partnerships and decentralisation of the local decision-making 
process, the LA21 Program of Turkey has provided a unique opportunity for the enhancement of local 
democracy and for practical implementation of the concepts of “good governance” and “sustainable 
development” in Turkey”. 	
32	In 2004, the number of active associations dropped from 71.832 to 69.439. According to 2015 data, there are 
105.201 active associations in Turkey (Ministry of Interior, Department of Association)	
33	The four biggest cities have the highest percentage of active associations per province: Istanbul 20.02 %, 
Ankara 9.59 %, İzmir 5.47 % and Bursa 3.98 %.	
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A research conducted by Hirai (2007) provides some useful insights on the general 
features of CSOs in Turkey. According to the findings, a majority of civil society 
organisations in Turkey are social support groups (26.9 %) and mutual organisations (16.5 
%). Especially community support organisations are the mot popular type of associations. The 
other leading civil society organisations are education (11.7 %) and occupation (10.3 %) 
focused organisations (Hirai, 2007).  
The study shows that in terms of local governance activities, ‘serving to the public’ 
(43.5 %) and ‘informing society for public interest’ (20.1 %) are perceived as responsibilities 
of CSOs.  CSOs are predominantly interested in ‘regional and local development policies’ 
(30.8 %) and ‘education and sport policies’ (28.4 %). Other notable policy areas are 
‘environmental protection’ (13.4 %), ‘local governance’ (11.2 %) and ‘health and welfare’ 
(14.7 %). The relation with the public authorities is mostly defined in terms of inspection 
instead of participation in decision-making. Only 8.2 % of participating associations answered 
as participating into decision-making processes. Lastly, the research examines the relation of 
CSOs with political parties. CSOs are predominantly (around 80-90%) disclaiming any sort of 
relation with political parties. Yet, there are some associations which openly favour one type 
of political party. Among them, AKP has the biggest support with 11.4 %, followed by CHP 
with 9 %.  
An important channel for CSOs to participate in local governance is the urban 
councils. As previously mentioned, through urban councils various CSOs can participate into 
the meetings of provincial assemblies. Albeit they have no right to vote in the assemblies they 
can express their opinions and discuss suggestions of local administrations in the formal 
meetings. However, informality is still dominant in the relationships between governmental 
agencies and CSOs (Çaha, 2010). 
Lastly, a research by YADA foundation (Keyman, Yeğen, Çalışkan, & Tol, 2010) 
clusters the most common problems faced by voluntary organisations in Turkey under eight 
categories: 
1) Infrastructural problems: A major problem faced by voluntary organisations is the 
insufficient financial sources. Other problems under this category include the 
insufficient human resources, managerial incapacities and lack of institutionalisation. 
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2) Problems with voluntary people and members: The lack of responsibility among 
members, insufficient professional staff and lack of communication. 
3) Relations with the public bodies: The lack of formal relations with public bodies, the 
impact of partisanship and patronage on the relationship with public bodies, the lack 
of trust by public bodies in voluntary organisations.. 
4) Intraorganisational problems: The lack of trust, personal conflicts and weak social 
relations among the members. 
5) Interorganisational relations between voluntary organisations: The lack of 
communication and coordination among voluntary organisations and lack of 
institutional platforms to enable interactions among voluntary organisations. 
6) Relations with target groups and society: Lack of public relations activities, the 
absence of communication channels with society, the prejudices of target groups 
against voluntary organisations, lack of reach to local TV channels and other 
communication means and absence of feedback mechanism from target groups.  
7) Relations with media: mainstream media’s favouritism among voluntary 
organisations; media’s indifference against the activities carried by voluntary 
organisations.  
8) Conceptualisation of ‘civil society’ among voluntary organisations: The lack of 
awareness among voluntary organisations on their roles and duties within the concept 
of civil society, unwillingness to get involved into lobbying and interest 
representation, and a narrow perception on civil society organisations limiting them 
only with voluntary organisations. 
            To sum up, the CSOs’ involvement in local governance is largely delimited with 
opinion-giving. There are some good examples of CSO’s participation in local governance 
activities which are usually through the urban councils. However, their involvement in policy 
implementation is limited and there are only individual cases for this matter.   
 
3.7 Capabilities of local administrations 
The final part of this chapter will elaborate the local governance capacity in Turkish 
local administrations by following the categorisation presented in the previous chapter. 
According to it, the local governance capacity will be elaborated in terms of capabilities in 
financial, material, communication, planning, managerial and human resource aspects.  
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3.7.1 Financial capabilities 
Financial capabilities indicate the adequacy of the local government in covering the 
expenditures with allocated revenue sources. The findings in Turkey depict a complex picture 
on this matter. Primarily, the differences in financial capacities vary depending on the type of 
local administration, population, geographical position and economic development of the 
given territory. 
To start with, according to 2015 data the revenues of local administrations correspond 
to 10.59 % of the general public revenue which did not change significantly since the 
implementation of new laws on local government (see Figure 3.2). Table 3.1. shows that the 
revenues are highly dependent on the shares and funds from the central budget. In 
municipalities almost half of the revenue is stemmed from the shares from central revenue 
whereas SPAs are largely dependent on funds from central government. The difference is that 
while municipalities collect their shares by a certain formula and without any conditionality, 
the funds for SPA’s are conditional and they can be utilised only for specific purposes. A 
further distinction exists between municipalities and metropolitan municipalities in terms of 
allocation criteria. While the former predominantly depends on the population criteria, the 
latter is funded additionally by the place of origin. Other allocation criteria (e.g. development 
index) are relatively more important for SPAs comparing to the municipalities. Therefore, the 
allocation criteria in tax sharing directly influences the financial capabilities of local 
administrations.  
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Figure 3.2 Budget Balance in Local Administrations (2004-2015) 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
Table 3.1: Revenue shares in local administrations 
Revenues  Municipalities Affiliated 
Agencies 
SPAs Unions Total Local 
Administrations 
1.Own-source revenues  34,9% 82,1% 5,7% 26,4% 37,7% 
Tax revenues  13,5% 0,0% 1,5% 2,5% 8,8% 
Enterprise and property revenues  15,4% 80,5% 3,1% 23,4% 24,7% 
Contribution to public 
expenditures  
1,3% 1,0% 0,6% 0,4% 1,1% 
Capital revenues 4,6% 0,7% 0,5% 0,2% 3,1% 
2.Shared revenues  58,7% 6,2% 26,6% 8,8% 42,7% 
Shares from the central 
government budget tax revenues  
49,8% 5,3% 25,0% 1,0% 36,4% 
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Other shares  8,9% 0,9% 1,5% 7,7% 6,2% 
3.Donations and aids  1,4% 5,3% 63,7% 57,2% 14,4% 
Donations and aids from the 
central budget  
0,4% 0,0% 44,6% 10,9% 8,2% 
Other donations and aids  1,0% 5,3% 19,0% 46,3% 6,2% 
4.Other Revenues  5,0% 6,4% 4,0% 7,6% 5,2% 
Collections from receivables  2,5% 4,6% 0,0% 3,2% 2,5% 
Interest and Penalties  2,5% 1,7% 4,0% 4,5% 2,7% 
Total  100% 10% 100% 100% 100% 
Total by type of local 
governments  
62,8% 17,1% 17,1% 3,0% 100,0% 
 Source: Péteri & Sevinç (2011) 
Another distinction in financial capabilities is caused by the different abilities in 
raising own-source revenues. The own-source revenues originate from following sources 
(Péteri & Sevinc, 2011); 
• Taxes collected by local administrations: property taxes (land, building) advertising 
tax, entertainment tax, communications tax, fire insurance tax, electricity and liquid 
petroleum gas consumption tax and environment cleaning tax. 
• Municipality fees: occupation fees, permission fee for working on holidays, freshwater 
sources fee, commissioners fee, building user fee, land development fee, business 
opening permit fee, examination license and report fee, and health document fee. 
• Public expenditure contribution to sewage and road expenditures by the users of the 
construction of the infrastructure of road, sewage and drinking water.  
• Enterprise and property revenues: revenues from sale of goods and services, property 
use and operation permit revenues, rent income, state economic enterprise revenues, 
State Bank Revenues, service provision revenues of local administrations, other 
institution profits. 
• Capital revenues: Sales revenues from movable and immovable property, security and 
other asset sales. 
‘Tax revenues’ and ‘Enterprise and Property Revenues’ have the biggest share in the 
own-source revenues of municipalities. Among the local taxes, the property taxes constitute 
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75% of all tax revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). There are two factors which directly affect 
the revenue by property taxes: the value of the local property and the value of the land. Thus, 
there is a correlation between the development level of the province and the amount of own 
source revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
Fees are another important source of revenue for municipalities. It is noteworthy to 
say, on both of these revenue sources, municipalities have the right to determine the actual 
prices within the upper and lower limits set by the central government (Péteri & Sevinc, 
2011). Municipalities decide on the exact prices according to the economic and social 
variations among districts.  Similar to the tax revenue, the economic activity and development 
level of the province is an important determinant in the fee revenues, as the construction fee 
(25 %), occupation fee (18 %), wholesale market fee (12 %) and building user permit fee (9 
%) have the biggest shares (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).  
The third element in municipal own revenues is the contributions to specific services 
such as road construction, sewage investment or drinking water. The contributions are 
collected from the landowners and they cannot exceed the 2% of the tax value of the estate. 
The revenues under this category are only 1.4 % of total municipal revenues and the 
metropolitan municipalities are the main beneficiaries (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). The rest of the 
income originates from the rents and sales of the properties. Revenues from the building sites 
are the primary source of income under this category as corresponding to the 3.3 % of the 
total revenue (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). Yet, only metropolitan and metropolitan district 
municipalities are able to generate substantial income from the sales of building sites. Rent 
income, on the other hand, largely relies on immovable properties (around 80 %) and it is an 
important source of income for smaller municipalities. 
In terms of expenditures, according to 2015 data, 10,75 % of all public expenditures 
are spent by the local government (see Figure 3.2). Almost half of the expenditures of local 
administrations are allocated for utility and communal services. The second biggest item in 
expenditures is the cost of administration (see the Table 3.2.) Nevertheless, there is a clear 
distinction in expenditures on services between SPAs and municipalities. In particular health, 
education and security have the biggest share in SPAs’ expenditures. Given that in the past 
the SPAs have been the extension of central authority in local level and the governor is still 
the head of administration, the services used to be assumed by the central government are 
largely delivered now by the SPAs. On the other hand, services such as environment and 
housing are predominantly delivered by municipalities and associated organisations.  
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Table 3.2: Expenditures in local administrations 
Services  Services 
Total 
Municipalities Affiliated  
agencies 
SPA's Unions 
General Public Services  35.2% 67.8% 7.0% 21.0% 4.2% 
Economic Affairs  22.0% 63.9% 24.8% 7.3% 4.0% 
Housing and Communal 
Amenity  
21.5% 54.9% 37.7% 3.8% 3.6% 
Environmental Protection  7.5% 86.4% 12.2% 0.4% 1.0% 
Education  4.2% 6.3% 0.0% 92.9% 0.8% 
Recreation, Culture, 
Religion Services 
3.7%   87.0% 0.0% 12.7% 0.3% 
Public Order and Security  2.9% 88.5% 1.3% 10.1% 0.2% 
Health care    1.6% 47.0% 0.1% 52.7% 0.3% 
Social Security, Aid  1.2% 83.9% 3.0% 12.7% 0.4% 
Defence  0.1% 25.9% 17.2% 56.9% 0.0% 
Total  100.0% 64.1% 17.0% 15.6% 3.2% 
Source: Péteri & Sevinç (2011) 
LAR II report suggests that the financial resources of municipalities are usually 
insufficient to cover the public services and administrative duties (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
This eventually leads to exceeding the debt limits for many municipalities. 
According to Kurtuluş (2006), the majority of municipal services are sustained with 
domestic debts, which are financed by further debts. There are different forms and sources of 
debts for local administrations. They can find money through loans from domestic and 
international banks, state loans, bond issue, accumulation of arrears or private-public 
partnership schemes (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). According to 2010 data, the total debt to income 
ratio set by the laws is above the limits in all types of municipalities, and half of the current 
debts in municipalities have short-term obligations (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). This ratio points 
out deterioration in short term debts which were around 30 % in the period between 2005-
2010 (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011).  
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The assessment report of the IV. Financial Management in Local Administrations 
Forum34 (2011) highlights some urgent needs on financial management of municipal 
expenditures. The report identifies the following problems: 
• The central transfers and current resources on financing local services are inadequate. 
• The inapplicability of cost-benefit analysis for public goods such as water, 
transportation, heating and environment and different local service costs are impeding 
effective pricing on public services. 
• The inefficient financing of public services due to lack of prioritisation on public 
provision. 
• The ineffective use of public revenues to supplement the objectives on service 
provision. 
• The inadequate legislative bases are impeding effective tax collection. 
• The union of municipalities are institutionally incapable and have lack of financial 
contribution from the member municipalities. 
• Lack of capable personnel and efficient accounting systems. 
In short, studies suggest that the size and the economic development of provinces 
influence the financial capabilities of municipalities. The LAR II report points out there are 
high differences in per capita own source revenues between developed regions such as 
Istanbul, East Marmara, Aegean, West Anatolia and other less developed regions 
Additionally, the similar differences are also observable between larger and smaller cities. 
While the local tax to total revenue ratio is much higher in bigger cities, the smaller cities and 
municipalities are more dependent on national budget transfers35. The difference is so striking 
that for the least developed cities, even the cost of collecting revenues could be a financial 
burden simply because of lack of revenue-raising capability and high local service costs. For 
instance, in the most underdeveloped five provinces (Ardahan, Muş, Ağrı, Şırnak and Kilis), 
the cost of financial services (including the collection costs, the total financial administration, 
accounting costs of municipalities) is even above their own source revenues (Péteri & Sevinc, 
2011).  
                                                            
34	The forum is organised by the Treasury 	
35 Provinces Muş, Ağrı and Hakkari have the lowest tax to total revenue ratio while İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir 
have the highest (Péteri & Sevinc, 2011). 
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3.7.2 Material capabilities 
There are two aspects which are essential to assess the material capabilities of local 
administrations. First of all, it is necessary to evaluate if all departments are equipped with the 
required materials to carry out their responsibilities. Especially the level of computer services, 
the physical conditions of departments and acquisition of necessary software and machines 
are important indicators of material capabilities. Secondly, in case the departments need 
certain goods and services, they should be able to purchase easily through public 
procurement. Inevitably, the flexibility in purchasing is closely linked with financial 
capabilities. However, the effectiveness in purchasing increases with less red tape and 
effective methods in public procurement. On the other hand, the municipalities do not 
necessarily need to purchase the good and services but through effective partnerships with 
other municipalities and local institutions they can meet their needs without the limitations of 
the financial capabilities.   
Starting with the first aspect, local governments need adequate means of work for their 
activities. These means can vary from the basic physical conditions of work environment to 
the holdings of advanced machinery and computer technology. There is not a general 
framework provided by the state setting the minimum standards for office materiel and 
machineries that the local administrations should possess for efficient service delivery. 
Furthermore, the data provided by municipalities are not consistent in each case as well. For 
instance, the KENTGES project (2011) which is conducted among 2954 municipalities found 
out severe inconsistencies on the number of registered buildings and infrastructure that the 
municipalities hold. A general conclusion drawn by the study is that the municipalities lack 
the required capacity and infrastructure to provide satisfactory input on inventory and 
statistical data on their material capabilities. Thus, it is not easy to evaluate the capabilities on 
physical means by objective sources. A solution can be relying on the perception of 
municipalities on their material needs.  
On the other hand, the innovations in public provision and in e-government services 
created a concern on the adequacy in computer and online services. In this regard, a survey by 
the General Directorate of Local Administrations (2011) points out that 97 % of the 
population lives within the service area of a local administration which has a website. 
Similarly, the 9th E-Government Measurement and Benchmarking Survey (2010) by the EU 
supports the findings on the rapid development in Turkey in terms of technological 
competences. According to the survey, in 89% of cases? Turkey has carried its services into 
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the electronic environment which is above the EU-27 average with 82%. Additionally, Turkey 
has a competent level on online sophistication of services with 91% which is slightly above 
the EU-27 average. The survey also evaluates the back office applications and horizontal 
enablers in electronic environments by focusing on 9 different elements, i.e. ‘authentic 
sources’, ‘electronic identity’, ‘electronic payment’, ‘open specifications’, ‘single sign-on’, 
‘architectural guidebooks’, ‘catalogue of horizontal enablers’, ‘secure e-delivery’ and ‘e-safe’. 
By enabling 6 out of 9 services (i.e. authentic sources, electronic payment, open specification, 
single sign-on, secure e-delivery and e-safe) Turkey scores an average service capability on 
this section as well.  
In fact, comparing to the early 2000s, the technological capabilities of public 
administrations have increased notably. Although there is a global transformation in public 
services due to technological achievements, the prioritisation of ICT investments and the 
initiation of comprehensive projects such as the E-Transformation Turkey36 and FATIH37 
have been most influential on the remarkable change. In the last decade, a four-fold increase 
has been realised on ICT investments from 526 million TL in 2002 to 2 billion TL in 2011 
(SPO, 2011) With the inauguration of FATIH project, the ICT investments on education 
sector will reach to 4,9 billion TL (SPO, 2011).  
Despite these remarkable achievements in public administration sector, the differences 
among local administrations have been considerably high. For instance, according to the 
KENTGES survey (2011), the rural and district municipalities do not even possess the basic 
machines to perform the urban strategies defined by the central government. The difference 
between the municipality types is so remarkable that while metropolitan municipalities score 
around 80% in ‘technical’ capabilities, the provincial municipalities score around 30 % and 
                                                            
36	The e-transformation of Turkey was initiated in February 2003. The State Planning Organisation (SPO) was 
assigned to co-ordinate the project. A new institutional structure was formed by introducing e-Transformation 
Turkey Executive Board, e-Transformation Leaders and an Advisory Board (Telli, 2011).		
37	The following information is given in the story published by the newspaper Today’s Zaman: “Undertaken by 
the Ministry of Education and supported by the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Movement to 
Increase Opportunities and Technology (FATIH) Project is expected, once finalised, to be in use in 570,000 
classrooms in 42,000 schools all around Turkey. According to government plans, teachers will be able to 
instantly access any document around the world they may need for their class, projecting it on the interactive 
smart board. The project will also facilitate long-distance learning programs while encouraging a gradual 
transition to e-textbooks and other electronic-learning materiel for each class. In the second component of the 
project, there will be 110 in-service training centres connected to each other through a network that covers 
Turkey’s 81 provinces for educator training purposes, where all the participants will able to interact with each 
other live through teleconferencing. The last component is the establishment of a secure and appropriate network 
infrastructure for all the schools across the country. FATİH was first introduced at a ceremony attended by 
Erdoğan in November 2010. (Today's Zaman, 2012) 
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the other rural and district municipalities score less than 5%. Nevertheless, the technical 
capabilities in this survey incorporate personnel related qualifications on the targeted area 
with the material capabilities for the given services.  
The survey of the Ministry of Interior (2011) lists the weak points of e-government 
services in local administrations as following: 
• Lack of trust in the security systems ensuring the personal data registered for the e-
government services. 
• Inadequate legislative framework and regulations ensuring the security of personal 
data on online services. 
• The websites of local administrations are offering information services rather than 
interactive services.  
• Some e-government mechanisms are usually limited with the services provided by the 
central authority and their online systems do not extend into local services. 
• Not all municipalities hold a centralised IT mechanism necessary to provide the e-
government services.  
In a nutshell, the studies point out, the material capabilities of local administrations 
vary horizontally and vertically among the types of local administrations. Especially smaller 
local administrations do not always have the necessary equipment and infrastructure to 
provide the services. The technological capabilities, on the other hand, are enhancing in 
public administrations but the implications on local level are relatively limited. The 
inadequacy of legislative framework and the absence of a unified e-government mechanism 
containing municipal services are notable factors with the current situation. 
Moving to the second aspect, sharing equipment between municipalities is limited 
with certain sectors (e.g. water management, waste management, environment...etc.) and is 
not a popular practice (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). It seems there are two aspects to be 
considered in this regard. First of all, there are different interpretations of the law on Union of 
Local Administrations. Even though the law allows municipal partnerships, municipalities are 
not clear about the extent of the law due to a Courts of Account’s opinion on forming 
partnerships (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). This impedes further initiatives to form municipal 
partnerships to supplement material needs. Secondly, sustaining municipal partnerships 
requires a certain extent of capacity in terms of staff capability and personnel costs. 
Apparently, for many municipalities the relative cost of partnerships is a handicap on this sort 
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of initiatives (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). Yet, informal cooperation among neighbouring 
municipalities is taking place instead of formal partnerships (Jackson & Üskent, 2010). 
In terms of purchasing goods from public or private sources, there are three options for 
local administrations to supply their needs. The first option is the State Supply Office (Devlet 
Malzeme Ofisi) which is a state economic enterprise affiliated with the Ministry of Finance 
and the central procuring agency for public bodies. The second option for municipalities is 
opening-up their own private enterprises to supply their needs, and purchasing their goods 
from them. The third option is procuring the goods and services through private companies. 
Turkey has a central procurement agency, i.e. the Public Procurement Agency, to supervise 
and facilitate the procurement procedure for public bodies. Turkey is currently preparing a 
new law to incorporate some EU procurement methods to its own legislation. The current 
legislation is largely compatible with the old EC Directives and contains the general 
procurement rules and procedures (Bianchi & Guidi, 2010). Yet, there are deficiencies in the 
legislation. For instance,  the privately owned utilities are not covered by public procurement 
rules while publicly owned utilities such as State Economic Enterprises need to follow the 
general public procurement provisions (Bianchi & Guidi, 2010) Furthermore, the current 
system does not include e-procurement which is becoming a preferred option in public 
procurements in the EU (SIGMA, 2010). 
According to the 2009 statistics on public procurement in Turkey, 2.431 local and 
regional authorities procured goods and services which is the equivalent of one fourth of all 
public contracts in 200938 (SIGMA, 2010). However, these numbers do not include low-value 
procurements which have an estimated number of 125.000 (SIGMA, 2010). Thus, low-value 
procurements which are a convenient way to purchase goods and services for departments 
seem as a more preferable option.  
To sum up, partnerships among municipalities and procurement of goods and services 
from private sector are not much developed means of purchasing for municipalities. Yet, the 
high number in low-value procurements and popularity of informal partnerships among 
municipalities point out that there are ways of purchasing goods for municipalities outside of 
state sources and in time these alternative sources might gain importance. 
 
                                                            
38 Regional and local authorities awarded 25.482 public contracts in total 98.142 contracts.	
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 3.7.3 Communication capabilities 
The most important notion in relation to communication capabilities is the flow of 
information inside the organisational structure and outside of the organisation with citizens 
and other institutions. In this regard, it is essential to integrate new information technologies 
into the existing organisational structures and to build social communication with local 
governance actors. Thus, in this part three aspects will be elaborated about the communication 
capabilities of local administrations in Turkey. First, intra-organisational communication 
mechanisms, i.e. the communication between municipal management and organisation and 
inter-departmental communication, will be examined. The emphasis will be on the 
effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for intra-organisational communication. Second, the 
communication between society and local administrations will be examined. Especially, the 
capacity of e-government mechanisms and effectiveness of the means to build social 
interaction will be part of the inquiry. The last step will focus on the communication with the 
central government and with the union of local administrations.  
The intra-organisational communication in local administrations has two different 
dimensions. The first one is the relationship between the heads of organisation with the 
councillors and the other one is between the managers and the civil servants. According to the 
findings of LAR II, there are problematic relations on these lines. According to the 
assessment report (2010), only some municipalities have line-management structures whereby 
Heads of Units can meet regularly under the supervision of the Deputy Mayor while for others 
there is not an adequate communication mechanism between the mayors and civil servants. 
Additionally, for some municipalities ‘the physical nature of the offices’ or ‘bureaucratic 
bottlenecks’ appears as obstacles on building effective communication mechanisms (LAR II, 
2010). There is also a lack of awareness and cooperative attitude in top-management to 
promote the sharing of the information within the organisation. The remarkable finding is that 
despite the fact that municipalities are usually equipped with capable ICT infrastructure, due 
to the unwillingness to share information or disregarding the storing of information, the 
management information systems are not operating adequately (LAR II, 2010). The lack of 
mutually agreed descriptions on tasks and responsibilities, and the managerial deficiencies to 
cultivate the most from the inter-departmental meetings emerge as other barriers on building 
effective communication within the administrative body. 
On the other hand, the relations between the councillors and mayors or civil servants 
are also handicapped by several capacity related issues. It appears that in most of the 
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municipalities, councillors rarely or not at all meet with the civil servants. In addition to this, 
there is a lack of guidelines and training possibilities for councillors how to establish this 
particular relationship. In fact, in most of the municipalities, councillors are neither 
knowledgeable of their responsibilities, nor have the technical capabilities to conduct their 
responsibilities (LAR II, 2010). Inevitably, this situation hampers their essential internal 
control function on municipal activities. Nevertheless, in most of the municipalities 
communicating with the mayor is not a significant problem for councillors.   
Moving on to the second aspect, there are again two dimensions to be assessed in the 
external communication with the society. The first one is the existing participation 
mechanisms for citizens in local governance. As previously mentioned, citizens can 
participate in local governance mechanism through elected councillors, muhtars and urban 
councils. Secondly, the e-government system is an alternative source to communicate with 
local administrations. 
Starting with the relation between councillors and citizens, in many municipalities 
there is neither a particular mechanism nor guidelines to facilitate the communication with 
citizens (LAR II, 2010). Eventually, the councillors are rarely meeting with their electorate if 
they are meeting at all. It appears as well that the residents have little information on what a 
councillor does (LAR II, 2010). Clearly, the existing communication mechanisms with 
residents are inadequate and not properly functioning. The picture is almost the same with 
regard to communicating through urban councils. The LAR II report indicates that the 
members of urban councils meet seldom or not at all with elected municipal councillors. 
There are only some ad-hoc committees initiated by urban councils to monitor the activities of 
municipalities but there is not a formal mechanism to facilitate meetings between these two 
groups. Also, there is some criticism against the propositions prepared by the urban councils 
as being irrelevant with the municipal council’s agenda (LAR II, 2010). Moreover, several 
municipal respondents complain that the confrontational attitudes of civil society 
organisations are damaging a constructive dialogue. Yet, these problems are in fact outcomes 
of not functioning communication channels not the source of it. Along the same lines, the 
good experiences are not prevalent in citizen participation through muhtars. In some cases, 
with the mayor’s initiative, muhtars can find easier access into the municipal decision-
making. However, these examples are sporadic as in other cases muhtars complain about the 
absence of participation opportunities (LAR II, 2010).  
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It seems that the existing participation mechanisms for citizens are not satisfactory. 
Thus, citizens usually prefer to bring their complaints and opinions directly to the mayor 
(LAR II, 2010). Indeed, most municipalities have one form of direct communication 
mechanism between the mayor (or deputy mayor) and the citizens. For instance, many 
municipalities have public desks for the questions and complaints directed by the citizens. 
Moreover, some municipalities provide local TV and newspaper services which can be an 
alternative source of information for citizens. Nevertheless, the findings of LAR II 
programme point out the public awareness on structures, responsibilities and functions of 
local administrations are limited which is an indication of poor communication between local 
administrations and citizens. The good examples of functioning communication mechanisms 
are limited to the cases and they are mostly implemented with the initiative of the mayor.  
The e-government mechanisms are other means for building effective communication 
with the community. Especially, at the second term of AKP government, there have been 
great emphases on e-government transformation of public services. For instance, the e-
government gateway project initiated in 2008 was to enable a one single entry for the 
provision of public services. Since 2010 there are 246 governmental services  accessible from 
an online single source (SPO, 2011). According to 2011 data, at least one participatory online 
application (e.g. online surveys, voting, interactive discussions, etc.) is provided in the 
website of municipalities which corresponds to the 87 % of the total population (Mahalli 
İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011). Also, an interactive city guide is provided over the website 
covering 80 % of population (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011). 
However, the effectiveness of e-government is partly dependent on the capacities 
existing in the society. In this sense ‘e-government readiness’ is an important indicator to 
assess the willingness and capability of society to embrace e-government mechanisms. The 
most notable evaluation method on ‘e-government readiness’ is developed by United Nations 
Public Administration Programme (UNPAP) which is publishing the E-Government 
Readiness Index (EGRI) since 2003. The index evaluates the capacities on online service, 
telecommunication and human capital. According to the 2010 index, Turkey ranks 69 in e-
government development which is a poor performance compared to European countries. 
Additionally, Turkey and Italy show the lowest increases in individual usage of Internet 
according to the OECD data (Telli, 2011). In fact, the national statistics on e-government in 
Turkey shows a low ranking in households with Internet connection (34%) and Internet user 
individuals (37.6 %) (SPO, 2011). By and large, citizens in Turkey prefer face-to-face 
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interaction in public offices39 instead of online services (SPO, 2011). Compared to OECD 
countries, Turkey is the second last regarding the percentage of businesses using the Internet 
to interact with public authorities and the lowest on the percentage of citizens using the 
Internet to interact with public authorities (Telli, 2011). 
Yet, there is the other side of the medallion which is not that depressing for Turkey. 
First of all, Turkey has a high level of young population (almost half of the population is 
under 24) and the level of Internet usage among young people is distinctively higher 
compared to the country average40. Secondly, the Internet usage has a positive correlation 
with literacy and education level. Thus the regions with high level of education and 
development level perform higher in rankings of e-government readiness. Thirdly, contrary to 
the individual level, the private enterprises have competent levels in terms of e-government 
readiness according to the EU standards. The percentage of enterprises with broadband 
connection is 89% which is above the EU-27 average with 86% (SPO, 2011). Additionally, 
the online sophistication in business is quite above the EU-27 average. Fourthly, despite the 
low rankings in e-government usage among individuals and private companies, the 
satisfaction rates for e-government services has raised from 63,3 % in 2008 to 95,7% in 2010 
(SPO, 2011). Again, this rate is above the EU average. 
In sum, the statistics indicate the importance and the usage of e-government services 
will most likely increase rapidly in the coming years, and it might be an important mean of 
communication and service allocation in local governance. As mentioned previously, the 
improvements on e-procurement and a unified system on e-governance incorporating the 
municipal services can foster the efforts on e-government. 
The last aspect of communication capabilities is about the communication with the 
central government and with the union of local administrations. The most urgent problem on 
this relation is the absence of an information database connecting local administrations with 
the central authority. Thus, the communication between the municipalities and central 
government is generally limited with personal links, and usually works through the affiliated 
political parties.  
In fact, there are some on-going attempts to create a unified databank connecting local 
and central information sources. The most promising project on that matter was initiated by 
                                                            
39		According to the 2009 data, 64.4 % of citizens responded as the ‘preference to meet face to face’ as the main 
reason on not choosing to use e-government services.			
40	The Internet usage for the age group 16-24 is 76.6 %, which is almost double of country average. 
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the Ministry of Interior and TODAIE41 in 2001, namely the ‘YerelBilgi Project’. The aim of 
the project is to create a single databank to pool all the information provided by local 
organisations of central authority, local administrations and affiliated enterprises. However, 
the project is not realised so far and it was postponed due to software problems, the 
inadequacy of stakeholders on using the system and the complexity of the system on data 
entrance (Baruş, 2010). In 2009, a new phase has started on the project. New software has 
been prepared and the usage of the system has been simplified. The current aim in the project 
is to commence the first data applications starting from 2011 (Baruş, 2010). If the project can 
be fully operationalised, it will undoubtedly facilitate the communication gap between local 
authorities and central government.  
On the other hand, with the act on unions of local authorities, the unions of 
municipalities and SPAs have been recognised as public bodies. Two nationwide unions, one 
for municipalities and one for SPAs, were allowed to be formed and all respective local 
administrations are recognised as the natural members. The main function of these 
organisations are to defend and protect the interests of their members, to participate in 
lobbying activities, to develop awareness and to provide trainings to their members on related 
fields. This new initiative has the potential to be an important mean of communication among 
the local administrations. Furthermore, the LAR II report (2010) points out that the 
municipalities are willing to cooperate with the Union both on their relations with central 
government and also with each other. In addition, the regional unions of municipalities  (e.g. 
Union of Marmara Municipalities) are also gradually gaining importance as platforms to share 
information and to build partnerships among its members.  
 
3.7.4 Planning capabilities 
The recent reforms foresee new planning functions for local administrations. In a 
nutshell, local administrations are embarked with the planning responsibilities of strategic 
plans, performance programmes, budgets and accountability reports. The main purpose of 
these planning activities is to establish an effective financial management and service delivery 
in local administrations. 
                                                            
41	Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) is a public body inaugurated in 
1952 to conduct research on public administration and to provide trainings to civil servants.	
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The legal basis of strategic planning has been introduced in 2003 with the Public 
Financial Management and Control Law (PMC Law). The new obligations presented by the 
law have been reaffirmed later in the separate laws. The first strategic plans by local 
administrations were expected until July 2006. However, the short application period without 
any prior preparation had adversely affected the purpose of strategic planning by disregarding 
participation and learning processes thus the quality of first strategic plans was unsatisfactory.  
According to the article 9 in PMC Law, the strategy planning should include setting 
the mission, vision and the strategic goals; defining measureable outcomes and performance 
targets with predefined indicators; and the supervision and evaluation stages. The strategic 
planning process should be prepared with the participation and cooperation of the 
shareholders. On this regard, the Handbook of Strategic Planning for Public Institution (2006) 
prepared by the SPO42 explains various analysis methods for each stage of strategic planning. 
Additionally, strategic planning should be integrated into the budget preparation process by 
adopting performance criteria for objective setting. Because of that, another guidebook 
prepared by the Ministry of Finance (2005) explains the basics of performance based 
budgeting. The guidebook suggests that the adoption of performance based budgeting is the 
link between strategic planning and budget preparation. The system anticipates for each 
public organisation to decide on yearly performance targets and to designate the activities and 
their budgets to reach the objectives. The success criteria for each activity should be indicated 
in the performance charts to evaluate the results. Lastly, the guidebook foresees an activity 
based costing for budgeting process.  
Nonetheless, the actual practices on planning are far from the intended ones. Both 
national and international observers report substantial discrepancies in planning processes. 
For instance, the 2010 assessment report by LAR II highlights that the managers and 
councillors in the municipalities do not think that strategic planning is linked into the 
operational effectiveness of the administrations. The pilot studies demonstrate the strategic 
plans are usually prepared as academic practices without any participation from internal or 
external sources. Furthermore, the report underlines that there is a very little sense of 
ownership by lower level managers over the plans thus the plans do not serve for management 
purposes.  
                                                            
42	The State Planning Organisation was  restructured  as the Ministry of Development in 2011.		
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Another report on performance budgeting (Çatak & Çilingir, 2010) conducts a system 
analysis on performance budgeting in Turkey and sheds light on the current problems within 
the system. The report argues that the performance budgeting system in Turkey performs 
poorly and the level of progress is low. The problems and their causes are given in the report 
as following; 
• Inadequate and incomplete legislation caused by deficiencies and ambiguity in 
strategic planning, performance programming, budgeting and accountability reporting 
regulation; preparation of investment and operational budgets as separate documents; 
preparation of performance programmes and budgets as separate documents; short 
coverage period of performance programmes; short budget approval period by 
Parliament; and unaligned complementary legislation. 
• Incomplete and unclear performance budgeting methodology caused by ambiguity in 
the performance budgeting approach; lack of a systematic approach for strategic 
planning; deficiencies and ambiguity in the performance programming methodology; 
ambiguity in linking strategic plans to higher-level policy documents, performance 
programmes to strategic plans, budgets, accountability reports and detailed 
expenditure programmes to performance programmes; lack of programme 
classification; ineffective performance budgeting documents in determination of 
budget ceilings; appropriations of administrations and ambiguity in rules and 
procedures of budget negotiations. 
• Weak co-ordination and guidance caused by two regulatory administrations (i.e. 
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance) in the performance budgeting system; 
inadequacy of the assessment of the strategic plans and performance programmes; 
insufficient guidance for strategic planning and performance programming processes; 
disconnected performance budgeting legislation and disconnected budget negotiations. 
• Improper and ineffective implementation caused by delays in the budget calendar; lack 
of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting. 
• Disabling administrative and external factors such as organisational problems of the 
Strategy Development Departments; insufficient political ownership and supervision; 
lack of infrastructure to obtain, track and evaluate performance data; inadequacy of the 
e-budget system. 
In sum, even though the planning responsibilities delegated to local administrations 
are considerably enhanced, the practices can remotely meet the expectations. The reasons are 
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both systematic and organisational. Nevertheless, a well-functioning planning process in local 
administrations has a great potential to contribute to overall capacity as well.   
 
3.7.5 Managerial capabilities  
Managerial capabilities of local administrations incorporate the functional and 
technical capabilities held by the senior managers and head of the units. Besides these, 
institutional arrangements on managerial functions should be considered as part of the 
managerial capabilities as well. Yet, some of these institutional arrangements have been 
elaborated previously as part of the communication and planning capacities. Therefore, to 
avoid repetition, the focus in this part will be on personal qualities and other institutional 
arrangements.  
There are some general management skills, regardless of which sector is in it. For 
instance, the type of leadership, a certain level of education and knowledge are crucial to 
assess the managerial capacities. Unfortunately, there is no official statistics on the education 
levels of mayors. However, a study on managerial capacities should evaluate the education 
levels and the occupational knowledge of the managers. In terms of occupational trainings, 
there are some limited training programmes available by the Union of Municipalities of 
Turkey, by the Ministry of Interior and some private companies. In addition to this, some 
international actors such as the UNDP and the EU are organising occasional projects to 
enhance the managerial capacity in municipalities. Yet, there is not a single accredited 
training programme targeting managerial capacity and the number of municipalities able to 
benefit from these trainings is low.   
Furthermore, the motivation is an important subject on leadership qualities. A sort of 
awarding mechanism through promotion or increased income is essential to motivate the staff. 
Yet, as a result of overstaffing and politicisation in municipalities, most of the managers serve 
in the same positions for many years, clearly hampering their desire to try new approaches 
(LAR II, 2010). According to the studies, managers are not seen as ‘result-oriented’ or as 
‘problem-solvers’ but ‘doing the minimum to maintain their positions’ (LAR II, 2010). 
Another concern raised about managers is that they don’t take any initiatives and they do 
whatever the mayor asks them to do. This naturally impedes a well-functioning management 
system. Yet, this is partly related with the absence of performance-monitoring systems. The 
 139 
 
studies show an automated system to monitor and evaluate the performances is required in the 
municipalities (LAR II, 2010). 
There are some efforts to increase the motivation of the staff, as undertaking staff 
satisfaction surveys and organising social events (LAR II, 2010). Furthermore, some 
municipalities enable the posts in municipal companies with additional benefits for their 
senior managers (LAR II, 2010). 
Another important subject related to the managerial capabilities is the cooperation and 
coordination between the head of units and the mayor. Again, differences in political 
affiliations have a substantial influence on that matter. Mayors have to cooperate usually with 
the heads of units who are elected as the candidate of other political parties. Given the party 
politics are influential on the municipal levels, political calculations affect directly the roles 
and responsibilities in the administration. On the other hand, the municipalities usually lack a 
commonly agreed Terms of Reference for the units which either leads duplication of the work 
or for certain works not to be undertaken by any units (LAR II, 2010). 
To sum up, political affiliations and inertia among managers due to lack of career 
opportunities incapacitates the managerial capabilities of local administrations. Studies 
suggest that there is a need of substantial training and awareness programmes to enhance 
personal capabilities and functioning managerial systems inside the municipalities.  
 
3.7.6 Human resource capabilities 
Human resource (HR) capabilities are associated with the sufficiency of the personnel 
equipped with necessary skills and qualities to achieve the stated objectives. Number of the 
personnel, received trainings, skills, gender dispersion, and motivation are some important 
aspects to be considered on evaluating HR capabilities. Also, the HR capabilities are closely 
related with the quality of the HR management (HRM), which is essential for the efficient 
allocation of human resources. Therefore, the existence of HRM rules and the efficiency of 
HRM system are equally important for HR capabilities.  
According to 2011 data, there are approximately 2,583,000 public employees in 
Turkey, of whom approximately 75.2 % are in central government, 10.2 % in local 
governments and 14.6 % in state enterprises (SIGMA, 2011). According to the 2010 statistics 
of the Ministry of Interior, 224.041 people are employed in municipalities. There are four 
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different categories of employment statuses in municipalities; public servants, contracted 
personnel, permanent and temporary workers, of which 76.618 people are working as public 
servant, 13.520 as contracted personnel, 124.347 as permanent and 9.556 as temporary 
worker. The working and employment conditions of each category are described in the Civil 
Servants Act No. 657. The act was implemented in 1965 and since then there have only been 
some minor changes in the civil service system. There are concerns about it as being out of 
date in some respects. During the AKP period, the renewal of the law has been brought up as 
part of the general public management reform plan but at the moment the old law is still in 
effect.  
The 2011 assessment report of SIGMA underlines that the following policy actions are 
needed to improve the current civil service system: “narrowing the scope of the civil service, 
including a more precise delimitation of the boundaries between politics and administration; 
improving the merit-based system for recruitment and management; establishing a unitary, 
simpler, transparent and fair salary system; reinforcing rights and duties of civil servants; 
using mobility and training as important human resources management tools; cutting 
favouritism and patronage; eliminating the abuse of temporary appointments as a way of 
circumventing normal recruitment and promotion procedures; abolishing the immunity of 
civil servants and the permission system for being prosecuted; emphasising impartiality as a 
fundamental civil service value;  regulating the right to strike; removing restrictions on the 
freedom to unionise; increase social dialogue.” The absence of a central management unit to 
ensure common standards by preparing public service policies and the political polarisation 
among civil servants are other important weaknesses of the system, which are impeding 
professionalism in public services and paving the way for the nepotism and partisanism.  
On the other hand, the inefficiency of public service employment is a striking problem 
in all public services. The public employment is not balanced among departments and not 
equally distributed across the country. One reason is that the legal restrictions are impeding 
the internal mobility among departments (SIGMA 2011). Another reason is the absence of 
HRM systems both in local and central level. There is neither a single line ministry with the 
sole responsibility of HRM function (OECD, 2011) nor ministries have the capacity and skills 
to develop accurate human resource management (SIGMA, 2011). The recently established 
HRM departments inside the ministries are mainly in charge of record keeping practices 
rather than developing embedded strategies (SIGMA, 2011). Similarly, the lack of established 
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HRM mechanisms and the absence of legal restrictions on the level of employment resulted 
with overemployment in many municipalities.  
A report prepared by the General Directorate of Local Authorities in Turkey (2010) 
arrays the reasons of overemployment in municipalities as following: “irrational employment 
policies; the absence of any regulation on personnel expenditures; the practicalities in 
recruitment procedures; the transfer of 117.533 temporary workers to permanent positions 
following the implementation of the Act no. 562043; and the additional personnel44 transferred 
to local administrations following the abolishment of General Directorate of Village Services 
in 2005”. The uncontrolled employment policies in municipalities throughout the years have 
turned into a huge financial burden especially for smaller municipalities. Additionally, the 
changes in population census system in 200745 have adversely affected municipalities in less 
developed areas whose residents migrated in bigger cities while officially being registered in 
their hometowns. Considering the transfer shares from the general budget are largely decided 
by the population criterion, the financial burden of overemployment in those municipalities 
with declining population has become even more overwhelming.  
However, there are some efforts to deal with overemployment problem in public 
institutions. A noteworthy development occurred in 2007 with the adoption of ‘norm cadre’ 
system for municipalities and affiliated agencies. The system sets the standards and the 
ceiling number for each post and type of personnel to be employed thus trying to prevent 
inefficient employment of the personnel. Each year, the Ministry of Interior is publishing the 
number of norm cadre for each municipality based on the population range and economic 
activities. Furthermore, the Law no. 6111 has been enacted in 2011 to transfer the redundant 
workers in municipalities into the provincial organisation of the Ministry of Education and to 
the police headquarters. However, there are some concerns against the law that it might be 
subjective on the selection process. The reason is that the norm cadre personnel are not 
excluded and the list of the redundant workers is to be prepared by the municipalities even 
though an independent commission will evaluate it later. Another change in terms of HRM 
                                                            
43 The act was implemented in 2007 to prevent the arbitrary employment of workers in temporary positions for 
long periods. The act prohibited the employment of temporary workers for longer periods than 180 days. 
Moreover, the salaries and minimum employment periods of temporary workers have improved parallel to the 
changes in employment statuses.  
44 31.646 out of 43.274 people are still employed in local administrations. (General Directorate of Local Adm., 
2010) 
45 The new census system is designed on the basis of residence addresses of the citizens instead of a one-day 
enumeration on a ‘de facto’ basis.  The main purpose of the system is to prevent the population overcount which 
was usually the case in the traditional system.  
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occurred with the presentation of performance criteria in the new local administration laws, 
wherein each public body has been assigned to adopt performance assessment measures. Yet, 
the performance assessment is used mostly for career progression and contract renewal, and it 
is not linked to pay (OECD, 2011). 
Despite the overemployment problem there is a lack of qualified staff in most 
municipalities. This is partly due to the training programmes adopted in municipalities. The 
Training Needs Assessment (TNA) Report (2010) of the LAR II programme underlines some 
crucial findings regarding the training needs in local administrations: 
• There is a lack of coordination among various training providers and no commonly 
agreed training courses or packages. Also there are no recognised standards and no 
system for accrediting trainers. 
• There is an uneven balance between the elected councillors and administrators in 
access to trainings. The elected councillors lack even the basic trainings on their legal 
duties to control and supervise municipal actions, and the administrators are not 
trained on how to cooperate with and support elected councillors.  
• Trainings for local administrations are implemented by a ‘supply-led’ approach rather 
than ‘demand-led’, where the managers are selecting the training topics for their staff. 
Thus, most of the training programmes do not cover the real training needs demanded 
by the personnel.  
• Few of the local administrations have the capacity within their HR departments to 
assess and monitor training needs.  
Lastly, the other indicators of the qualified staff are interrelated with the profile of the 
individuals in local administrations. The TNA report presents both positive and negative 
findings in this regard. According to the report, 18.3% of women are serving in administrative 
positions and 9.1% in elected positions, which is low compared to the EU average. Similarly, 
in the 2014 local elections, only 2.92 % of mayors and 10.72% of councillors are elected from 
women candidates46. Yet, the experience level of managers (63% of the managers in the 
administrations have between 10 to 30 years of experience) and high usage of Internet for 
work purposes, (80% of the managers are using internet for 6 hours or more each week) 
indicate that there is good potential to implement successful learning activities in the 
administrations.  
                                                            
46	See www.kadinkoalisyonu.org 	
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3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter touched upon some important aspects which need to be taken into 
account before proceeding with the methodology chapter. First of all, the public 
administration system relies on the control of local administrations by the central authority 
and there are direct (i.e. based on law) and indirect (e.g. corruption charges, discretion on 
funds from central budget) means for central authority to enforce this control mechanism. 
Secondly, party affiliation seems as an important factor which is affecting both the municipal 
decision-making and also the relations with the central government. Thirdly, municipalities in 
economically developed regions have more advantages to raise income by own source 
resources and through owned economic enterprises. Similar to financial capabilities, empirical 
findings show that communication and human resource capabilities are also related with the 
economic development and size of the municipality. Thus, it is logical to expect that the local 
governance capacity will be correlated with the local capacity in Turkish case. Fourthly, 
different type of local administrations shows significant differences in terms of capabilities 
and reliance on central government. Despite the legal changes, SPAs are still highly 
dependent in practice on central authority both on decision-making and implementation. On 
the other hand, studies show that different types of municipalities have varying degree of 
capacities in terms of local governance. In other words, metropolitan municipalities have 
usually larger capacities from provincial municipalities and provincial municipalities have 
larger capacities than district municipalities. Therefore, in terms of capacities it is important to 
compare the same type of local administrations. 
In sum, the influence of central government, party affiliations, socio-economic 
development, size and type of local administrations appear as primary factors which can have 
an impact on the relationship between local governance capacity and decentralisation in 
Turkish case. In the next chapter, I will address the questions regarding the methodological 
aspects of this research and the data collection strategy. Subsequently, in Chapter V the data 
analysis and the interpretations of the statistical findings will be presented.  
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Chapter IV- Methodology 
This dissertation explores the relationship between capacities for better local 
governance and decentralisation in local governance. Three alternative research hypotheses 
are formulated to describe the assumed relationship between the local governance capacity, 
local capacity and decentralisation.  
H1: Decentralisation is influenced by local governance capacity while the impact of 
local capacity is limited or insignificant on decentralisation. 
H2: Decentralisation is influenced both by local governance capacity and local 
capacity significantly, and both capacities independently affect decentralisation. 
H3: Decentralisation is influenced by local capacity while the impact of local 
governance capacity apart is limited or insignificant. 
Hence the methodological choices shed light on the (1) presence of a relationship and 
(2) the degree of relationship between these concepts separately and jointly. Furthermore, 
local governance capacity is not a unified concept but rather a quintessence of the 
mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation capacity of local 
government. Any study on the relationship between decentralisation and capacity should 
indicate the influence of each subcategory under local governance capacity but also the 
influence of their interaction with each other. Finally, capacity and decentralisation are 
multifaceted concepts and any given relationship should be controlled on the influence of 
other explanatory factors. Therefore a reliable study on the relationship between these 
concepts should reflect on external variables with a possible influence on decentralisation and 
capacity.  
In the light of this, this dissertation has the following research objectives; 
Objective 1: Determine the relationship between the core concepts. 
Objective 2: Determine the degree of relationships between the core concepts 
separately and jointly. 
Objective 3: Control any possible external variable on the assumed relationships. 
In a nutshell, Chapter IV focuses on the research design and the chosen methods to 
accomplish the research objectives. Choices made in data sampling and unit of analysis; 
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operationalisation of the concepts; data collection strategy and instrumentation; methods in 
data analysis and concerns on reliability and validity will be elaborated in this chapter.  
  
4.1 Research Method and Design Appropriateness 
The research objectives inherently favour a quantitative research design. As Creswell 
(2003) suggests, in case the problem is identifying factors that influence an outcome, the 
utility of an intervention, or understanding the best predictors in outcomes, then a quantitative 
approach is the best choice for the researcher. Creswell describes the pillars of a quantitative 
research design as following: 
“A quantitative approach is one in which the investigatory primarily uses postpositive 
claims for developing knowledge (i.e., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific 
variables and hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation, and the 
test of the theories), employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and surveys, 
and collect data on predetermined instruments that yield statistics data (Creswell, 
2003)” 
However, the quantitative research design has its own limitations. The structured data 
collection instruments for quantitative research usually fall short in capturing intangible or 
abstract notions. Especially measuring capacity encompasses several intangible elements 
which are difficult to interpret in quantifiable data. Moreover, the rigidity of quantitative data 
collection method can easily fail to capture other influential factors. Therefore, qualitative 
responses will be supplemented with the statistical findings in order to attain more insight on 
the mechanism and to complement the big picture on how the concepts are mutually affecting 
each other. 
One of the main handicaps of quantitative research design is securing the adequacy in 
sample size. The basic principle of “more is better” in statistical analysis is not easily 
attainable in social sciences, especially if the unit of analysis is not individuals. Statistical 
inferences based on the population of public bodies or states are inevitably restricted by the 
possible data size. Similarly, this research is also restricted by the number of existing 
municipalities in terms of possible data size.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is increasingly becoming popular in social 
sciences especially in case of limitation with data sizes. QCA enables the researchers to drive 
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causal inferences based on data and is perceived to be a bridging method between qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. QCA is recommended as preferable option in comparison to 
quantitative research methods if the researcher strives on understanding the causal conditions 
of a complex phenomenon or event based on set of factors. The findings of QCA enable the 
researcher to address various questions such as, ‘under what conditions a certain 
event/phenomenon occurs?’ or ‘which conditions are sufficient for a certain outcome to 
occur?’. If we adopt this mentality to this research, a possible research question would take 
the shape of “under which capacity conditions higher decentralisation occurs?”. Although this 
research question has similarities with the research interests, the central research question of 
this research revolves around the degree of influence of local capacity and local governance 
capacity on decentralisation. Measuring the degree of influence is best addressed with the 
regression analysis. Nevertheless, QCA presents a viable alternative for future researches, 
especially for studying the causal inferences between sub-elements constituting the local 
governance capacity and higher decentralisation. 
 
4.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is provincial municipalities. As discussed in Chapter III, Turkey is 
allotted into 81 provinces governed by provincial and metropolitan municipalities. There are 
in total 16 metropolitan municipalities and 65 provincial municipalities47. Metropolitan and 
provincial municipalities differ in terms of organisational structure, administrative and 
financial discretion. Therefore a comparison on provincial level should exclude metropolitan 
municipalities. Previous chapter indicated that smaller municipalities usually lack the basic 
capacities, thus data collection in the level of district or first-level municipalities would most 
likely result with lots of missing data to address satisfactorily various aspects of local 
governance capacity. Hence a comparison among provincial municipalities appears as the 
most logical choice for this research. 
The organisational structure of provincial municipalities varies in each case. Yet, in 
each municipality the mayor is the highest authority in management and the deputy mayors 
are in charge of the management of different departments. Usually, in each provincial 
                                                            
47	After the implementation of 6360 numbered law on the status of 14 provincial municipalities in March 2014, 
Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Hatay, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaras, Mardin, Mugla, Ordu, Tekirdag, Trabzon, 
Sanlıurfa and Van, municipalities are changed into metropolitan municipalities. However, during the field 
research, these municipalities were still provincial municipalities, thus they are part of the analysis.  
 147 
 
municipality, there are two or three deputy mayors, and with the mayor they form the 
managing body of the municipality. 
The decision-making body of the municipality is the municipal assembly, which is 
composed of elected councillors. Councillors usually belong to political parties and they are 
selected according to the share of votes their parties have received in the local elections. In 
2009 local elections, the distribution of provincial municipalities among the political parties48 
has been as following: 
AKP (Justice and Development Party): 36 provinces 
CHP (Republican People’s Party): 11 provinces 
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party): 8 provinces 
BDP (Peace and Democracy Party): 7 provinces 
Independent: 2 provinces49 
Others: 1 (Sivas) province 
4.3 Operationalisation of Variables 
The research hypotheses require the operationalisation of three key variables, local 
governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation. This part presents the choices and 
arguments on the operationalisation of these variables. Several potential external factors 
which may have an exogenous influence on the relationship between capacity and 
decentralisation in local governance were highlighted in the previous chapter. These factors 
are categorised under external variables and the choices on operationalisation are explained in 
the final part of this section. 
4.3.1 Local Governance Capacity  
The theoretical approach towards local governance in this research highlights two 
domains for the capacities in local governance. The first domain is about the capacity 
components possessed by the local government, and the second domain captures the relational 
                                                            
48 The list indicates the number of provincial municipalities whose mayor was a candidate from the associated 
political party. 
49 The mayors of both provinces have joined in AKP in 2013. So the total number of provincial municipalities 
governed by the candidates from AKP has increased to 38. 
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capacity components existing in the surrounding environment. The former is categorised 
under ‘local governance capacity’ and the later is categorised under ‘local capacity’.  
Local governance upholds the local government responsible on mobilising the 
resources from the actors in locality and to channel them wisely to the needs of the public. For 
clarification, actors in locality do not necessarily need to be located within the jurisdictional 
area of the local administration, but any institution involving into local governance affairs can 
be considered as an actor in locality. For instance, if a central government institution is 
responsible on providing loans to local administration, it will be considered as an actor in 
locality.   
 Based on this definition, three fundamental functions are expected from local 
governments in terms of governance; (1) mobilisation of resources, (2) decision-making and 
(3) implementation. These functions are expected to correspond to the six key dimensions to 
locate the required capabilities, i.e. financial, material, communication, planning, human 
resources and managerial dimensions (see Figure 2.3). In a nutshell, mobilisation capacity 
focuses on the financial and material dimensions of capacity; decision-making capacity 
focuses on planning and communication dimensions of capacity; and implementation capacity 
holds on human resources and managerial capacities.  
Yet, this logical construct of local governance capacity entails a significant challenge 
to overcome in terms of measurement. Since all the three functional capacities under local 
governance capacity include several indicators, measuring local governance capacity as a 
single variable would require a larger sample size than 65 provinces for sensible statistical 
inferences. Yet, treating the local governance capacity variables separately would enable to 
explore what variations of capacities are functional in terms of decentralisation. Therefore, in 
this research local governance capacity will not refer to a single variable but the theoretical 
construct influenced jointly by mobilisation, decision-making and implementation capacities.  
 
 
a. Mobilisation Capacity  
Mobilisation capacity focuses on the abilities and means of the local government in 
mobilising the financial and material resources needed for public services and administrative 
functions. Three sub-areas are defined according to the stages in mobilising the resources; (1) 
the ability to bring in the financial resources for purchasing, (2) the capability to channel the 
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financial resources for the purchasing goods and services, (3) the adequacy in financial and 
material means for municipal functions.  
The first sub-area focuses on the ability of municipality to generate income from its 
own sources. Two indicators are selected; (1)‘property taxation’, which is the biggest 
contributor to the municipality tax revenues and (2) ‘utilisation of immovable’, which 
indicates the ability of the municipality to generate income from municipality’s immovable.  
‘Property taxation’ is measured by the ratio of property tax collected to registered taxpayers. 
‘Utilisation of immovable’ is the ratio of revenue generated by the immovable owned by the 
municipality to the overall value of the immovable. These indicators show municipality’s 
capability to generate income by focusing on the two most important items affecting 
municipality’s own-source revenues (i.e. tax revenues, and enterprise and property revenues). 
Both of the indicators are expected to be in the same direction with the mobilisation capacity. 
The second sub-area incorporates the indicators capturing the ability of the 
municipality in channelling its revenues for purchasing goods and services required for public 
services. Two questions are important in this regard; (1) ‘what is the financial flexibility in 
purchasing goods and services?’, and (2) ‘how good is the public procurement system?’. The 
financial flexibility decreases when the compulsory administrative expenditures (e.g. 
personnel cost, social security cost, ...etc.) hold a big share in the overall expenditures or 
when the short-term debt level is too high. Hence three indicators are picked for this stage; (1) 
debt structure, (2) public procurement and (3) purchasing power. ‘Debt structure’ is measured 
by the ratio of short-term debts (with a due date less than a year) to long-term debts. ‘Public 
procurement’ is a 5 point Likert-scale variable composed of 4 items;  (a) the sufficiency of 
public procurement in supplying the needs of the municipality, (b) the speed of public 
procurement, (c) specialised personnel in public procurement and (d) e-procurement 
infrastructure. ‘Purchasing power’ is measured by the ratio of the expenditures on goods and 
services to the overall municipal expenditures. ‘Debt structure’ is expected to be in adverse 
relation with the mobilisation capacity, as higher ratios would indicate the municipality has 
lesser flexibility to buy goods and services due to debt obligations. Other two indicators are 
expected to be in the same direction with mobilisation capacity. Here, higher purchasing 
power and higher share of the expenses on goods and services would indicate a higher 
capability in purchasing resources needed for better governance.  
The third sub-area focuses on the financial and material adequacy for the delivery of 
public services. Three indicators are selected: (1) material adequacy in public services, (2) 
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adequacy of financial resources, and (3) physical and technical adequacy in administration. 
‘Material adequacy in public services’ is measured by the mean score of mayors’ responses 
on a 1 to 5 satisfaction scale about the material adequacy in 14 municipal services. ‘Adequacy 
of financial resources’ is measured by the responses of mayors on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5. 
‘Physical and technical adequacy’ is a 5 point Likert-scale variable and measured by the mean 
score of 5 Likert items on adequacy in; (1) computer and computer hardware, (2) technical 
equipment and machinery, (3) internet connection and computer software, (4) physical 
condition of civil servant's offices, (5) physical condition of manager's offices. 
Albeit not being part of the statistical analysis, one final element in mobilisation 
capacity is municipal partnerships and whether they substitute the formal ways on purchasing 
goods and services. A relevant question put forward in the survey is whether the 
municipalities form municipal partnerships to supplement their material needs and what is the 
degree of importance in covering material needs. The responses to this question will provide 
insight on the extent the municipal partnerships provide an alternative and viable model in 
covering municipality’s needs. It is noteworthy to mention that except ‘debts structure’, 
higher scores imply better results for each indicator. 
 
Table 4.1 Mobilisation Capacity Variables 
TYPE CODE VARIABLE DIMENSION 
Mobilisation 
Capacity 
MOB1 Property taxation Financial 
MOB2 Utilisation of immovable  Financial 
MOB3 Debt structure  Financial 
MOB4 Adequacy of financial resources Financial 
MOB5 Purchasing power Material 
MOB6 Physical and technical adequacy Material 
MOB7 Material adequacy in public services Material 
MOB8 Public procurement Material 
  
b. Decision-making Capacity 
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Decision-making capacity indicates the ability in deciding on how to allocate and 
where to allocate the mobilised resources. The ability in deciding on how to allocate is a clear 
indication of planning capacity. The municipalities should strategize between their means and 
needs, and apply this strategy to a feasible budget plan. In a nutshell, the success in strategic 
planning, performance budgeting, and the importance of strategic and performance plans on 
actual decision-making are selected indicators to evaluate the capacity on planning.  
‘Success in strategic planning’ is the mean score of mayors and deputy mayor’s 
response from 1 to 5 on the evaluation of the last strategy-planning process. The deputy 
mayors are asked to evaluate four aspects with regards to strategic planning; (1) describing 
the vision, mission and strategic goals, (2) identifying measurable outputs and performance 
indicators for goals, (3) monitoring the implementation of the strategic plan, (4) evaluation of 
the implementation of the strategic plan. Additionally, the mayor is asked to evaluate the 
success of the last strategic planning. The mean score of 5 items are registered as the data for 
the ‘Success in strategic planning’. ‘Performance budgeting’ is measured by the mean score 
of 7 Likert-items on performance budgeting; (1) timing in budget planning, (2) integration of 
budget plans with performance plans, (3) implementation of performance criteria on budget 
negotiations, (4) coherence with strategic planning, (5) integration of activity-based costing, 
feasibility analysis, risk assessment and cost accounting in budget plans, (6) adequacy of 
equipment to monitor and assess performances, (7) adequacy of an e-budget system. The 
‘importance of strategic plan and performance plans on actual decision-making’ indicator is 
selected to evaluate to what extent the plans are important on decision-making process of 
mayors. This indicator shows if the strategic plan and performance plan are part of the 
decision-making process in municipal actions or whether the decisions are made according to 
individual priorities of the mayor or with other political motives.   
The best decision on where to allocate the resources can only be attained with 
adequate and effective means of information. In order for the decision-makers to attain the 
most accurate information, the organisation should have the capacity on sharing the 
information, storing the information, and effective horizontal and vertical communication. 
Not only information attained by the organisation but the interactions with Urban Councils 
and muhtars can also be source of information with decision-makers. Additionally, the 
decision-makers should employ the instruments to collect the data on segments of society and 
demands of citizens. Although the spread of paper sheets could be an instrument of collecting 
data, online data collection methods via webpages are becoming more widespread and more 
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influential. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the capacity of e-government and e-
participation means and the number of visitors in municipality’s website.  
Hence, to capture the communication dimension of decision-making capacity 7 
variables are selected. ‘Intra-organisational communication’ is the mean score of 7 Likert 
items; (1) communication among departments, (2) communication between deputy managers 
and directors, (3) share of information inside the municipality, (4) adequacy of IT systems, (5) 
storing of information, (6) division of work and collaboration among departments, (7) 
communication between civil servants and councillors. ‘Importance of local representatives 
on decision-making’ is the mean score of mayor’s assessment on the importance of Urban 
Council and muhtars’ influence on the formation of the municipal programme. ‘Data sheets’ 
and ‘Citizen polls’ indicate the number of the spreadsheets and polls conducted in 2012. ‘e-
government system’ is the mean score of dummy variables on online services that are  
available in municipality's website. Each service is registered as 0 or 1. It comprises 8 
services; (1) transaction with taxes, fees,.etc., (2) business search, (3) reaching personal 
documents, (4) company registration, (5) statistical information, (6) applying for permits and 
licences, (7) personal statements on finances and taxes, (8) information about zoning status. 
This indicator shows the sophistication in e-government services. ‘e-participation system’ 
indicator is the mean score of dummy variables on e-participation means  in municipality's 
website. Each variable will be registered as 1 or 0.  It includes 7 variables; (1) announcement 
of municipal decisions, (2) announcement of projects, (3) announcement of plans, (4) 
broadcasting municipal sessions, (5) social media tools, (6) opinion polls, (7) white desk. 
‘Visitors of the website’ is measured according to the Alexa Traffic Ranking indicating the 
frequency of visitors in the website in which lower ranks mean higher number of visitors. 
Therefore, the relationship of this indicator with decision-making capacity variable should be 
in opposite direction. 
In sum, the following variables are selected to measure capacity in decision-making. 
All variables except e-participation system are expected to be in the same direction with 
decision-making capacity.  
 
Table 4.2 Decision-Making Capacity Variables 
TYPE CODE VARIABLE DIMENSION 
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Decision-making 
Capacity 
DM1 Success in strategic planning Planning 
DM2 Performance budgeting Planning 
DM3 Importance of strategic plan and 
performance plans on actual decision-
making 
Planning 
DM4 Intra-organisational communication Communication 
DM5 Importance of local representatives on 
decision-making 
Communication 
DM6 Data sheets Communication 
DM7 Citizen polls  Communication 
DM8 E-government system Communication 
DM9 E-participation system Communication 
DM10 Visitors of the website Communication 
  
c. Implementation Capacity 
For a higher capacity in implementation, local governments require higher capacities 
in management and in human resources. The managerial dimension incorporates the 
individual skills and abilities of managers and as well as management practices to increase 
performance in the organisation. Education, experience, collaboration and initiative taking in 
management and the management practices to increase performances are the focal points in 
terms of managerial capabilities.  
In total 6 indicators are selected to measure managerial capabilities. ‘Education level 
of the mayor’ is a categorical variable for the education level of the mayor. ‘Years in office’ 
consists of the number of years spent in the mayor position and it indicates the experience as a 
mayor. ‘Initiative taking in management’ is the mean score of the mayor’s responses on the 
level of initiative taking by the deputy mayors and directors. ‘Collaboration in management’ 
is the mean score of responses collected by the mayor and deputy mayors about the degree of 
collaboration between deputy mayors and directors and deputy mayors and mayor. 
‘Management practices’ is measured by the mean score of 3 Likert items; (1) practices to 
increase motivation among staff, (2) trainings on leadership and management, (3) practices to 
increase initiative taking in directors and other personnel. Finally, ‘seniority in directors’ 
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captures the seniority of the directors in occupation. 5 clusters are identified divided by a 
scale of 5 years of occupation and for each corresponding cluster a weighting number is given 
( 0-5 years= 1; 5-10 years=2; 10-15 years=3; 15-20 years=4; above 20=5). The number of 
directors on each cluster will be multiplied with the corresponding weight number. The total 
sum will indicate the seniority level in management. 
Successful implementation also relies on the quality and the sufficiency of the 
municipal personnel. Several variables will be incorporated to assess the quality of the 
personnel such as seniority, specialisation, formation and technical expertise. Yet, adequacy 
in human resources cannot be fully grasped without evaluating how it fits to the overall need. 
Therefore, the indicators on the effectiveness of human resource management system and 
employment policies will be integrated into the measurement.  
In total 8 indicators are selected for human resource capabilities. ‘Seniority in 
personnel’ captures the years of occupation among personnel by following the same formula 
for ‘seniority in directors’ indicator. ‘Norm cadre’ indicates the adequacy and efficiency of 
staff number inside the municipality by taking the ratio of norm cadre to the total number of 
employees. As explained in Chapter III, norm cadre indicates the number of personnel 
designated for municipal functions. In this variable, values over 1 would indicate there is 
more staff in the municipality than it is deemed necessary for the existing functions. Values 
less than 1 would indicate an understaffing situation. The optimal values should be close to 1. 
Technical personnel are important for the delivery of specialised services inside the 
municipality, and ‘Technical personnel’ indicator is measured by the ratio of the number of 
technical personnel to the total number of municipal personnel. Similar to ‘norm cadre’ 
indicator, more is not always better for this indicator since values closer to 1 would indicate 
overstaffing in terms of technical personnel. Therefore, both variables could create non-linear 
relationships with other variables which would require logarithmic transformation before 
factor analysis. ‘Specialised personnel’ grasps the education and expertise level of the 
personnel by taking the ratio of the personnel with a postgrad or equivalent vocational 
training degree to the total number of personnel. ‘Personnel in municipal companies’ is 
measured by the ratio of personnel employed in municipal companies to the overall number of 
personnel. This variable is important to consider the impact of employment outside the 
municipality on implementation capacity. ‘HR management system’ is a Likert-scale variable 
by taking the mean score of 7 Likert items: (1) functionality of HR management system, (2) 
sufficiency of HR management system, (3) coherence of the HR management plans with the 
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municipality's needs, (4) competence of HR department, (5) implementation of HR strategies, 
(6) monitoring and assessing the training need, (7) trainings meet the municipality’s needs. 
‘Employment policies’ indicator is measured by the mean score of 4 Likert items; (1) 
sufficiency in personnel number, (2) sufficiency in qualified personnel number, (3) efficiency 
of employment policies, (4) match of new recruits the job criteria. The final variable, 
‘Formation’ indicates the average hour of occupation training received by the personnel. The 
respondents for this indicator are asked to provide the hours of occupation training provided 
to municipal personnel in 2012 and the number of personnel benefited from the trainings.  
All indicators are expected to be in the same direction with implementation capacity. 
However, for ‘norm cadre’ and ‘technical personnel’ indicators, the degree of relationship 
might be reduced due to non-linear relationships with other variables. Therefore, logarithmic 
transformation of both variables will be controlled before factor analysis. 
 
Table 4.3 Implementation Capacity Variables 
TYPE CODE VARIABLE DIMENSION 
Implementation 
Capacity 
IMP1 Education level of the mayor Management 
IMP2 Years in Office  Management 
IMP3 Initiative taking in management Management 
IMP4 Collaboration in management  Management 
IMP5 Management practices  Management 
IMP6 Seniority in directors Management 
IMP7 Seniority in personnel HR 
IMP8 Norm cadre HR  
IMP9 Technical personnel HR 
IMP10 Specialised personnel HR 
IMP11 Personnel in municipal companies HR 
IMP12 HR management system HR 
IMP13 Employment Policies HR 
IMP14 Formation  HR 
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4.3.2 Decentralisation 
In the majority of comparative empirical studies, decentralisation is operationalised as 
the extent of the sub-national government’s influence/discretion/share over administrative, 
political and fiscal dimensions. The comparison of political and administrative dimensions is 
only useful if the purpose of the study is to draw inferences about the differences on 
institutional and regulatory frameworks. This dissertation compares the same types of local 
administrations in a single country case. Hence, administrative and political dimensions of 
decentralisation won’t be relevant for the level of comparison. Consequently, fiscal 
decentralisation is the only feasible option to focus on operationalisation and to indicate 
decentralisation in local governance. 
OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database provides a wide array of possible indicators to 
measure fiscal decentralisation in comparative studies among country cases. The OECD 
database keeps the data on 14 dimensions to compare the fiscal decentralisation level.  These 
are; ‘tax autonomy’, ‘intergovernmental transfer’, ‘expenditure’, ‘revenue’, ‘tax revenue’, 
‘intergovernmental transfer expenditure’, ‘intergovernmental transfer revenue’, ‘user fees’, 
‘tax revenue as a share of total revenue’, ‘intergovernmental transfer revenue as a share of 
total revenue’, ‘balance’, ‘debt’, ‘fiscal rule indicators’, ‘the recurrent tax on immovable 
property’. ‘Tax autonomy’ is a composite indicator evaluating the fiscal discretion of sub-
national governments over their own taxes. It is a useful indicator for country comparisons, 
yet it is not suitable for comparative purposes within a single country case where same tier of 
local administrations share an equal discretion over own taxations. For similar reasons, ‘fiscal 
rule indicators’ and ‘the recurrent tax on immovable property’ are not suitable indicators for 
this study. ’Balance’ and ‘debt’ indicators measure respectively the level of net lending/ 
borrowing, and the level of the consolidated liabilities according to the GDP. These variables 
are similar to ‘expenditure’ more suitable for country comparison cases. The rest of the 
variables are related with the revenue structure of the sub-national governments. The local 
administrations in Turkey have two key categories in terms of revenues, own-source revenues 
and intergovernmental transfer shares. The rest of the revenues do not have significant impact 
in terms of financial decentralisation. The intergovernmental transfer shares are allocated 
from general budget based on a formula without any discretion from central government. 
Therefore, the extent of intergovernmental transfer shares does not necessarily influence the 
financial autonomy of local governments. In light of this, the ratio of own source revenues to 
overall revenues, is the only significant element in the Turkish case to compare financial self-
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reliance and local autonomy of provincial municipalities. Hence, decentralisation variable will 
be framed as the financial autonomy and self-reliance of local government. It will be 
operationalised by measuring the ratio of own-revenues to overall revenues.  
 
4.3.3 Local Capacity  
The relational understanding of governance suggests that the local government should 
have access to sufficient socio-economic resources for better governance. In that sense, the 
local capacity variable refers to the socio-economic development of the locality. Measuring 
socio-economic development can incorporate tangible indicators such as GDP, life 
expectancy, levels of employment, or more intangible elements such as freedom of 
association or participation in political parties or civil society organisations.  
In this dissertation, the data for the local capacity variable are taken from the Ministry 
of Development’s study ‘the Socio-Economic Development Ranking Survey of Provinces and 
Regions (SEGE-2011)’. In this study, 61 indicators from 8 subcategories are utilised to create 
an index to rank the socio-economic development level of all provinces. Table 4.4 lists the 
indicators for the subcategories of demographics, education, health, employment, competition 
and innovation capacity, fiscal capacity, accessibility and quality of life.  
Table 4.4 Indicators of SEGE-2011  
Demographic Indicators 
1 Population density 
2 Fertility rate (between 15-49) 
3 Dependent young population rate (0-14 years old) 
4 Net immigration rate 
5 Urbanisation rate 
Education Indicators 
6 Literacy rate 
7 Literacy rate in woman population 
8 Secondary education schooling rate 
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9 Vocational and technical schooling rate 
10 Provincial YGS50 success rate 
11 Ratio of university or equivalent degree graduates in 22 + years old population 
Health Indicators 
12 Number of hospital beds per 100.000 people 
13 Number of doctors per 10.000 people 
14 Number of dentists per 10.000 people 
15 Number of pharmacies per 10.000 people 
16 Ratio of green card51 holders in the province 
Employment Indicators 
17 Unemployment rate 
18 Labour force participation rate 
19 Ratio of population in working age (15-64) to overall population 
20 Ratio of manufacturing sector in social insured employment 
21 Ratio of social insured employment to overall population 
22 The average daily earning 
23 The average daily earning- Woman 
24 Employment rate 
Competition and Innovation Capacity 
25 Share of the province in Turkey’s export 
26 Export amount per person 
27 Number of manufacturing companies (share in Turkey) 
28 Ratio of registered companies in manufacturing sector 
                                                            
50 National University Entry Exam 
51 Green cards are distributed to those without any social security coverage to receive public health services free 
of charge		
 159 
 
29 Electricity consumption per person in manufacturing sector 
30 Number of production parcels in organised industry zones (share in Turkey) 
31 Number of small enterprises (share in Turkey) 
32 Total capital in the new enterprises (share in Turkey) 
33 Foreign capital enterprises per 10.000 people 
34 Trademark application per 100.000 people 
35 Patent application per 100.000 people 
36 Rate of post-graduate and doctorate degree holders in 30+ years old population 
37 Agricultural production value per population living in rural area. 
38 Number of certified beds in touristic facilities (share in Turkey)  
39 Amount of incentivised investments (share in Turkey) 
Fiscal Capacity 
40 Bank credits in the province (share in Turkey) 
41 Saving deposits in the province (share in Turkey) 
42 Amount of bank deposits per person 
43 Active online banking individual users per 1000 people 
44 Active online banking business users per 1000 people 
45 Budget revenues per person 
46 Provincial tax revenues (share in Turkey) 
Accessibility 
47 Asphalted road ratio in rural area 
48 Distance of the province to the nearest airport 
49 Broadband users per household 
50 GSM subscribers per person 
51 The value of the province in terms of goods per km on national highways 
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52 The ratio of total railway lines to land surface area 
Quality of Life 
53 Rental total space in shopping malls per 1000 people 
54 Rate of the population benefited from sewerage services to total population 
55 Household electric consumption per person 
56 Number of cars per 10.000 people 
57 CO2 average value 
58 Particulate matter (smoke) average value 
59 Ratio of population without social security coverage to overall population 
60 Number of convicts per 100.000 people 
61 Number of suicide cases per 100.000 people 
 
Table 4.5 presents the index value and the ranks of the provinces in terms of socio-
economic development according to SEGE-2011. 
Table 4.5 SEGE-2011 Development Index of Provinces 
Rank Province Index Value Rank Province Index Value 
1 İstanbul 4,5154 42 Malatya -0,0785 
2 Ankara 2,8384 43 Afyon -0,0797 
3 İzmir 1,9715 44 Artvin -0,1046 
4 Kocaeli 1,6592 45 Erzincan -0,1056 
5 Antalya 1,5026 46 Hatay -0,1302 
6 Bursa 1,3740 47 Kastamonu -0,1471 
7 Eskişehir 1,1671 48 Bartın -0,1976 
8 Muğla 1,0493 49 Sivas -0,2208 
9 Tekirdağ 0,9154 50 Çorum -0,2405 
10 Denizli 0,9122 51 Sinop -0,2479 
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11 Bolu 0,6394 52 Giresun -0,2564 
12 Edirne 0,6383 53 Osmaniye -0,2892 
13 Yalova 0,6263 54 Çankırı -0,3312 
14 Çanakkale 0,5999 55 Aksaray -0,3671 
15 Kırklareli 0,5923 56 Niğde -0,3761 
16 Adana 0,5666 57 Tokat -0,3821 
17 Kayseri 0,5650 58 Tunceli -0,3892 
18 Sakarya 0,5641 59 Erzurum -0,4327 
19 Aydın 0,5597 60 Kahramanmaraş -0,4677 
20 Konya 0,5308 61 Ordu -0,4810 
21 Isparta 0,5272 62 Gümüşhane -0,4814 
22 Balıkesir 0,4764 63 Kilis -0,5733 
23 Manisa 0,4711 64 Bayburt -0,5946 
24 Mersin 0,4636 65 Yozgat -0,6079 
25 Uşak 0,3737 66 Adıyaman -0,9602 
26 Burdur 0,3684 67 Diyarbakır -1,0014 
27 Bilecik 0,3634 68 Kars -1,0923 
28 Karabük 0,2916 69 Iğdır -1,1184 
29 Zonguldak 0,2758 70 Batman -1,1203 
30 Gaziantep 0,2678 71 Ardahan -1,1384 
31 Trabzon 0,2218 72 Bingöl -1,1920 
32 Karaman 0,1864 73 Şanlıurfa -1,2801 
33 Samsun 0,1579 74 Mardin -1,3591 
34 Rize 0,1550 75 Van -1,3783 
35 Düzce 0,1056 76 Bitlis  -1,4003 
36 Nevşehir 0,1029 77 Siirt -1,4166 
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37 Amasya 0,0510 78 Şırnak -1,4605 
38 Kütahya 0,0198 79 Ağrı -1,6366 
39 Elazığ -0,0103 80 Hakkari -1,6961 
40 Kırşehir -0,0211 81 Muş -1,7329 
41 Kırıkkale -0,0687       
Source: Turkish Ministry of Development, 2013 
 
4.3.4 External Factors 
In the light of Chapter II and III, the following external factors are selected as control 
variables for the relationship between decentralisation, local governance capacity and local 
capacity. 
Population: It has a direct impact on intergovernmental transfer shares (a weight of 80%) and 
intergovernmental transfer share is the most important budget item for most municipalities. 
Since decentralisation variable is calculated by the ratio of own-source revenues to all 
revenues, population may have an impact on decentralisation via its impact on the dividend. 
However, LAR II report suggests that municipalities with bigger population can levy higher 
income with local resources, thus population can also have an impact on own-source 
revenues. In the meantime, access to a larger pool of human and financial resources would be 
possible with higher population which can influence the local governance variables. In sum, 
population is a crucial external variable to control any impact on the relationship between 
decentralisation and capacity.  
Political diversity: Provinces governed by opposition parties could be less willing to 
cooperate with central government, or central government might pursue uncooperative 
policies towards local governments. This can have an impact on the relation between local 
governance capacity and decentralisation. Thus, in order to understand this impact, a proxy 
variable will be added into the equation on the provinces governed by opposition parties. This 
binary variable will be given the value ‘1’ if the mayor is from AKP, and ‘0’ if the mayor 
belongs to an opposition party.  
Party affiliation: Different party affiliations inside the municipalities can cause unwillingness 
for cooperation among managers or inefficiencies in functioning. This variable indicates the 
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extent that the governing party is dominant in municipal management. Its measurement will 
rely on the percentage of votes the governing party received in the 2009 local elections.  
Influence of central government: The theoretical and contextual chapters suggest that the 
competences owned by the local government do not necessarily indicate the ‘real 
decentralisation’. Rather, central government can impose its influence via indirect means on 
the political, administrative and fiscal discretion of local government. Therefore, it is essential 
to control if the influence of central government has an impact on the presumed relationship 
between decentralisation and local governance capacity. Two assumptions can be built on the 
impact of central government’s influence on the relationship between decentralisation and 
local governance capacity.  
The first assumption is that central government can influence the decision-making 
process of local government which can adversely influence the decision-making capacity in 
local governance by undermining the citizen based communication or intra-organisational 
communication. Additionally, the influence of central government in local governance can 
undermine the importance of strategic planning on municipal decisions.  
A second assumption is that the central government does not necessarily get involved 
in local governance to influence the decision-making of local government, but in case the 
local government lack the necessary capacities for better governance, the local government 
can look for the central government’s involvement in local governance. In that case, the 
influence of central government can increase if there is a low level of local governance 
capacity or local capacity.  
Since the influence of central government on municipal decisions cannot be addressed 
on objective basis, the perception of mayors on the influence of central government in 
financial, administrative and political dimensions will be evaluated to measure the variable. 
The influence of central government will be traced in eight areas, namely own source 
revenues, aids, loans and credits, municipal partnerships and collaborations with CSOs and 
private companies, decision-making on municipal services, administrative activities, 
implementation of municipal services, and investment decisions. Each mayor is asked to 
grade the influence of central government on each selected area in a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 
depicts the lowest and 5 the highest influence from the central government. The influence 
variable will be measured as a Likert-scale variable by the mean of the cumulative scores.  
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4.4 Data Collection Strategy 
The primary data collection instrument is surveys that have been distributed to mayors 
and deputy mayors in provincial municipalities. Two separate surveys were prepared, one for 
the mayor and the other for the deputy mayor. The mayor’s survey incorporates mainly 
opinion-based questions, whereas the deputy mayor’s survey contains a large extent of 
technical and factual questions. Even though there are usually several deputy mayors inside 
the municipality, only one survey is prepared addressing to deputy mayors. The decision on 
who should fill the survey has been left unaccounted, as some questions require the collection 
of the data from various departments inside the municipality. The surveys were conducted 
between January and June 2013. They were posted to the mayor’s office and were collected 
via post or e-mail. The other data sources are the official documents and information 
published by the municipalities or by the relevant state institutions. Data collected both from 
surveys and other sources comprise the data from 2012. The details of the data sources are 
specified in the indicators list (see Appendices).  
25 questions are directed to mayors and 37 questions are directed to deputy mayors. 
The questions are clustered according to financial, material, communication, planning, 
managerial and human resource capabilities and decentralisation. Most of the questions are 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale asking the respondent to give a value between 1 and 5. There 
are also some semi-open and open questions that will be used to elaborate the numerical 
responses or to attain more insight on the process of inquiry. Additionally, one broad open 
question is directed to mayors for personal evaluation on the capacity of their municipalities. 
The responses for this question and other received remarks will be used to provide a rationale 
on interpreting the findings in data analysis and for further discussions. Both original surveys 
in Turkish and their translations into English can be found in Appendices. Further aspects 
about validity and reliability on data collection are addressed in the last section of this 
chapter. 
 
4.5 Data Measurement  
Indicators are selected to measure capacity, decentralisation and external variables. 
Table 4.6 shows the coding list for the selected indicators. The indicator list is available in the 
Appendices. 
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Table 4.6 Coding List of Indicators 
Characteristic of the indicator Explanation 
Code number The acronym for the variable and the serial 
number. 
Name Name of the indicator in a concise form. 
Clarification Definition of the indicator in detail. 
Relevancy Description of why this indicator is relevant 
to the dimensions and categories. 
Type Type of the indicator in reference to the 
given categories 
Instrument Survey or other statistical data 
Source of data Mayor or Deputy Mayor, the corresponding 
question in the survey, or the source of the 
data 
Measurement level Nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio 
Unit of analysis The measurement level in which the data is 
explained. 
 The majority of the indicators are measured by the values of Likert type questions at 5 
point-scale. Even though the range of scales can vary from 3 to 11 values, most psychometric 
studies apply 5 or 7 point Likert scale for measurement. In principle, the response error should 
diminish with higher levels of measurement, as the measurement bias would be lower. The 
measurement bias occurs if the respondents cannot find the corresponding value for their 
assessment and is forced to pick the closest value. However, with higher number of same 
level of Likert type questions in a survey, the scale of questions matters less. The difference 
between 5 and 7 point Likert-scale is relatively more important in larger samples sizes, that is 
why the difference will be negligible for the sample size of this dissertation. Additionally, to 
reduce the respondent’s fatigue, 5-point Likert scale is opted in the questionnaires.  
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  The measurement of Likert type questions have been much debated in the literature 
because while the ordinal nature of Likert items is widely accepted, in practice many 
researches treat them at interval scales. The argument for pro-ordinal scale is, that numbers 
are anchored with verbal labels which do not necessarily imply equal distances between 
integers. A common formulation of Likert type question asks the respondents to select a 
statement where each statement is numerated on a scale (see Table 4.7). In this setup, the 
researcher cannot argue that the distance between ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ is equal 
to ‘neutral’ to ‘agree’. Thus any descriptive statistic or further analysis such as factor analysis 
or regression would be statistically not interpretable.   
 Some of the confusion here arises from the interchangeable usage of the concepts 
Likert-scales and Likert-item or Likert-type item (Clason & Dormody, 1994; Boone & Boone, 
2012; Uebersax, 2006). A Likert-scale is composed of Likert-type or Likert-items and unlike 
Likert-item data, Likert-scale data can be analysed at interval measurement scale (Boone & 
Boone, 2012). An explanatory example would be that while the questions on a multiple-
question test are categorised under 5 options (a, b, c, d, e), the test scores are treated at 
interval level (e.g. 90 out 100).  
 The majority of indicators addressed by Likert-type questions combine at least two 
items into a Likert-scale data by taking the mean score of constituting items. There are only 
two variables (MOB4 and IMP1) used as single- item measures and they are registered in the 
indicator list as ordinal.  
The reliability of the internal structure of Likert-scale items will be reported by 
providing Cronsbach’s alpha score. There are some aspects to be aware of while interpreting 
the results of Cronsbach’s alpha score. First of all, alpha score does not only depend on the 
magnitude of the correlations among the components, but also on the number of components 
in the scale. Scales with larger numbers can misleadingly give higher scores, while average 
correlation might remain the same. Second, two scales, each measuring a different aspect, 
when combined together can give higher alpha scores without necessarily measuring the same 
attribute. Third, a significantly high number on alpha coefficient score may indicate redundant 
items which probably measure the same attribute rather than a common attribute. 
Nevertheless, the Cronsbach’s alpha coefficient will provide an idea on the internal structure 
of the variables which in the later stage will be analysed with factor analysis. 
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4.6 Data Analysis 
Following the data screening methods, the data will be analysed by employing 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to retain the factors representing local governance capacity 
variables which will be taken into regression analyses afterwards.  
The aim in factor analysis is to discern the latent factors underlying the measured 
items and to compare the construct of the retained factors with the theorised variables for 
mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation.  
Maximum likelihood (ML) and principal axis factoring (PAF) are most commonly 
used methods and usually give the best results on factor extraction (Costello & Osborne, 
2005). According to Fabrigar et al., (1999) ML yields more efficient results if the data is 
relatively normally distributed ML, otherwise PAF should provide more reliable results. 
Nevertheless, both extraction methods would serve for the purpose of the research.  
The number of factors to be retained will be decided based on the Kaiser’s criterion 
(selecting the factors with an eigenvalue above 1) and on a screen plot. In case there is more 
than one factor to be retained, the result will be rotated to reveal the simple structure of items. 
There are basically two categories of rotation methods, orthogonal and oblique rotation. The 
decision on rotation method relies principally on the perception of the correlation between the 
produced factors. Orthogonal rotations produce factors that are uncorrelated and thus easier to 
interpret. Oblique rotation takes into account the correlation of produced factors and thus 
enables a more realistic interpretation of the reality despite the relative complexity on the 
interpretation (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Tabachnick & Fidell (2007, p. 646) argue that; 
 “Perhaps the best way to decide between orthogonal and oblique rotation is to 
request oblique rotation with the desired number of factors and to look at the 
correlations among factors…if factor correlations are not driven by the data, the 
solution remains nearly orthogonal. Look at the factor correlation matrix for 
correlations around .32 and above. If correlations exceed .32, then there is 10% (or 
more) overlap in variance among factors, enough variance to warrant oblique 
rotation unless there are compelling reasons for orthogonal rotation.”  
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An alternative method to EFA would be principal component analysis (PCA). 
Although both methods of analysis are similar, there are some underlying differences in their 
epistemological background. While EFA produces factors that cause variables, PCA produces 
components which are aggregate of variables (University of North Texas, 2014). The decision 
on which method to employ, however, usually relies on the theoretical structure built for the 
observed variables. In that sense, while EFA aims to reveal the latent factors of the observed 
variables, PCA relies on the assumptions that the observed variables have a linear inference 
with the anticipated variable. Methodologically, PCA aims to find the most variance of the 
observed variables, whereas EFA analyses the covariance (Suhr, 2014). One major 
methodological difference is that PCA does not discriminate between unique and share 
variance unlike EFA (Costello & Osborne, 2005). This carries the risk of producing inflated 
values of variance accounted for by the components, when the factors are uncorrelated and 
communalities are moderate. (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Gorsuch, 1997; McArdle, 1990).  
There are two issues that need to be addressed before applying EFA for variable 
reduction. First of all, it is important to decide how many items to take in the factor analysis. 
Two factors are important in this decision: (1) the items should have a certain degree of 
communality (or correlation), (2) the ratio of number of items to sample size. The degree of 
communality between variables refers to both the overall correlation among the variables and 
also the binary correlations. One suggested test to check if a given data set is suitable for 
factor analysis is Bartlett’s test of sphericity (LAERD, 2014).  
For the strength of the binary correlations, a correlation matrix will be created. A 
popular technique in correlation analysis is Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient 
(PCC), which measures the degree in linear correlation by giving a value between -1 and +1. 
In this scale, -1 suggests a perfect negative correlation, whereas +1 is perfect positive 
correlation and 0 is no correlation. Pearson’s model is less sensitive to non-parametric 
relations between variables and assumes linear relationships between continuous variables. In 
the literature, Polychoric correlation analysis is recommended if the dataset contains ordinal 
and categorical variables.  
Secondly, sampling adequacy is important to be considered. There are different 
arguments on the minimum requirement on sample size, and the choices are also very much 
dependent on the theoretical backing of the variables and the nature of the data (Fabrigar et 
al., 1999; Costello & Osborne, 2005). A general rule of thumb on sample size is a subject to 
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item ratio between 5:1 and 10:1. However, there is a lot of research which reports the results 
of factor analysis with subject to item ratio 2:1 or less.  Costello & Osborne (2005) suggest 
that a larger dataset can help to decide whether or not to drop an item, provided that the 
following problems emerge in the data; (1) if item communalities are above 0.8, (2) if there 
are several strong cross loader items (an item that loads at 0.5 or higher on two or more 
factors) and (3) a factor with fewer than three items. In addition to the sample to item ratio, 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test will be applied to ensure the adequacy in sample size.  
 Following factor analysis, the newly created mobilisation capacity, decision-making 
capacity and implementation capacity variables, along with other local capacity and 
decentralisation variables will be taken into correlation and regression analysis. The 
correlation analysis will be important to discern the direction of the relationship between 
factors (see Objective 1).  
The degree of relationships between variables will be measured by a series of 
regression analyses and the best fitting model between decentralisation and capacity variables 
will be pursued. An alternative model to multiple regression analysis could be structural 
equation modelling (SEM). SEM has advantageous over multiple regression analysis 
especially on causal modelling or path analysis, and a further research with SEM could bring 
further insight on the findings of this study. However, at this stage the aim is to explore the 
impact of variances on the dependent variable (i.e. decentralisation) based on the linear 
combinations of capacity and other external variables.  
 It is important to control any conditional effect among local governance capacity 
variables on decentralisation. For instance, the effect of implementation capacity on 
decentralisation can increase (or decrease) for different values of decision-making capacity or 
mobilisation capacity. It is important to understand the interaction between local governance 
capacity variables with regards to decentralisation, because it would directly affect the 
formulation of capacity building practices. Therefore, the impact of local governance capacity 
variables will be also modelled along the interaction terms.  
 In the last stage, the models will be controlled by the selected external variables (i.e. 
population, political diversity, party affiliation, influence of central government) and any 
extraneous relation will be controlled.  
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 To select the best fitting regression model, the assumptions of ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression will be tested prior to the analysis. The OLS regression has the following 
assumptions; (1) linear relationship, (2) multivariate normality, (3) no or little 
multicollinearity, (4) no autocorrelation, (5) homoscedasticity. In case there is a violation of 
the assumptions of normality, alternative regression models such as Generalised Linear 
Models (GLM) or Tobit regression will be tested.   
 
4.7 Reliability and Validity 
Surveys are one of the main sources of data collection in social sciences, and all 
surveys are affected by certain biases on sampling, response and measurement stages. Total 
Survey Error (TSE) is a collective method to address sources of all possible errors occurring 
during a survey-based research. Although TSE does not suggest a single uniform design, it 
identifies some categories which should be addressed on each research design.  
Basically, TSE refers to sampling and non-sampling error occurring throughout a 
survey-based research. Non-sampling errors can be broken down into three further categories 
such as coverage error, non-response error and measurement error.  
Total Survey Error = Sampling Error + Coverage Error + Nonresponse Error + 
Measurement Error (Gideon, 2012, p. 40).  
Sampling error occurs when the sample of cases does not fully represent the whole 
population. The cause of sampling error could be either the bias on selecting the cases, or the 
selected cases do not reflect the variance on population. Nevertheless, in this research the 
targeted population is all provincial municipalities and the sampling error is not necessarily an 
issue to be addressed as part of TSE. 
 Coverage error occurs, when the population of interest is missing from the sampling 
frame of the target population. Coverage error can manifest itself when sampling frame does 
not include a part of the target population (i.e. under coverage) or when ineligible units are 
part of the sampling frame (Groves et al., 2004, p. 54). In this research the population of 
interest are the mayors and deputy mayors and/or the head of departments. The sampling 
frame is constructed on the basis of the addresses of the municipalities and the surveys are 
addressed to the name of the mayors. Throughout the research, the follow-up calls were 
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conducted with the assistants of the mayors or the heads of staffs. Coverage errors can be 
broken down further into coverage bias and coverage variance. Coverage bias occurs when 
elements in the population are systemically excluded from the sampling frame (Gideon, 2012, 
p. 42). A possibility of the coverage bias is if other people than the addressees fill out the 
surveys, especially on the opinion-based questions. To mitigate this risk, a foreword is added 
about the study and who should fill out the surveys. Furthermore, all the official addresses of 
the municipalities are found either from the website and from relevant government websites. 
Three weeks following the posting of the surveys, follow-up calls were made with each 
municipality to ensure the surveys arrived to the addressees. In case the addressees did not 
receive the surveys, the surveys were sent via email to the head of staff or assistants of the 
mayors. Only in one case, the surveys failed to be sent to the target, as the municipality did 
not have any working email or a fax reachable from abroad lines. 
Nonresponse error occurs when the sample individuals choose not to respond to some 
of the questions (item nonresponse) or all questionnaire (unit nonresponse). A systematic 
nonresponse of a category of participants could lead to bias as the survey statistics may not be 
representative of the population parameters (Gideon, 2012, p. 43). The nonresponse bias can 
be calculated as the differences between respondents and non-respondent means multiplied by 
the nonresponse rate. There are several statistical techniques to mitigate the impact of 
nonresponse. In case of unit nonresponse, weighting techniques can be adjusted to 
compensate the nonresponse bias. For item nonresponse, single or multiple imputation 
techniques are useful to prepare the data for statistical analysis. Nevertheless, techniques such 
as weighting or imputation can increase the uncertainty on our results by replacing the bias 
with variance (Gideon, 2012).   
In this research, municipalities could have been reluctant to share information about 
financial and budgetary questions, even though the new law on public financial management 
stipulates that this information should be transparent. In case there is a low-response rate on 
budget related questions, additional information will be sought from the sources of the 
Ministry of Finance which keeps these data for all municipalities. Furthermore, to increase the 
response rate, a letter signed by the Secretary General of Union of Municipalities of Turkey 
has been attached to encourage the respondents in participation. Similarly, a pre-test has been 
conducted with the experts from Union of Turkish Municipalities to ensure that the survey 
questions are clear and without any ambiguity.  
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In case there are missing surveys from municipalities, the socio-economic differences 
and differences in party affiliation will be controlled on non-responded municipalities with a 
statistical significance test. If a bias is detected, weighting options will be utilised.   
As far as the missing data is concerned, depending on the missing sample size, it can 
be treated either with data imputation methods or with the elimination of the indicator. The 
decision on which option to take will depend on the response rate.  
Measurement error occurs when there is a difference between the estimated value and 
the real value of the target variable. There are four sources of measurement error; (1) 
questionnaire, (2) mode of data collection, (3) characteristic of the interviewer, (4) 
characteristics of respondents. More than one of theses sources can be the cause of the 
measurement error at the same time (Gideon, 2012, p. 45). According to Gideon, there are 
various factors which could cause measurement error on survey results such as “poor question 
wording, unclear question instructions, erroneous skip patterns, lengthy questions, inadequate 
response options, the topic of the questionnaire, timing, sponsorship, confusing visual 
designs, data collection methods, interviewer characteristics, faulty interviewer training, 
interviewer actions (whether indicated by the training or unforeseen behaviours), interviewer 
expectations, respondent reactions (whether to the topic or to the interviewer appearance), 
social pressure in the interviewer-respondent interaction, and respondents’ memory erosion 
among many others” 
Given that the surveys are directly sent to addressees without the involvement of any 
surveyor, psychological factors due to the interaction between the interviewee and interviewer 
are not a subject of inquiry in this research. However, the downside is any measurement error 
as potential misunderstanding of the respondent will not be corrected on the spot by a 
surveyor. As a precaution, the experts in the Union of Municipalities of Turkey have assessed 
the surveys. Furthermore, most of the questions are formulated in closed or semi-closed 
questions in Likert-scale form, in order to minimise variances on the responses. To minimise 
the measurement bias due to wording of statements for each numerical value, the respondents 
are asked to pick a number from 1 to 5 where ‘1’ is stated as the lowest degree and ‘5’ is the 
highest degree for the statement without necessarily stating the verbal equivalent of each 
numerical value.   
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To avoid any social pressure on the deputy mayors or other lower ranking managers, 
the questions on the second survey are largely formulated as factual questions rather than 
opinion-based. The opinion-based questions are addressed usually in the questionnaire for the 
mayors. Among the few opinion-based questions directed to deputy mayors (e.g. Q13 and 
Q14/3 in both surveys), the same questions are directed to mayors to reduce the risks on 
measurement bias. In terms of any bias due to sponsorship, the Union of Municipalities of 
Turkey is a largely independent body whose main objective is to voice the problems or needs 
of the municipalities to central government. Therefore, the sponsorship of the Union of 
Municipalities is not expected to indicate any bias on responses. Social desirability could be a 
matter of concern as mayors are asked to self-evaluate on the capabilities in different areas. 
However, the questions can hardly be regarded as politically sensitive and the collected data 
on opinion-based questions will be taken either into factor analysis or will be used as 
supplementary information to control the findings of the statistical analysis. Therefore, any 
impact of social desirability is expected to be minimal. 
There are several attempts to measure TSE with statistical modelling, but to this day 
there is not a single straightforward method to compute a measure of TSE (Gideon, 2012, p. 
48). TSE provides a theoretical framework to understand potential errors which could 
undermine the accuracy of results and serves as a useful map to consider on a survey design. 
For the reliability of the statistical analysis or internal validity, several data screening 
methods, ex-ante and ex-post tests and normality checks will be run to ensure the reliability of 
the data. The details of precautions that are to ensure the statistical validity will be elaborated 
in the next chapter.  
In terms of external validity, it should be taken into consideration that country cases 
have their idiosyncratic aspects which need to be adjusted to the model. In this research as 
well, these aspects were influential on selecting control variables and indicators. Therefore, it 
should be underlined that this research can be applied in other country cases as long as the 
country idiosyncrasies are taken into account.   
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CHAPTER V- DATA ANALYSIS 
The fifth chapter presents the findings attained via the data analysis of the research 
conducted on the provincial municipalities in Turkey. The chapter starts with a description of 
the data, informs the reader on the data collected from the municipalities and displays the 
municipalities that participated in the survey. The subsequent parts in the chapter deal with 
the missing data problem and data screening. Subsequently, the data will be analysed by 
factor analysis, correlation and regression analyses. The final part of the analysis focuses on 
the interpretation of the relationship between decentralisation and capacity, including the 
elaboration of local capacity and other explanatory variables’ influence on the governance 
capacity and decentralisation. The results of the findings will be enriched by the qualitative 
responses collected through the surveys and the graphical display of the responses which are 
not included in the statistical analysis. 
 
5.1 Overview of the Field Research  
The majority of the data for the analysis have been gathered from the surveys with the 
mayors and deputy mayors in provincial municipalities. Over a duration of 8 months in 2013, 
out of 130 surveys distributed in 65 provincial municipalities, 24 municipalities sent both 
surveys back, 9 municipalities sent only one survey back, either from the mayor or the deputy. 
Hence, with a total number of 33 surveys, the field study had a response rate of 51%.  
It is important to say a couple of words on the personal experience and challenges 
encountered throughout the field research. Even though engaging with high-ranking public 
officials for research purposes has always been a challenging task for researchers, a research 
on this scale was a particular challenge given the geographical extent of the target area and 
the complexity of hierarchical structures in Turkish public administration. First of all, the 
unfeasibility of conducting surveys from first hand in 65 provinces necessitated in most cases 
the reliance on intermediary agents in municipalities for distribution, application and 
collection of the surveys. These agents have varied from personal secretaries to executive 
assistants or deputy mayors depending on the internal organisation of the municipality. 
Without an initial personal contact, relying only on phone conversations and e-mail 
exchanges, the fieldwork required extensive time on follow-up calls and  a diligent research 
on finding the key people.  
 175 
 
I am not disregarding the possibility that some surveys might have been filled out not 
by the mayor personally but instead by an executive assistant or a similar respondent. It is 
virtually impossible to ensure the genuineness of the opinion-based answers of the addressee. 
But, as a precaution, clear written and oral indications were provided to respondents on how 
to complete the surveys.  
Secondly, the stiff hierarchy in some municipalities has often necessitated several 
contacts with different respondents to climb up within the hierarchy. In some municipalities 
this procedure was particularly easy given the absence of an initial personal acquaintance, yet 
in some it was almost impossible. One observation is that some municipalities are keen and 
have more awareness in participating in these sort of studies, whereas for others the 
executives were unwilling to cooperate and more suspicious towards the survey.  
Another remark is also necessary about the difficulties encountered on the dispersion 
of the surveys. As mentioned previously, the surveys were dispatched via mail to 
municipalities addressing the mayors. Unfortunately, out of 130 surveys about half of them 
failed to reach their destinations, either as a result of a defect in postal services or internal 
delivery mechanisms inside the municipalities. Thus, more than half of the surveys were 
resent via email to intermediary agents. It was relatively easy to conduct the research via 
emails, as most municipalities possessed a basic level of competency. However, there have 
been cases in which the municipalities have failed to provide a functioning e-mail address, 
and particularly in one case the municipality did not have any functioning e-mail address or a 
fax number despite their genuine interest to participate in the study. 
Lastly, some remarks can be made for the quality of responses and the extent of 
responses to represent the country case. The length of the surveys and especially the 
frequency of questions asking for factual data from different departments have augmented the 
challenge in conducting surveys. Nevertheless, the quality of responses in the majority of 
surveys has been highly satisfactory. Remarkably, except a few cases, all factual data were 
provided thoroughly and in almost half of the surveys the respondents were willing to provide 
feedback and additional comments about the questions and relevant issues. Given the genuine 
answers and high attention in filling the surveys, it can be said that the issues concerning 
capacity and decentralisation are vital concerns for Turkish municipalities.  
Furthermore, the responses from the provinces are not restricted to a certain 
geographical area or socio-economic level but rather they are well dispersed. The socio-
economic level of non-participating provinces is compared with the participating provinces in 
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Table 5.1. The socio-economic development value of each province is measured according to 
the SEGE-2011 index scores. The t-test of a comparison of responders (Dev) and non-
responders (Dev0) does not indicate a statistically significant relationship between the 
response rate and socio-economic differences.  
 
Table 5.1: t-test of non-responses 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  
      Variable                    Obs Mean  Std. Err.  Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Dev                 33 -0.2148455 0.121462 0.6977461 -0.4622555 0.0325646 
Dev0            32 -0.3005969 0.129639 0.7333489 -0.6011937 
 combined                65 -0.2570615 0.088212 0.7111881    -0.514123 
 diff               
 
0.0857514 0.1775113 
 
-0.2689767 0.4404795 
diff = mean(Dev)-mean(Dev0)      
  
t =   0.4831 
Ho: diff = 0  
 
degrees of freedom =     63  
Ha: diff < 0                       Ha: diff != 0 
 
Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6846            Pr(T > t) = 0.6307 
 
Pr(T > t) = 0.3154 
 
Additionally, the dispersion of responses among political parties is close to the overall 
results of 2009 local elections. Only BDP is relatively underrepresented in the data list with 
only one municipality.  
Table 5.2 and Map 5.1 display the features of municipalities participating in the study. 
To conclude, taking into account the extent of the study and the  above-mentioned 
challenges, the current response rate and the quality of the responses can be deemed as an 
achievement and satisfactory for further analysis. A comparison of socio-economic 
characteristics of responders and non-responders suggest that these characteristics are not 
likely to limit the generalizability of results to all Turkish provincial municipalities.  
Table 5.2 Participated municipalities 
Name Population Governing Party (in 2013) Surveys received 
Adıyaman 217.463 AKP Both 
Afyonkarahisar 186.991 AKP Both 
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Aksaray 186.599 AKP Both 
Amasya 91.874 AKP Both 
Ardahan 19.075 AKP Both 
Artvin 25.771 CHP Both 
Bilecik 51.260 AKP Both 
Bitlis 46.111 AKP Only from the Deputy 
Bolu 131.264 AKP Both 
Burdur 72.377 AKP Both 
Çanakkale 111.137 CHP Both 
Çorum 231.146 AKP Only from the Mayor 
Denizli 525.497 AKP Only from the Deputy 
Giresun 100.712 CHP Only from the Mayor 
Gümüşhane 32.444 MHP Only from the Mayor 
Kahramanmaraş 443.575 AKP Both 
Karabük 110.537 MHP Both 
Karaman 141.630 AKP Both 
Kars 78.100 AKP Both 
Kastamonu 96.217 AKP Both 
Kütahya 224.898 AKP Only from the Mayor 
Manisa 309.050 MHP Both 
Mardin 86.948 AKP Both 
Muğla 64.706 CHP Both 
Muş 81.764 AKP Both 
Niğde 118.186 AKP Both 
Rize 104.508 AKP Only from the Deputy 
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Sivas 312.587 BBP Both 
Tokat 132.437 AKP Only from the Mayor 
Trabzon 243.735 AKP Both 
Uşak 187.886 MHP Both 
Van 370.190 BDP Only from the Mayor 
Yozgat 78.328 AKP Both 
AKP: Justice and Development Party; CHP: Republican People’s Party; MHP: Nationalist Action Party; BDP: 
Independent Democracy Party 
 
Map 5.1 The distribution of responses among provincial municipalities52 
 
 
                                                            
52	Dark green: Both surveys received; light green: only one survey received; red: no surveys received; white: 
metropolitan municipalities (not included in the study). 
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Map 5.2 The results of 2009 local elections 
 
AKP: Justice and Development Party; CHP: Republican People’s Party; MHP: Nationalist Action Party; 
ANAVATAN: Motherlands Party; DSP: Democratic Leftist Party; DP: Democrat Party; DTP: Democratic 
Society Party; SP: Felicity Party; BAĞIMSIZ: Independent Candidates; DİĞER: Others 
Source: www.secimanketleri.org 
 
5.2 Data screening 
The data from the surveys and other sources have been registered to the data file (see 
Appendices) according to the codebook in Chapter IV. The raw data contains several missing 
values to be dealt with prior to further analysis. Several dimensions with the data will be 
controlled as part of data screening to ensure that the assumptions hold for further analysis 
and to avoid any measurement errors.  
 
5.2.1 Missing Data 
A quick glance at the data set reveals that there are several missing values for more or 
less each variable. Considering that most of the missing values are unit nonresponse caused 
by the absence of one survey (either from the mayor or the deputy mayor) from the province, 
a pattern in missing values is apparent. Apart from the missing data caused by the absence of 
surveys, the missing values are random and less than %10 for most variables (see Table 5.2.). 
There are only two variables with considerable high number of missing values, MOB2 and 
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MOB6. A closer check on them is required in order to avoid any bias in non-observed data. 
MOB2, a variable about utilisation of immovable, is the ratio of generated income from 
immovable per year to the overall value of immovable owned by the municipality. The value 
generated by immovable is not necessarily a data kept by the municipalities which is required 
on the preparation of the budgetary plans. Therefore, the extra work needed to collect or to 
find the data for the question might be the reason for the lack of responses. MOB6 is a 
variable to capture the physical and technical adequacy in municipality. The variable is the 
mean score of 5 Likert-items capturing the adequacy in  (1) computer and computer hardware, 
(2) technical equipment and machinery, (3) internet connection and computer software, (4) 
physical situation of civil servant's offices, (5) physical situation of manager's offices. There 
could be several reasons for the lack of responses, but since it is an opinion-based question 
directed to deputy mayors and/or head of departments about the physical conditions of the 
municipality, the respondents might have been reluctant to provide a genuine answer. 
Furthermore, from one municipality the survey has been received with missing the page 
including the information for the variable.  
There are several ways to deal with missing data. An easy and safer way is listwise or 
pairwise exclusion of missing cases. However, considering the limitations on the sample size, 
listwise exclusion of cases with only one survey would have resulted in a decrease in sample 
size of around 30%, which is an extreme loss in the data sample. Therefore, data imputation 
appears as a viable option to deal with missing data. 
 
Table 5.3 Missing Values 
 All provinces  Provinces with both surveys 
Variables # of 
missing 
values 
% of 
missing 
values 
total # of 
variables 
# of 
missing 
values 
% of 
missing 
values 
total # of 
variables 
MOB1 5 15 33 0 0 24 
MOB2 11 33 33 5 21 24 
MOB3 6 18 33 0 0 24 
MOB4 4 12 33 1 4 24 
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MOB5 0 0 33 0 0 24 
MOB6 10 30 33 4 17 24 
MOB7 3 9 33 0 0 24 
MOB8 9 27 33 2 8 24 
DM1 9 27 33 0 0 24 
DM2 7 21 33 0 0 24 
DM3 5 15 33 0 0 24 
DM4 8 24 33 1 4 24 
DM5 3 9 33 0 0 24 
DM6 7 21 33 1 4 24 
DM7 7 21 33 1 4 24 
DM8 0 0 33 0 0 24 
DM9 0 0 33 0 0 24 
DM10 0 0 33 0 0 24 
IMP1 0 0 33 0 0 24 
IMP2 0 0 33 0 0 24 
IMP3 3 9 33 0 0 24 
IMP4 10 30 33 1 4 24 
IMP5 8 24 33 1 4 24 
IMP6 8 24 33 2 8 24 
IMP7 8 24 33 2 8 24 
IMP8 7 21 33 2 8 24 
IMP9 7 21 33 1 4 24 
IMP10 6 18 33 1 4 24 
IMP11 7 21 33 1 4 24 
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IMP12 10 30 33 1 4 24 
IMP13 7 21 33 1 4 24 
IMP14 5 15 33 1 4 24 
DEC 0 0 33 0 0 24 
INF 3 9 33 0 0 24 
Pop 0 0 33 0 0 24 
PolDiv 0 0 33 0 0 24 
Party 0 0 33 0 0 24 
Dev 0 0 33 0 0 24 
 
There are different methods in data imputation, which can be categorised as single 
imputation methods and multiple imputation methods. Single imputation methods primarily 
aim to estimate and replace the missing data by implementing several methods such as relying 
the last observed variables (hot-deck methods), taking the mean of all observed variables 
(mean imputation) or regressing the observed variables to variables with missing data to 
replace the missing values. One common problem with single imputation methods is that they 
tend to neglect the error terms while replacing the unobserved data and treat the imputed data 
as genuine. Therefore, especially in cases of large percentage of missing values (such as 
30%), single imputation methods can lead to underestimation of variability and might result 
with too optimistic significance tests and confidence intervals (StataCorp, 2013). 
Multiple imputation (MI) methods, which have been developed to overcome the vices 
of single imputation methods create multiple imputations for each missing data. MI has been 
embraced widely thanks to the advancements in computer technology since it was first time 
proposed by Donald B. Rubin in 1987. According to Rubin (1987) there are three distinct 
advantages of MI over single imputation methods: (1) MI increases the efficiency of 
estimation, (2) MI can produce easier valid inferences by combining complete-data inferences 
in a straightforward manner; and (3) MI allows the “straightforward study of sensitivity of 
inferences of various models for nonresponse simply by using complete-data methods 
repeatedly”. By doing so, MI enables the researcher to control the reliability of the 
estimations in subsequent analyses. There is one considerable advantage of single imputation 
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over MI, and that is its simplicity in calculation, data storing and analysis (Rubin, 1987:18). 
Nevertheless, these disadvantages have become almost obsolete with the advancements in 
statistical analysis programs.  
Despite the relative advantages of MI over single imputation, I will adopt single 
imputation to replace the missing values as one practical problem is arising in the planned 
analysis following the imputation. In this research, I want to apply factor analysis to combine 
various indicators into a few factors of local governance capacity variables. In further steps, 
the attained aggregate variables will be included in the regression analysis. Considering that 
the primary purpose of MI is to preserve the uncertainty resulting from imputations, most 
statistical programs combine the imputed datasets only after the main analysis, which in most 
cases is a sort of regression analysis. Factor analysis requires a combination of created 
multiple imputation datasets prior to the actual analysis, that in a way diminishes the initial 
advantage of MI to enable the control of uncertainty brought by imputations. Therefore, 
STATA, which is the statistical program adopted in this research, does not include the factor 
analysis as part of the estimation in MI. There is one caveat of implementing imputation prior 
to factor analysis. Fitting missing data through regression techniques can lead to unrealistic 
high correlations thus manufacture factors (Wulder, 2014). To avoid any misinterpretation of 
the created variables, it is imperative to refer to the composition of each variable if it is 
backed by a theoretical standpoint.   
Hence by using the regular variables of MOB5, DM8, DM9, DM10, IMP1 IMP2, 
DEC, Dev a set of imputed variables are generated. A normality check for the imputed data is 
needed especially for the variables which are taking a value between 1 and 5, as the values 
will be rounded off to the nearest acceptable number. Nevertheless, there are only a few 
variables needed to be rounded off and their distance to the acceptable numbers is 
significantly limited. The complete list of the variables can be found in the Appendices.  
 
5.2.2 Internal Consistency of Likert Scale Variables 
Cronbach’s alpha score of the variables are controlled for the reliability of internal 
structures of Likert scale variables. The alpha scores provide the estimate of reliability, where 
a score between 0.7 and 0.9 is treated as acceptable and any score lower than 0.5 is interpreted 
as unacceptable. Nevertheless, higher alpha coefficient does not imply unidimensionality, 
which is an important condition for internal consistency, and alpha scores are sensitive to the 
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length of the construct because with smaller number of index items, the value of alpha 
reduces. One way to control unidimensionality is running factor analysis. The result of factor 
analysis shows that the index variables are unidimensional except for IMP4, IMP5 and IMP13 
where the cumulative score is above 1, which indicates a spurious solution. However, these 
three variables contain the least items and we can deduct that very few factors are taken in 
factor analysis for a valid solution. Similarly, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (see Table 
5.4.) of the four variables with least number of items score either around the acceptable level, 
or lower. The only variable with an alpha score relatively lower than the acceptable limit and 
with a spurious solution in factor analysis is IMP4. This variable is the composite score of the 
same question directed to mayors and deputy mayors about the level of collaboration in 
management. Therefore, it is certain that the index variable is covering the same construct.  
 
Table 5.4 Cronbach’s alpha scores 
Variable Cronbach’s alpha score Number of items in the scale 
MOB6 0.7405 5 
MOB8 0.6991 4 
DM1 0.8417 5 
DM2 0.8150 7 
DM3 0.8224 2 
DM4 0.8550 7 
IMP4 0.5489 3 
IMP5 0.7005 3 
IMP12 0.7366 7 
IMP13 0.6945 4 
Inf 0.8665 8 
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5.2.3 Common Source Bias 
The majority of variables rely on the self-reported data collected from the mayors and 
deputy mayors at a specific time, thus a check on the extent of Common Method Bias (CMB) 
would increase the reliability of findings. Harman’s one-factor test and confirmatory factor 
analysis are the most common methods to test the presence of common-method effect. To test 
if the common source bias is a concern on the reliability of the research, the opinion based 1 
to 5 scaled 11 variables (i.e. MOB4, MOB6, MOB 7, MOB8, DM1, DM2, DM3, DM4, DM5, 
IMP3, IMP4, IMP5, IMP6, IMP7, IMP12 and IMP13) are taken in an exploratory factor 
analysis without any rotation. Harman’s one factor test suggests that if one single factor 
explains more than 50% of variance, than the effect of common source bias could lead to 
Type 1 or Type 2 errors on the observed relationships between constructs. The result of the 
test gives one factor which has a cumulative score of 0,43 that corresponds to a 43% of 
variance. Although this is a lot of variance to be explained by one single factor, it is within the 
acceptable limits.  
 
5.2.4 Normality & Linearity 
Normality assumption is important for significance testing, especially with small sizes, 
i.e. less than 200 samples. The normality of variables is controlled visually via histograms and 
Skewness-Kurtosis test. Despite the relatively lower sample size, skewness-kurtosis test 
results for all variables between -1 and 1, and the visual display of normality curve on 
frequencies usually gives a fair shape of bell curve. Only for the variables MOB2, DM6, 
DM10, IMP14 and MOB8, the skewness appears to have a bigger impact on the distribution 
of data, where only the last one is negatively skewed.  
 Factor analysis assumes linear relationships between variables and determines 
orthogonal lines to capture the largest amount of variance. Therefore, any non-linear 
relationship would fail to capture the best fit for the given data. The most common way to 
examine if there is a non-linearity between two variables is to apply a scatterplot matrix and 
to see any peculiar non-linear shaped formations. But, the limited number of observations and 
the number of pairwise combinations needed to scan all variables encumber a thorough 
graphical examination of the data. Some pairs of variables with the abovementioned-skewed 
variables suggest that a logarithmic transformation might fit better to data. However, any 
logarithmic transformation did not improve the overall correlations coefficients with 
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polychoric correlation analysis. Also, the verifications of the linearity and normality do not 
necessarily call for a statistical analysis, but a logical assessment on whether there is any 
condition that could violate the linearity assumptions among variables. In that sense, ‘norm 
cadre’ and ‘technical personnel’ variables (iIMP8 and iIMP9) were suspected in terms of non-
linearity. However, the visual study of the data did not point out a clear non-linear 
relationship with other variables. Similarly, logarithmic transformation of these variables did 
not have a drastic impact on correlation coefficients, thus the variables are kept as they were. 
 
5.3 Factor Analysis 
The aim of factor analysis is to detect latent factors under three categories of local 
governance capacity. It is expected to find the latent variables, which could be treated as 
mobilisation capacity, decision-making capacity and implementation capacity for each set of 
variables.  
Prior to the analysis, the factorability of variables and the suitability of sample size are 
checked with some ex-ante tests. The factorability of variables is tested by the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity (LAERD, 2014). The results of the test suggest that for all three sets of variables 
we can reject the null hypothesis that the variances between variables are equal. Thus, there 
are workable correlations to apply factor analysis. 
 
Table 5.5 Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
 Mobilisation 
Capacity 
Decision-making 
Capacity 
Implementation 
Capacity 
Chi-square          70.407 112.046 150.853 
Degrees of freedom 28 45 91 
p-value             0.000 0.000 0.000 
H0: variables are not 
intercorrelated 
Reject the H0 Reject the H0 Reject the H0 
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For the evaluation of sampling adequacy, a statistical method called Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy will be adopted. The results of KMO test are 
usually interpreted within the following ranges; 0.90: “marvellous”; 0.80: “meritorious”; 0.70 
“middling”; 0.60 “mediocre”, 0.50 “miserable”, and below 0.40 “unacceptable” (Kaiser, 
1974; Rasli, 2006). The results of the test suggest that despite the low KMO numbers for DM 
and IMP, the results are in the acceptable range. KMO scores are sensitive to sample size to 
number of items ratio, which is for DM a little higher than 1:3 and for IMP a little higher than 
1:2.  
 
Table 5.6 KMO- Test 
 KMO 
MOB 0.647 
DM 0.479 
IMP 0.443 
 
Following the ex-ante tests, the intercorrelations of each set of variables are studied 
with correlation matrixes. The strength of correlations is controlled with polychoric 
correlations matrixes. The absolute value of correlation coefficients less than 0.2 would 
indicate a no relationship or a negligible relationship, and an absolute value above 0.4 
indicates strong relationships. Any variable without any binary correlation coefficient more 
than 0.2 will be exempted from the analysis. The correlation matrix of each type of capacity is 
given in the following tables.  
 
Table 5.7 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Mobilisation Capacity 
  iMOB1 iMOB2 iMOB3 iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6 iMOB7 iMOB8 
iMOB1 1 
       iMOB2 0.3932 1 
      iMOB3 -0.0671 0.0771 1 
     iMOB4 0.4964 0.1560 0.1805 1 
    MOB5 0.2129 -0.0302 0.1876 0.3236 1 
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iMOB6 0.4000 0.4063 0.0516 0.3260 -0.0001 1 
  iMOB7 0.5633 0.4038 0.1593 0.5717 0.3190 0.6162 1 
 iMOB8 -0.2757 -0.0919 0.1937 -0.1521 0.3409 -0.1615 0.1123 1 
 
Table 5.8 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Decision-Making Capacity 
  iDM1 iDM2 iDM3 iDM4 iDM5 iDM6 iDM7 DM8 
iDM1 1               
iDM2 0.3513 1             
iDM3 0.4870 0.0915 1           
iDM4 0.1898 0.4611 0.044 1         
iDM5 0.1917 -0.0761 0.2675 0.0672 1       
iDM6 0.0631 0.0182 -0.1323 -0.0501 0.1034 1     
iDM7 0.3992 0.5389 -0.0234 0.1781 -0.0915 0.428 1   
DM8 0.5254 0.3083 -0.174 -0.0361 0.0765 0.1838 0.1473 1 
DM9 0.4232 0.2761 0.1352 0.3397 0.1587 0.1431 0.2507 0.4415 
DM10 -0.6433 -0.151 -0.1878 -0.0733 -0.2776 -0.4158 -0.4123 -0.5075 
 
  DM9 DM10 
DM9 1   
DM10 -0.5219 1 
 
Table 5.9 Polychoric Correlation Matrix- Implementation Capacity 
  IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3 iIMP4 iIMP5 iIMP6 iIMP7 iIMP8 
IMP1 1              
IMP2 0.4163 1            
iIMP3 -0.1018 0.4303 1          
iIMP4 0.0964 0.2884 0.5256 1        
iIMP5 0.4059 0.2174 0.138 0.3888 1      
iIMP6 0.2555 -0.04 -0.1484 -0.2833 0.0349 1    
iIMP7 0.0691 -0.0052 0.4592 0.3644 0.2257 -0.1376 1  
iIMP8 -0.2826 -0.1812 0.1681 0.1016 0.0594 -0.2377 -0.0507 1 
iIMP9 -0.4133 -0.1317 0.1558 0.0814 0.0153 0.0826 -0.118 0.4546 
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iIMP10 0.0656 0.3108 0.1299 0.0062 0.187 -0.2289 0.0009 0.2365 
iIMP11 -0.2019 -0.0349 0.2397 0.4044 -0.0909 0.0632 0.0853 0.2337 
iIMP12 0.1879 0.2552 0.2557 0.6143 0.1477 -0.1331 0.137 -0.0682 
iIMP13 -0.4355 -0.0108 0.3675 0.5066 0.1056 -0.2541 0.376 -0.0325 
iIMP14 -0.1779 -0.2443 0.1159 -0.0051 0.0497 -0.0823 0.27 -0.0445 
 
 
 
Among the three correlation matrixes, the only variable without an absolute value of 
binary correlation coefficient above 0.2, is the MOB3 variable. This variable indicates the 
debt structure of the municipality and corresponds to the level of debt payment obligations 
with a due date less than a year to overall debts. Higher values indicate that the municipality 
has less flexibility in allocating funds for purchasing goods and services. However, almost 
30% of respondents selected ‘0’, indicating that they don’t have any short-term debt 
obligations, thus the variance on responses is quite limited. The rest of the variables show 
largely strong binary correlations, which is a good indication for the suitability for the factor 
analysis.  
 A general rule of thumb suggests that components with an eigenvalue higher than 1, 
should be retained as lesser values account for less variance than original variable (Wulder, 
2014). Another method to decide on the number of factors to be retained is the scree plot 
analysis. It is also important to evaluate the cumulative number that accounts for the 
percentage of the total variance measured by the factors. Starting with the mobilisation 
capacity variables, the eigenvalues and scree-plot of Mobilisation capacity variables suggest 
that the only one factor to be retained is the one which accounts for the 78 % variances. Since 
there is only one variable to retain, there is no need for rotation. The Table 5.7 shows that 
except for the iMOB8 (Public procurement), the rest of the variables are positively correlated 
with Factor1. In fact, iMOB8 does not necessarily reflect the mobilisation capacity, but 
  iIMP9 iIMP10 iIMP11 iIMP12 iIMP13 iIMP14 
iIMP9 1           
iIMP10 0.1772 1         
iIMP11 0.1282 -0.0065 1       
iIMP12 -0.2680 -0.0560 0.5492 1     
iIMP13 0.0811 0.0256 0.2787 0.4655 1   
iIMP14 0.0417 0.059 0.1267 -0.056 0.2794 1 
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iMOB8 is important to perceive the municipality’s ability in extracting material resources if 
there is a need for purchasing. Not surprisingly, it is the least important indicator for 
mobilisation capacity. At the end, the factor scores of Factor1 are extracted and Factor 1 is 
labelled as the Mobilisation Capacity for the rest of the analysis. 
 
Table 5.10 Eigenvalues- Mobilisation Capacity 
Factor analysis/correlation  
 
Number of obs =     33 
Method: principal factors  
 
Retained factors  =   4 
Rotation: (unrotated)  
 
Number of params=   21 
Factor  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion  Cumulative 
  
   
  
Factor1 2.36728 1.53439 0.7761 0.7761 
Factor2 0.83288 0.46331 0.2731 1.0491 
Factor3 0.36957 0.31548 0.1212 1.1703 
Factor4 0.05409 0.19185 0.0177 1.1880 
Factor5 -0.13777 0.02797 -0.0452 1.1429 
Factor6 -0.16573 0.10429 -0.0543 1.0885 
Factor7 -0.27003 . -0.0885 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) =   69.70                  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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Figure 5.1 Scree plot – Mobilisation Capacity 
 
 
Table 5.11 Factor loading matrix- Mobilisation Capacity 
  Factor 1 Uniqueness 
iMOB1 0.7111 0.6667 
iMOB2  0.4705 0.4758 
iMOB4 0.6413 0.5913 
MOB5 0.2782 0.4666 
iMOB6  0.6468 0.2173 
iMOB7 0.8469 0.5306 
iMOB8 -0.1265 0.6667 
 
 Moving to the second set of variables, the eigenvalues of the factors in Table 5.12 
point out that there are 2 factors with an eigenvalue above 1. Yet the second factor’s 
eigenvalue is slightly above 1 and the scree plot shows the line starts to flatten, following the 
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second factor. The first factor explains 56 % of variances and the second factor adds 19% to 
the total variances. Therefore, only one factor is decided to be retained. 
 
Table 5.12 Eigenvalues- Decision-Making Capacities 
Factor Analysis/correlation  
 
Number of obs = 33 
Method: principal factors  
 
  Retained factors  = 6 
Rotation: (unrotated) 
 
Number of params= 45 
  
   
  
Factor  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1 2.95991 1.92982 0.561 0.561 
Factor2 1.0301 0.16356 0.1952 0.7562 
Factor3 0.86654 0.30093 0.1642 0.9205 
Factor4 0.56561 0.19007 0.1072 1.0277 
Factor5 0.37554 0.33233 0.0712 1.0988 
Factor6 0.04321 0.07921 0.0082 1.107 
Factor7 -0.036 0.05232 -0.0068 1.1002 
Factor8 -0.08832 0.06708 -0.0167 1.0835 
Factor9 -0.1554 0.12962 -0.0295 1.054 
Factor10 -0.28502 . -0.054 1 
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Figure 5.2 Scree plot – Decision-Making Capacity 
 
 
Table 5.13 displays the factor loadings of the retained factor. According to it, the first 
factor is a fitting example of how decision-making capacity could look like. The factor has a 
positive strong relationship with iDM1, DM8, DM9, iDM7 and iDM2. D10 has a negative 
coefficient since the smaller values stand for larger number of visitors in the webpage. For 
Factor1, iDM1, DM10, DM8, DM9 are the most affected variables which represent ‘success 
in strategic planning’, ‘number of visitors in website’, ‘e-government system’ and ‘e-
participation system’ respectively. It is notable, that among the most influential variables, 
DM8, DM9 and DM10 are associated with the capacity in e-governance. iDM3 and iDM5 are 
the least affected by Factor 1, which include ‘importance of strategic plan and performance 
plans on actual decision-making’ and ‘importance of local representatives on actual decision-
making’. Interestingly, both variables indicate the link between decision-making capacity and 
the actual decision-making. This configuration indicates that the decision-making capacity in 
local governance is not necessarily linked with the decisions taken by the mayors.    
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Table 5.13 Factor loading matrix- Decision-Making Capacity 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
iDM1 0.7998 0.3603 
iDM2 0.4889 0.761 
iDM3  0.2052 0.9579 
iDM4 0.3073 0.9055 
iDM5 0.1918 0.9632 
iDM6 0.3553 0.8738 
iDM7 0.5362 0.7125 
DM8 0.7307 0.466 
DM9 0.6047 0.6343 
DM10 -0.771 0.4056 
 
The final set of variables about mobilisation capacity contains most variables in 
comparison to the former capacity variables. The results on initial eigenvalue scores point out 
that there are 3 factors with an eigenvalue above 1.  Similarly, the scree plot graph displays 
that there are 3 factors to retain which account for the most of the variance. Three factors 
together can account for 75% of total variance.  
 
Table 5.14 Eigenvalues- Implementation Capacity 
Factor Analysis/correlation  
 
Number of obs = 33 
Method: principal factors  
 
Retained factors  = 9 
Rotation: (unrotated) 
 
Number of params= 90 
  
   
  
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1 2.82602 1.15956 0.3710 0.3710 
Factor2 1.66645 0.45416 0.2188 0.5898 
Factor3 1.21229 0.30142 0.1592 0.7490 
Factor4 0.91088 0.26362 0.1196 0.8686 
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Factor5 0.64725 0.08110 0.0850 0.9535 
Factor6 0.56615 0.19358 0.0743 1.0279 
Factor7 0.37258 0.09152 0.0489 1.0768 
Factor8 0.28106 0.26038 0.0369 1.1137 
Factor9 0.02067 0.05861 0.0027 1.1164 
Factor10 -0.03794 0.08891 -0.0050 1.1114 
Factor11 -0.12684 0.05446 -0.0167 1.0948 
Factor12 -0.18130 0.04623 -0.0238 1.0710 
Factor13 -0.22753 0.08536 -0.0299 1.0411 
Factor14 -0.31289 . -0.0411 1 
 
Figure 5.3 Scree plot – Implementation Capacity 
 
 
After controlling the factor rotation matrix with oblique rotation, the factor loadings 
are rotated with varimax for better interpretability of the results. Table 5.13 shows the factor 
loadings with a value above 0.3. Factor 1 is influenced by iIMP4 (Collaboration in 
Management), iIMP13 (Employment Policies), iIMP12 (HR Management System), iIMP11 
(Personnel in Municipal Companies), iIMP3 (Initiative taking in Management) and iIMP7 
(Seniority in Personnel). Factor 1 is mostly related with the systems and practices in 
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implementation and least influenced by qualitative and quantitative features of mayor and 
staff. Factor 2 is mostly influenced by management capacity components and it can be 
labelled as the management capacity. Factor 3 is largely influenced by the quantitative aspects 
of human resources, therefore it can be interpreted as the sufficiency of staff In comparison to 
other factors, Factor 1 is the most representative of implementation capacity in local 
governance therefore Factor 1 is retrieved as Implementation Capacity for further analysis. 
 
Table 5.15 Rotated factor loading matrix- Implementation Capacity 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness 
IMP1  0.6511 -0.4144 0.3852 
IMP2  0.5864  0.6483 
iIMP3 0.5394 0.3100 0.3300 0.5040 
iIMP4 0.7688 0.3288  0.2940 
iIMP5  0.5025  0.7134 
iIMP6    0.8808 
iIMP7 0.4773   0.7464 
iIMP8   0.6506 0.5708 
iIMP9   0.6659 0.5374 
iIMP10   0.3722 0.7718 
iIMP11 0.5694   0.6260 
iIMP12 0.7192  -0.3430 0.3419 
iIMP13 0.7503   0.3983 
iIMP14    0.8996  
 
To sum up, at the end of factor analysis 3 variables are created to represent the 
Mobilisation Capacity, Decision-Making Capacity and Implementation Capacity.  The 
theoretical expectation is that these variables are strongly correlated with each other and in 
sum they represent the local governance capacity. The pairwise correlation matrix presented 
in Table 5.16 confirms the theoretical expectations as all three factors are significantly 
correlated. 
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Table 5.16 Significance of correlations- MOB-DM-IMP 
 MOB DM IMP 
MOB 1   
    
DM 0.7424 1  
 0.000   
IMP 0.4224  0.3876 1  
 0.0143   0.0258  
 
 
5.4 Correlation and Regression Analyses 
Three capacity variables are created at the end of factor analysis to capture the local 
governance capacity. This section will focus on their relationships with local capacity and 
decentralisation variables, as well as with the selected control variables. First, through 
correlation analysis I will identify the strength of relationships among the variables and 
second, I will select the best fitting model to describe the relationship between capacity and 
decentralisation variables. The relationships between variables will be measured by applying 
OLS-regressions, unless diagnostic tests suggest that alternative methods such as GLM or 
Tobit regression fit better for model assumptions.  
 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Analyses 
Table 5.17 presents the descriptive statistics of mobilisation capacity (MOB), 
decision-making capacity (DM), implementation capacity (IMP), decentralisation (DEC), 
local capacity (Dev), central government’s influence (iINF), size of the province (POP), the 
political divide between the governing party and central government (PolDiv) and the 
difference in terms of party affiliations inside the municipality’s decision-making body 
(Party). The local capacity variable has been coded with the acronym ‘Dev’ signifying the 
socio-economic development level in the province. ‘iINF’ is the imputed variable for INF 
which reflects the perception of mayor on central government’s influence on local 
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governance. ‘POP’ indicates the size of the municipality by using the population level of the 
locality where the municipality operates. ‘Party’ reflects the impact of political conflicts 
inside the municipality’s decision-making body by utilising the ratio of the votes received by 
the elected party in the 2009 local elections. In this variable, a lower degree would imply a 
larger level of presence of opposition parties inside the municipal assembly. The third 
variable ‘PolDiv’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is governed by the 
governing party of the central government or by an opposition party.  
 
Table 5.17 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MOB 33 -8.78E-09 0.918457 -2.594843 1.358933 
DM 33 -4.06E-09 0.9456926 -2.19453 1.535497 
IMP 33 -5.42E-09 0.9435443 -2.325766 2.099706 
DEC 33 0.2506061 0.1067889 0.053 0.527 
Dev 33 -0.2148455 0.6977461 -1.7329 1.0493 
iInf 33 2.849865 0.7824249 1.25 4.5 
POP 33 158030.4 121153.4 19075 525497 
PolDiv 33 0.6969697 0.4666937 0 1 
Party 33 0.4573636 0.0763339 0.31 0.65 
 
The correlation matrix in Table 5.18 presents the strength of correlations between the 
variables. High correlations are signified with bold characters. The table shows that all key 
variables of local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation are highly 
correlated.  
As far as the external variables are concerned, PolDiv has a high negative correlation 
with IMP and Dev, and POP has a high positive correlation with DM. Also, a high positive 
correlation is observable between PolDiv and iINF, and also between PolDiv and Party. 
Finally, a correlation between POP and Party is observable. The correlations between PolDiv, 
MOB, Dev and iINF show that municipalities governed by AKP appear to be associated with 
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lower implementation capacities and lower socio-economic development, yet in the meantime 
they are associated with higher perceived central government’s influence on local governance. 
Besides that, the correlation between Party and PolDiv, shows that mayors which are selected 
with strong electoral support usually belong to AKP; and the correlation between Party and 
POP shows that governing parties of municipalities in more populous provinces usually have 
stronger electoral support.  
 
Table 5.18 Polychoric Correlations  
  MOB DM IMP DEC Dev iINF POP PolDiv Party 
MOB 1 
        DM 0.742 1 
       IMP 0.422 0.388 1 
      DEC 0.636 0.672 0.368 1 
     Dev 0.597 0.734 0.326 0.885 1 
    iINF 0.077 -0.025 0.079 0.106 -0.047 1 
   POP 0.136 0.392 0.134 0.199 0.167 -0.008 1 
  PolDiv -0.175 -0.199 -0.505 -0.195 -0.322 0.438 -0.032 1 
 Party 0.243 0.172 0.068 -0.111 -0.223 0.226 0.383 0.303 1 
  
  Additionally, the visual study of correlations with a scatterplot matrix did not point 
out a significant non-linear relationship, which could not be detected by the correlation 
analysis. However, the scatterplot graph between POP and DM hints a logarithmic 
relationship (see Figure 5.5). The graph shows that with population increase, there is a 
decreasing slope in decision-making capacity. In fact, increased population could lead to 
increased flow of information from locality. However, with the increased flow of information, 
the planning aspect of the decision-making capacity would be more challenging. In order to 
examine if the logarithmic transformation of POP would indicate a better fit with DM 
variable, a new variable ‘lnPOP’ has been generated. A re-run of the correlation analysis with 
lnPOP has in fact provided better results, even though the DM still remains the only key 
 200 
 
variable with a higher correlation. It is noteworthy to mention, that unlike it was expected, the 
correlation between development level and population does not indicate a high correlation 
even with the logarithmic transformation. 
 
Figure 5.4 Scatterplot graph with fitted regression line of DM-POP 
  
Figure 5.5 Scatterplot graph with fitted regression line of DM-lnPOP 
  
Both DEC and Party are proportions and have the range between 0 and 1. A 
logarithmic transformation of both variables fits better for the visual and statistical 
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interpretation of the relationships with other variables. The new variables ‘logDec’  and 
‘logParty’ are created by log(x)= log(x/ 1-x))  
A new correlation analysis with logarithmic transformation of both variables improved 
the degree of significant correlations. Table 5.19 presents the correlation analysis matrix after 
the logarithmic transformations of POP, Dec and Party variables.  
 
Table 5.19 Correlation Analysis Matrix after Logarithmic Transformations  
  MOB DM IMP logDec Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty 
MOB 1 
        DM 0.742 1 
       IMP 0.422 0.388 1 
      logDec 0.688 0.716 0.384 1 
     Dev 0.597 0.734 0.326 0.896 1 
    iINF 0.077 -0.025 0.079 0.157 -0.047 1 
   lnPOP 0.292 0.441 0.165 0.224 0.214 0.015 1 
  PolDiv -0.175 -0.199 -0.505 -0.139 -0.322 0.438 0.033 1 
 logParty 0.244 0.177 0.066 -0.102 -0.220 0.227 0.419 0.304 1 
 
5.4.2 Ex-ante control  
Multiple regression analysis relies on the following assumptions for the validity of 
results; (1) linearity, (2) multivariate normality, (3) multicollinearity, (4) autocorrelation, and 
(5) homoscedasticity. Since this study is not based on time-series data, serial autocorrelation 
is not an issue of concern. Also, since all data is collected from provincial municipalities 
which abide the same municipal law, there is no need to suspect from sectoral autocorrelation.  
If the purpose of the analysis is to increase the predictability of the model, control on 
significant outliers and leverage points are also important. The prediction ability of the model 
is not the main issue of concern in this dissertation, but any influential outlier in the data will 
be duly reported.   
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Before regression analysis, linearity and normality assumptions are controlled both 
visually and with statistical tests as well. For linearity assumption, the binary relationships are 
controlled visually with a scatterplot matrix. As presented in Figure 5.6, the relationships 
among variables do not signify any non-linearity. 
 
Figure 5.6 Scatterplot Matrix of all variables 
  
The normality assumption is visually controlled with normal QQ-plots and boxplots, 
whereas the statistical control is done with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The visual study of 
the variables provides a largely clean view of the normal distribution of the residuals. Only 
MOB variable shows characteristics of a negatively skewed data due to three significant 
outliers apparent in the box-plot. Since the sample size is relatively limited for this research, 
the three outliers indicate the 10% of available data. That is why there is not a particular 
reason to remove these outliers. Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test does not indicate 
that the normal distribution assumption is violated. Nevertheless, since PolDiv is a binary 
variable, we cannot talk about a normal distribution, but we know that the data is 
representative to the results of local elections; thus, there is not a sampling bias to challenge 
the normality assumption. 
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Figure 5.7 QQ-plots 
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Figure 5.8 Box-plots 
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Table 5.20 One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
Smaller group  D  P-value Corrected 
MOB: 0.0884 0.597  
Cumulative: -0.1626 0.175  
Combined K-S: 0.1626 0.347 0.275 
 
The ex-ante control on linearity and normality assumptions does not suggest an that 
alternative regression methods such as GLM or Tobit, would create better fit for model 
assumption in comparison to OLS-regression.  
 
5.4.3 Model Assumptions 
The correlation analysis of key variables supported the argument that there is a linear 
dependency between local governance capacity, local capacity and decentralisation. The next 
step is to understand how these relationships are wired and which model can explain best the 
variance in the dependent variable.  
There are seven relationships to be modelled with multiple regression analysis: 
(1) logDec ~ MOB 
(2) logDec ~ DM 
(3) logDec ~ IMP 
(4) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP 
(5) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP+ Interaction terms 
(6) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP + Interaction terms +Dev 
(7) logDec ~ MOB + DM + IMP + Interaction terms + Dev+ iINF + lnPOP + PolDiv + 
logParty 
 
The local governance capacity variables are regressed separately, together and with the 
interaction terms against decentralisation variable. Since the sample size is relatively limited, 
the significance level of the p-value is selected starting from p<0.1. Table 5.21 presents the 
regression results of all models.  
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Table 5.21 Regression Tables- Decentralisation vs. Local Governance Capacity 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Ind. Var.  Coef
. 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
MOB 0,5 
**** 
0,095         0.238 
* 
0.136 0.299
* 
0.158 
DM      0,507 
**** 
0,089     0.315 
** 
0.129 0.4  
** 
0.136 
IMP         0,272 
*** 
0,118 0.052 0.096 0.102 0.096 
MOBxDM                 -0.193 0.128 
MOBxIMP                 0.25 0.195 
DMxIMP                 -0.178 0.171 
MOBxDM
xIMP 
                -0.264 0.158 
R2 0,473 0,512 0,147 0,571 0,66 
Adj. R2 0,456 0,497 0,12 0,527 0,564 
Root MSE 0,494 0,475 0,628 0,461 0,442 
F-value 27,8 **** 32,56 **** 5,35*** 12,87 **** 6,92 **** 
Note: N=33, *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
The first three models indicate that each local governance capacity variable is a 
significant predictor on the variation of logDec. Nevertheless, if all variables are included in 
multiple regression analysis, MOB and DM variable  are the two significant predictors 
remain. Model 5 has the highest adjusted R2 value in regression table, even though the 
difference between Model 4 and Model 5 is limited despite the inclusion of four interaction 
terms. Even though none of the interaction terms has a significant p-value, inclusion of the 
interaction terms has improved the prediction of the model. The R2 value of Model 4 suggests 
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that the 57% of variability in the ‘logDec’ variable is accounted for the local governance 
capacity variables.  
At the next stage, Dev variable is added into the equation with MOB, DM, IMP and 
interaction terms. Model 6 results with a statistically significant F-test and with a remarkably 
high R2 value of 0.871 and adjusted R2 0.8279. Similarly, the Root MSE value decreases from 
0.442 to 0.2777, which indicates that Model 6 has a better accuracy in prediction in 
comparison to Model 5. The former analysis pointed out that DM variable is the most 
significant predictor among local governance capacity variables in relation to logDec variable. 
Model 6 signifies three significant predictors, Dev with a highly significant p value, MOB, 
and MOBxDMxIMP close to 95% confidence level.  
 
Table 5.22 Model 6 – Decentralisation, Local Capacity and Local Governance Capacity   
Source SS df        MS   Number of obs 33 
Model 12.492 4 1.5615 
 
F( 8,    24) 20.25 
Residual 1.8508 28 0.0771 
 
Prob > F 0 
Total 14.3427 32 0.4482 
 
R-squared 0.8710 
  
  
  
 
Adj R-squared 0.8279 
  
  
  
 
Root MSE 0.2777 
  
  
  
  
  
logDec Coef. Std. Err.       t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
MOB 0.2737 0.0995 2.75 0.011 0.0685 0.4790 
DM 0.0268 0.1040 0.26 0.799 -0.1879 0.2415 
IMP 0.0614 0.0609 1.01 0.323 -0.0642 0.1870 
MOBxDM -0.0776 0.0827 -0.94 0.357 -0.2484 0.0931 
MOBxIMP -0.0204 0.1298 -0.16 0.876 -0.2883 0.2474 
DMxIMP 0.1131 0.1176 0.96 0.346 -0.1295 0.3558 
MOBxDMxIMP -0.1955 0.0999 -1.96 0.062 -0.4018 0.0107 
Dev 0.7555 0.1205 6.27 0 0.5068 1.0042 
_cons -1.0778 0.0630 -17.12 0 -1.2077 -0.9478 
 
The most striking change between Model 5 and Model 6 is that the coefficient of DM 
variable has decreased significantly in the later, and that the p value has become insignificant. 
This shows that Dev has a confounding effect on DM variable. A confounder is a variable 
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related to factors of interest that falsely obscures or accentuates the relationship between them 
(Meinert, 1986; Mackinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Unlike an intermediate variable, a 
confounder does not imply a causal relationship between the independent and third variable, 
but it removes the distortion which can obscure the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables. In this case, the relationship between DM and logDec is largely 
explained by the influence of Dev, as the regression coefficient of DM has decreased to 
almost zero once Dev is added into the equation. One explanation of this phenomenon could 
be that e-governance capacity indicators have an important influence on measuring decision-
making capacity and higher e-governance capacity largely relies on the socio-economic 
factors (e.g. infrastructure, literacy level, number of computers in the household…etc.).   
Another notable change is that MOBxDMxIMP has become a significant predictor and 
the significance of MOB as such has increased in the later model. Since the distortion on DM 
is removed with the inclusion of Dev variable, the significant effect of MOBxDMxIMP 
variable has become apparent. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative, which 
indicates an adverse relationship with decentralisation. The 2-way interactions do not have 
any significant effect on dependent variable. Theoretically, any interaction effect of local 
governance capacity variable should be positive with decentralisation; therefore, I have 
decided to further scrutunise the plots of the variable. Figure 5.9 clearly shows that the trend 
between MOBxDMxIMP and logDec variable is in fact positive, but there are two 
outstanding negative outliers that could explain the negative relationship. The rerun of the 
regression analysis after removing the two negative outliers has significantly increased the p-
value of the interaction term while significance of other variables did not change (see Table 
5.23). Therefore, the observed significant relationship is more likely due to influential outliers 
and we should be careful to report any significant relationship between the 3-way interaction 
of local governance capacity variables and decentralisation.  
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Figure 5.9 MOBxDMxIMP vs logDec 
 
 
Table 5.23 Regression Analysis with MOBxDMxIMP >-4 
Source SS df        MS   Number of obs 31 
Model 11.3332 8 1.4167 
 
F( 8,    22) 20.28 
Residual 1.5367 22 0.0699 
 
Prob > F 0 
Total 12.8699 30 0.4290 
 
R-squared 0.8806 
  
  
  
 
Adj R-squared 0.8372 
  
  
  
 
Root MSE 0.2643 
  
  
  
  
  
logDec Coef. Std. Err.       t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
MOB 0.2307 0.0971 2.38 0.027 0.0293 0.4320 
DM 0.0479 0.1218 0.39 0.698 -0.2046 0.3004 
IMP 0.0446 0.0613 0.73 0.474 -0.0825 0.1718 
MOBxDM -0.0941 0.0910 -1.03 0.312 -0.2828 0.0946 
MOBxIMP 0.0170 0.1706 0.1 0.921 -0.3368 0.3708 
DMxIMP 0.0396 0.1185 0.33 0.742 -0.2061 0.2852 
MOBxDMxIMP -0.0686 0.1815 -0.38 0.709 -0.4450 0.3077 
Dev 0.7100 0.1195 5.94 0 0.4621 0.9578 
_cons -1.0647 0.0631 -16.88 0 -1.1955 -0.9338 
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Mobilisation capacity is influenced by local government’s ability on tax collection and 
revenue generation on owned immovable which directly affect own source revenues. 
Therefore, apart from the overall impact of local governance capacity, mobilisation capacity 
appears to have an impact on decentralisation. Nevertheless, the regression coefficient of Dev 
is so high in comparison to local governance variables that we can argue that the level of 
socio-economic development can explain the majority of the variance in financial autonomy 
of the local government.  
The question at this stage is whether there is a measurement error that can explain the 
strikingly high R2 value. There are three common causes of high R2 value that can hint a 
measurement error. First, there can be too many regressors in the model creating inflation 
with a little prediction value. The adjusted R-square is a useful way to control the inflation 
due to large number of variables. In our case, the adjusted R2 value is almost as high as the R2 
value, thus this option can be ruled out. Secondly, collinearity and multicollinearity are the 
usual suspects on high R2 values, where two or more covariates have high correlations with 
each other. Nonetheless, the problem with multicollinearity is that it does not reduce the 
predictive power of the model but it affects the calculations regarding the predictors. The 
correlation matrix of variables shows that there are already high correlations among local 
governance capacity variables (especially between MOB and DM) and Dev variable, and 
there is a chance this could have a certain impact on the value of R2 value. However, the 
statistical significance of covariates undermining that multicollinearity is the main reason of 
high R2 value. The extent of collinearity will be controlled later with calculating Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) of independent variables, and any potential multicollinearity problem 
will be reported. Thirdly, high R2 value could be caused by a convenient regressor, which 
might be related to the dependent variable, thus measuring the same underlying construct. The 
most important change in the models occurred when Dev is included in the equation. 61 
different indicators measure the aggregate variable of Dev, among which two indicators can 
have a direct inference with the revenues of municipalities. These are ‘budget revenues per 
person’ and ‘provincial tax revenues’53. ‘Budget revenues per person’ measures the per capita 
value of the general budget revenue attained from the province. ‘Provincial tax revenues’ 
indicators measure the per capita value of revenue and corporate taxes are collected from the 
province. Both indicators can affect the municipal revenues through the transfer shares from 
                                                            
53	‘Budget revenues per person’ is the ratio of province’s population on revenues. ‘Provincial tax revenues’ is the 
share of province in Turkey in terms of taxes collected in the province. 
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the general budget. However, it is difficult to argue that higher values would indicate higher 
values on decentralisation as the relationship cannot be built with own source revenues which 
is the dividend of the fraction. Moreover, the impact of 2 indicators among 61 indicators 
would be limited on the index value and it would be highly unlikely to explain the high 
correlation by arguing that the abovementioned two indicators and decentralisation variables 
are measuring the same underlying construct. 
Finally, in Model 7 all control variables are included in the equation. Even though it is 
a slight change, the increase in adjusted R2 and decrease in RMSE indicate that the model has 
improved. Remarkably, the p value of MOBxDMxIMP has increased and it is no longer a 
significant predictor. iINF is the only significant external variable with a statistically 
significant p value. As external factors are not necessarily an integral part of the hypotheses, 
the control variables except iINF are removed in the subsequent regression analysis.  
 
Table 5.24 Model 7 – Decentralisation, Local Governance Capacity, Local Capacity and 
External Factors 
Source SS df        MS   Number of obs 33 
Model 13.0738 12 1.0895 
 
F(  12,    20) 17.17 
Residual 1.2689 20 0.0634 
 
Prob > F 0 
Total 14.3427 32 0.4482 
 
R-squared 0.9115 
  
  
  
 
Adj R-squared 0.8584 
  
  
  
 
Root MSE 0.2519 
  
  
  
  
  
logDec Coef. Std. Err.       t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
MOB 0.3118 0.097 3.2100 0.004 0.1094 0.5142 
DM 0.009 0.0985 0.0900 0.928 -0.1964 0.2145 
IMP 0.0678 0.0594 1.1400 0.267 -0.0561 0.1917 
MOBxDM 0.0208 0.0928 0.22 0.825 -0.1727 0.2143 
MOBxIMP 0.0542 0.1337 0.41 0.69 -0.2247 0.333 
DMxIMP 0.0052 0.1172 0.04 0.965 -0.2393 0.2497 
MOBxDMxIMP -0.1466 0.1019 -1.44 0.166 -0.3592 0.0659 
Dev 0.7526 0.1327 5.67 0 0.4758 1.0293 
iINF 0.1668 0.0691 2.41 0.026 0.0226 0.311 
lnPOP 0.0497 0.0789 0.63 0.536 -0.1149 0.2144 
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PolDiv 0.1258 0.1217 1.03 0.314 -0.1282 0.3797 
logParty -0.1386 0.2252 -0.62 0.545 -0.6084 0.3312 
_cons -2.2842 0.9841 -2.32 0.031 -4.337 -0.2313 
 
Expectedly, the removal of the control variables did not make any significant change 
in the model. 90% of the variability in logDec is accounted for by the variables in Model 8. 
Dev is still the most significant predictor in logDec variable, which is followed by MOB, 
iINF and MOBxDMxIMP variables. The p-value of the model shows that the effect of the 
variables is not random. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that DM and IMP do not have 
an influence on logDec, but the significance of the interaction term necessitates their inclusion 
in the model.  
Model 8 indicates that if the effect of local governance capacity and local capacity 
variables is kept constant; the perceived central government’s influence in local governance 
(iINF) is still significant on the financial autonomy of the local government. Interestingly, this 
influence is in a positive direction. This finding seems paradoxical, as the central 
government’s influence in local governance should be in adverse relationship with the degree 
of decentralisation. One plausible explanation is that municipalities with higher financial 
autonomy could look for higher decentralisation, thus they can perceive the influence of 
central government in the local affairs is larger than it is requested or necessary.  
 
Table 5.25 Model 8- Decentralisation, Local Governance Capacity, Local Capacity and 
Influence of Central Government 
Source SS df        MS   Number of obs 33 
Model 12.9711 9 1.4412 
 
F(  9,    23) 24.17 
Residual 1.3716 23 0.0596 
 
Prob > F 0 
Total 14.3427 32 0.4482 
 
R-squared 0.9044 
  
  
  
 
Adj R-squared 0.8669 
  
  
  
 
Root MSE 0.2442 
  
  
  
  
  
logDec Coef. Std. Err.       t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
MOB 0.2831 0.0875 3.23 0.004 0.102 0.4641 
DM 0.024 0.0915 0.26 0.795 -0.1652 0.2133 
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IMP 0.0487 0.0537 0.91 0.374 -0.0624 0.16 
MOBxDM 0.0007 0.0778 0.01 0.993 -0.1603 0.1617 
MOBxIMP 0.0032 0.1144 0.03 0.978 -0.2335 0.24 
DMxIMP 0.0501 0.1058 0.47 0.64 -0.1687 0.2689 
MOBxDMxIMP -0.1648 0.0885 -1.86 0.075 -0.348 0.018 
Dev 0.779 0.1063 7.33 0 0.5591 0.9989 
iINF 0.1742 0.0615 2.83 0.009 0.0471 0.3013 
_cons -1.5962 0.1911 -8.35 0 -1.9915 -1.2009 
 
It is remarkable that the correlation analysis matrix did not point out any significant 
correlation between iINF and other key variables (see Table 5.19). The influence of iINF is 
only revealed when Dev is included in the equation and the former is only a significant 
predictor as long as Dev is part of the equation. Therefore, any alternative theory suggesting 
that central government is more willing to intervene in economically developed provinces 
would be invalid, because it would require a significant correlation between Dev and iINF 
variables which is not observed in the correlation matrix (see Table 5.19). 
This phenomenon happens because  Dev is so highly correlated with logDec; thus, the 
inclusion of iINF exposes a relatively small amount of variation that has been previously 
masked and this variation is associated with iINF. To check this argument, a new variable 
‘resid’ is generated for the residuals between Dev and logDec and this variable is correlated 
with iINF. Table 5.26 shows that the correlation between the resid and iINF is large and 
significant although the rest of the correlations between iINF and other variables are small.  
 
Table 5.26 Correlation Analysis Matrix with resid, iINF, Dev and logDec54 
  logDec Dev iINF resid 
logDec 1       
          
Dev 0.8958 1     
  0       
                                                            
54	The first row shows the correlation coefficients and the second row shows the statistical significance of 
correlations.	
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iINF 0.1575 -0.0466 1   
  0.3815 0.7967     
resid 0.4444 0 0.4483 1 
  0.0096 1 0.0089   
 
Furthermore, the comparison of AIC and BIC values of all models indicates that 
Model 8 explains most adequately the relationship between the given variables. In Model 8, 
both values are the lowest, thus the goodness of fit is largest in the last model. 
 
Table 5.27 Goodness of Fit 
  Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
Model1 33 -33.07612 -22.51329 2 49.02657 52.01959 
Model2 33 -33.07612 -21.22981 2 46.45962 49.45263 
Model3 33 -33.07612 -30.45109 2 64.90218 67.89519 
Model4 33 -33.07612 -19.11261 4 46.22523 52.21126 
Model5 33 -33.07612 -15.29506 8 46.59013 58.56219 
Model6 33 -33.07612 .7100425 9 16.57992 30.04848 
Model7 33 -33.07612 6.937588 13 12.12482 31.57942 
Model8 33 -33.07612 5.653748 10 8.692505 23.65758 
 
The last step before suggesting the model is to check whether multicollinearity and/or 
homoscedasticity are affecting the model assumptions. The high level of correlations between 
Dev and local governance capacity variables might be an indication of multicollinearity. To 
control multicollinearity, the Variance of Influence (VIF) and Tolerance levels of variables 
are calculated (see Table 5.27). The VIF scores suggest that there is a mild impact of 
collinearity, but none of the values are high enough to be of concern A general rule of thumb 
is if the VIF score is above a tolerance (1/VIF) of less than 0.2 or 0.1, and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 
would suggest a multicollinearity problem (O’Brien, 2007). In our case, only MOBxDMxIMP 
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variable appears as slightly problematic in terms of multicollinearity. Furthermore, Klein’s 
rule of thumb suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem only if R2 obtained from an 
auxiliary regression is greater than the overall R2 (Gujarati, 2004). None of the auxiliary 
regressions with changing the dependent and independent variables have pointed out such a 
phenomenon. This finding shows that high correlation between independent variables is not 
the main cause of the high R2 value.  
 
Table 5.28 VIF and Tolerance level 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MOBxDMxIMP 5.78 0.173053 
MOBxDM 4.75 0.210640 
DM 4.02 0.248951 
MOBxIMP 3.65 0.274140 
MOB 3.47 0.288413 
DMxIMP 3.20 0.312444 
Dev 2.95 0.338829 
IMP 1.38 0.725839 
iINF 1.24 0.805974 
Mean VIF 3.38 
  
The assumption of homoscedasticity is tested with the Breusch-Pagan test. The test 
produces a p-value of 0.9471, which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis stating that 
there is no heteroskedasticity in this degree of freedom.  
 
Table 5.29 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF 
chi2(9)      =     3.38 
Prob > chi2  = 0.9471 
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 Finally, influential outliers are controlled on the given dataset. Figure 5.10 displays the 
graph of leverage versus squared residuals. As we can see, Van, Bitlis and Mugla have both 
high leverage and large residuals. To calculate the Cook’s distance values, a new variable 
“d1” is created and a cut-off level of 4/n (n is the number of observations) is implemented to 
display influential cases. The calculation of Cook’s distance with cut-off level produced 4 
influential outliers that require a closer examination.  
 
Figure 5.10 Leverage vs Squared Residuals 
 
 
Table 5.30 Cook’s Distance 
provinces d1 
Ardahan 0.3486432 
Bitlis 0.3769775 
Mugla 0.8283066 
Van 0.7361557 
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Further tests are conducted to identify the influential outliers. Studentised residuals 
help to identify the cases which have high influence in determining the other coefficients in 
the model (Belsley , Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). Cases higher than 3 or less than -3 are considered 
as problematic. STATA also has the ‘leverage’ command, which identifies high leverage 
cases. Since there is a limited data sample, the cases with leverage more than 3k>n55, will be 
considered with high leverage. Finally, DFBETA option in STATA shows how much a 
coefficient would change if a case is removed from the data. Observations with dfbeta>2 
sqrt(n) would require further attention (Belsley , Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  Table 5.31 
summarises the list of potential problematic cases for each test. Considering the results of 
Cook’s distance test as well, the most problematic cases on all tests are Mugla and Van. In 
fact, these two cities are two extreme cases in terms of socio-economic development. Mugla 
is one of the most socio-economically developed city in Turkey whereas Van is one of the 
most underdeveloped cities despite the fact of it being a populous city (see Table 4.5). 
Therefore, this result is most likely not due to a measurement error, but because of extreme 
cases. As a final step, the influential cases were dropped individually and the regression 
analysis is rerun to observe any significant changes in the model. The only changes occurred 
in MOBxDMxIMP when Van and Bitlis were dropped from the observation. On both cases 
the p-value increased significantly and the variable was no longer a significant predictor. This 
finding confirms that the interaction term is not necessarily a significant predictor and its 
significance is a result of influential outliers. Nonetheless, these cases will be kept in the data 
as there is no reason to remove them. Yet, post-estimation tests indicate that it is safer not to 
regard the influence of MOBxDMxIMP variable on decentralisation as significant.  
 
Table 5.31 Studentised Residuals, Leverage and DFBETA tests 
                                                            
55 ‘k’ is the number of coefficients and ‘n’ is the number of cases. 	
provinces rstudent leverage _dfbeta_1 
Mugla  
 
2.385529 0.6366783 
 
1.166055 
Van -1.786484 0.7164272 0.9358091 
Bitlis  2.008111  0.4651692 
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 Following the post-estimation analyses, Model 8 is selected as the most rigorous and 
representative model on the relationship between decentralisation, local capacity and local 
governance capacity variables. The following equation represents the linear relationship 
between the logarithmic transformation of decentralisation, local capacity, local governance 
capacity variables, 3-way interaction of local governance variables and perceived influence of 
central government in local governance. 
 𝑦∗ =  𝑎 +  𝑏!𝑋! + 𝑏! 𝑋! + 𝑏! 𝑋! + 𝑏! 𝑋!𝑋!+ 𝑏! 𝑋!𝑋!+ 𝑏! 𝑋!𝑋!+ 𝑏! 𝑋!𝑋!𝑋! +𝑏! 𝑋! + 𝑏! 𝑋! + 𝜀 
 
Ind. Var. Coef. Std. Err.       t P>t Beta 
MOB 0.2831 0.0875 3.23 0.004 0.3883 
DM 0.024 0.0915 0.26 0.795 0.0340 
IMP 0.0487 0.0537 0.91 0.374 0.0686 
MOBxDM 0.0007 0.0778 0.01 0.993 0.0013 
MOBxIMP 0.0032 0.1144 0.03 0.978 0.0035 
DMxIMP 0.0501 0.1058 0.47 0.64 0.0546 
MOBxDMxIMP -0.1648 0.0885 -1.86 0.075 -0.2886 
Dev 0.779 0.1063 7.33 0 0.8119 
iINF 0.1742 0.0615 2.83 0.009 0.2036 
_cons -1.5962 0.1911 -8.35 0 . 
 
 According to Model 8, a one-unit change in Dev by keeping constant other variables is 
associated with 0.779 unit change in logarithmic transformation of decentralisation. On the 
other hand, the standardised beta coefficients show that one standard deviation increase in 
Dev would result in 0.812 standard deviations change in the dependent variable.  This 
influence is followed by the changes in MOB with standardised beta coefficient 0.388 and by 
iINF with 0.174. Thus the impact of the change in Dev on the dependent variable is almost 
twice as high than MOB and four times higher than iINF.  
Ardahan -1.184974 0.7164371  
Kahramanmaras 
 
0.7007552 0.6621275 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 5, the central research questions have been addressed via a series of 
statistical analyses. The primary outcomes of the analyses are the following: 
 
(1) We can reject the null hypothesis that local capacity does not have an effect on 
decentralisation. We can reject the null hypothesis that mobilisation capacity does not 
have an effect on decentralisation. We cannot reject the null hypothesis for decision-
making capacity and implementation.  
(2) The local capacity is the most influential variable to explain the variance in 
decentralisation. The standardised beta coefficient indicates that the impact of local 
capacity on the change of the standard deviation is almost two times higher than 
mobilisation capacity. 
(3) A change in local capacity is associated both with the change in local governance 
capacity and decentralisation. We observe this influence on the p-value of DM when 
local capacity variable is included in the model. This change shows that local capacity 
is a confounding variable, thus it covaries both with local governance capacity and 
decentralisation variable. Mackinnon, Krull & Lockwood (2000) explain that a 
confounder variable is ‘a variable related to two factors of interest that falsely 
obscures or accentuates the relationship between them (Meinert, 1986)’. The 
confounding effect of local capacity removes the influence of decision-making 
capacity on decentralisation, which is observed on the previous models without 
including the Dev variable. Confounding influence does not necessarily imply 
causality but further studies with SEM or causal path analysis could provide further 
insights on causal relationships among local capacity, local governance capacity and 
decentralisation. 
(4) Among local governance capacity variables, mobilisation capacity variable is the only 
significant predictor on decentralisation. Considering that the mobilisation capacity is 
partly captured by the ability of collecting taxes and generating revenues through 
owned immovable, it can directly affect financial autonomy. However, this effect is 
much smaller than the influence of socio-economic development on decentralisation. 
In addition, the observed significant relationship between the 3-way interaction of 
 220 
 
local governance capacity variables and decentralisation has failed to pass the 
reliability tests.   
(5) The only statistically significant predictor among control variables is the perceived 
influence of central government in local governance (iINF). iINF does not have any 
significant correlation with any of the key variables but it explains the variance of 
decentralisation which is not explained by local capacity. One plausible explanation of 
this influence is that the municipalities from socio-economically more advanced 
provinces perceive the presence of central government in local governance as more 
than it is necessary or asked for. Similarly, municipalities with a lower level of socio-
economic development perceive that the involvement of central government in local 
governance is not satisfactory, as they cannot respond to local needs with existing 
resources. 
(6) The suggested model has a distinctly high R2 value which is uncommon in social 
sciences. Neither the statistical test nor the logical analysis of the relationships pointed 
out a measurement error to justify high R2 value. The most plausible explanation is 
that Dev variable has a high explanatory power due to 61 constituting elements on 
decentralisation. Additionally, the model relies on relatively limited data sample size, 
and with a larger dataset, the high R2 value can decrease to a certain extent. 
Nevertheless, the suggested model has a very high predictive power on the variance of 
decentralisation.  
 
In light of the findings, the relationship between local capacity, local governance 
capacity and decentralisation is depicted in Figure 5.10. The confounding effect observed 
between local capacity and local governance capacity variables, indicates a relationship 
between local governance capacity and local capacity in explaining the relationship with 
decentralisation. However, this relationship is not elaborated statistically as it is not within the 
scope of this research.  
Considering the hypotheses suggested in Chapter II, we reject Hypothesis 1, which 
indicates that there is no relationship between local capacity and decentralisation. We can also 
reject Hypothesis 3 which indicates that there is no relationship between local governance 
capacity and decentralisation. The statistical analyses point out that the relationship between 
governance capacity and decentralisation is best represented by Hypothesis 2.  
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Figure 5.11 The Relationship between Decentralisation and Governance Capacity 
 
Although the direction of relations cannot be derived by the regression analysis, it is 
logical to interpret that local capacity influences both decentralisation and local governance 
capacity, and local governance capacity influences decentralisation. One counter-argument 
could be that a reverse causality can be established between decentralisation and socio-
economic development. This argument would entail an indirect causality suggesting that an 
increase in financial autonomy brings better governance of public services and better public 
services affect the indicators measuring the socio-economic development. However, none of 
the indicators in SEGE study are directly affected by the municipal services. Variables in 
relation to health, education, life quality and mobility services in the province are mostly 
under the responsibility of the central government. Therefore, this alternative explanation on 
the direction of the relationship between decentralisation and local capacity would be 
theoretically less convincing.  
 
 
 
 
Local Governance 
Capacity 
Local Capacity Decentralization 
 222 
 
CHAPTER VI- QUALITATIVE RESPONSES & REMARKS  
This chapter presents the qualitative responses gathered from the surveys and separate 
questions, which are not included into statistical analysis. This information will provide a 
further insight on how to interpret the statistical findings into policy recommendations and it 
could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between capacity and 
decentralisation in Turkish case.  
 The chapter presents in sequence the remarks with regard to mobilisation, decision-
making and implementation capacity and central government’s influence, and at the final part 
the findings from each section will be synthesised with statistical findings. 
 
6.1 Remarks on Mobilisation Capacity  
In relation to mobilisation capacity, the respondents are directed questions on the 
choices on public procurement, utilisation of municipal partnerships, purpose of debt usage 
and the prioritisation in service areas.   
Starting with the first aspect, two questions are addressed to mayors in relation to the 
public procurement. First, mayors are asked to select the sources they are using to cover their 
material requirements. Among four given choices, ‘State Supply Office’ and ‘Private Sector 
Organisation’ are the most frequent  selected choices with a percentage of preference around 
40% (See Figure 6.1). Secondly, mayors are asked to assess the importance of sources in 
covering their equipment requirement. They are asked to pick a number from 1 to 5 to signify 
the degree of importance in each choice (see Figure 6.2). Similarly, State Supply Office and 
Private Sector Organisations are selected as the most important sources to cover equipment 
requirements. State Supply Office, is a state enterprise under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Finance, and its primary function is to supply state institutions with office materials with 
competitive prices. State Supply Office is supplied from several vendors and it supplies a 
large variety of merchandise to its customers from the public sector. Its profit is channelled as 
an income to the Treasury. Even though the primary customers for State Supply Office are the 
central government and its agencies, the provincial municipalities prefer the Office as their 
primary choice in procurement as well. The implication of these findings reveal that, in terms 
of the relationship between decentralisation and local governance capacity, both private and 
public sources are almost equally important in covering the material needs. By contrast, 
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municipal enterprises or other municipalities are less important and less preferred choices in 
covering material needs.  
Figure 6.1 Choices on Public Procurement 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Importance on Public Procurement 
 
Similarly, the responses of deputy mayors on the utilisation of municipal partnerships 
confirm that municipal partnerships are not the preferred choices to cover material needs. 
Among 25 responses, only 3 municipalities remarked that they are engaging in municipal 
partnerships to cover their material needs. These findings imply that at least for provincial 
municipalities, the municipal partnerships do not play an important role on mobilisation 
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capacity. The municipalities state the ambiguity of the current law on regulating municipal 
partnerships, as the primary reason of avoiding municipal partnerships. This option is 
followed by “no adequate personnel capacity to contribute to municipal partnerships” and “no 
adequate budget for municipal partnership”. With regard to the impact of financial 
constraints, one respondent stated that “Municipalities expect support from each other due to 
financial constraints, therefore joint projects fail to be materialised”. Nonetheless, 12 out of 
25 municipalities state they do not avoid municipal partnerships, despite the considerably low 
responses in utilising municipal partnerships, as an alternative way to meet their material 
needs. Furthermore, 62% of mayors’ responses were affirmative when asked if they engage 
with unofficial partnerships with other municipalities, (see Figure 6.4). That means there is a 
room for improvement in terms of collaboration between municipalities, and that with 
legislative and capacity-related improvements, municipal partnerships can be a feasible 
alternative for private and public sources of procurement and purchases.  
Figure 6.3 Reason of Avoiding from Municipal Partnerships 
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Figure 6.4 Unofficial Partnerships 
 
One important aspect under mobilisation capacity is if the financial and material assets 
are utilised in an effective way to enhance the local governance capacity. Especially, utilising 
loans and credits to build further financial and material capabilities, and knowing the public 
service areas in need of improvement are important aspects to improve the existing local 
governance capacity.  
For the former aspect, mayors are asked on their motivations of getting loans and 
credits. Debts can be instrumental on capacity enhancement in financial and material aspects, 
as long as they are utilised for new investments. Five options (i.e. administrative costs, current 
expenses of public services, investment on infrastructure, investment on superstructure, 
financial investment) are given to the municipalities to select the ones on which they utilise 
their loans and credits. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of responses collected from 25 
municipalities. The results indicate that for a clear majority of municipalities, the municipal 
debts are used for investment purposes. On the other hand, debts for current expenses such as 
administrative costs or cost of public services correspond to a total of 28%. The results 
portray a relatively positive picture on the sufficiency of financial resources for the provincial 
municipalities, and it shows that for a majority of provincial municipalities, current financial 
sources are sufficient to carry on the municipal services.  
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Figure 6.5 Utilisation of Debts 
 
To explore if there is a recurring area among municipal services where the provincial 
municipalities are in need of enhancing their capabilities, mayors are addressed with a 
practical question; ‘if you were given 1 Million TL in addition to your existing budget, on 
which service areas and how much would you spend?’ Table 6.1 shows that environment 
preservation and construction are two salient areas wherein the municipalities are more 
willing to invest, whereas religion and public security are the least emphasised service areas. 
Given that most of the services in public security & order, religion and health are covered by 
the central government, the results are consistent with the municipal responsibilities.  
 
Table 6.1 Public Service Areas in Need of Capacity Enhancement  
Public Service Areas Amount allocated (in thousand TL) 
Administrative & General  2650 
Economical activities 3542 
Construction 4775 
Environment Preservation 6000 
Education 2697 
Sports, Culture, Entertainments 2017 
Religion 944 
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Public Security & Order 914 
Health 1249 
Social Aid 3577 
 
In the final part of this section, the comments by the mayors and deputy mayors on 
financial and material aspects will be examined. Among 17 different comments received by 
the mayors and deputies from 16 municipalities, the financial issues are the second most 
commented subjects in terms of capacity. Usually, municipalities of poorer provinces mention 
the lack of financial resources as the most urgent subject under the financial capacities, 
contrary to the richer provinces which hardly report a lack in capacity with regard to financial 
or material aspects. The lack of financial resources is usually accompanied by lack of capacity 
in material aspects, such as a need in reparation and maintenance of owned equipment and 
machinery, or insufficient physical conditions.  It is noteworthy to mention, that in sum, there 
are three kinds of requests or statements regarding financial aspects; (1) central government’s 
involvement in co-financing of investments with larger financial burden, (2) more financial 
autonomy to levy taxes and an increase in financial decentralisation, (3) the misbalance 
between the municipal responsibilities and existing financial resources.  Especially in terms of 
the misbalance there are two outstanding positions. First of all, municipalities from poorer 
provinces underline that local sources are insufficient to generate income in scarcely 
populated and poorer areas for adequate public services. Secondly, the municipalities which 
are granted the metropolitan municipality status following the 2014 elections, point out the 
additional financial burden, which will be brought by the indebted district municipalities to 
them, once these municipalities are part of their jurisdiction. Last but not the least, in terms of 
material aspects, municipalities which report lack of capacity in financial resources are 
similarly stating a lack in material capacities.  
 
6.2 Remarks on Decision-Making Capacity 
Several questions are directed to respondents to elaborate particularly on their 
preferences on strategic planning and on their municipality’s communication system. With 
regard to strategic planning, the respondents are asked, which actors are involved in strategic 
planning, what are the means of their involvement and whether they received external 
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consultancy during the preparation of the plans. As part of the communication dimension, 
questions regarding the presence of a communication plan and a body responsible with 
internal communication, the structure of the information-sharing and data-storage system, as 
well the options of trainings or guidelines for the electorates in the municipal assembly have 
been addressed to respondents. 
In terms of strategy planning, the mayors are asked to select the actors which have 
participated in the strategic planning process and their means of participation. Figure 6.6 
points out that the managers of the municipality (i.e. deputy mayors and directors) are the 
main contributors in strategy plans as being most marked actors. In terms of interaction, 
managers inside the municipality usually engage personally with the mayor in strategy 
planning process, while group meetings are usually the most preferred methods for the rest of 
the actors. Only for citizens and municipal personnel, surveys are preferred as a viable option, 
while for the rest of the actors surveys appear as a marginal choice. Additionally, the 
respondents are asked if they have received any external consultancy during strategy 
planning, and if yes, on what stage have they required the external consultancy. Among 29 
respondents, 5 municipalities replied positively on receiving external consultancy on the 
preparation of strategic plans.  
 
 229 
 
Figure 6.6 Participation in Strategy Planning 
 
As far as the communication dimension goes, the mayors and deputy mayors are asked 
to fill the number of regular meetings they hold per month or per year with given actors. 
Figure 6.756 shows the average57 number of meetings held by mayors with each actor per year. 
Inside the organisational structure, the number of regular meetings each month with the 
municipal executive committee is around 5, whereas this number decreases in average to 2 for 
directors and municipal assembly. In terms of external communication, regular meetings with 
the representatives of locality are quite limited given that for most of the municipalities it is 
around 3 or 4 times per year. However, the number of regular meetings with the central 
government and governors exceed the number of meetings with Urban Council and muhtars, 
with an average number of 18 meetings per year. Additionally, the deputy mayors are asked 
how many times per month they have regular meetings with directors. The average number of 
meetings per month is slightly above 3, which corresponds to approximately 40 meetings per 
year. Hence, the communication with directors is taking place by deputy mayors in general. 
These findings can be interpreted as the decision-makers of the municipality put the 
intraorganisational communication at first place, which is followed by the communication 
with the central government and its agents, and lastly by the communication with the 
                                                            
56 The frequency of meetings with the councillors, municipal committee and directors are asked on a monthly 
basis, and the results have been multiplied by 12, unless an exemption is notified by the respondent.  
57	 The average number is attained by dividing the sum to the number of respondents for each actor.  The 
municipalities which did not provide any precise number (i.e. wordings such as “countless times” or “don’t 
know the exact number”) were not taken into account.	
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representatives of locality. Hence in terms of communication, the access of local actors in 
local governance is more limited than the access of central government actors.  
 
Figure 6.7 The Structure of Communication Channels in Municipalities   
 
Furthermore, the mayors are asked to describe the approach of Urban Council 
members in meetings. For the majority of municipalities, Urban Councils are perceived as 
useful and cooperative bodies suitable for collaboration and more engaged action. These 
results are contradicting with the findings of the former graphs because, while Urban Councils 
are largely described as cooperative and constructive, the mayors have fewer tendencies to 
engage with them in terms of local governance. 
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Figure 6.8 Attitude of Urban Council towards Municipality 
 
The previous studies about municipal councillors underlined the lack of 
communication capacity and involvement in municipal affairs. Therefore, some questions are 
addressed to apprehend the communication capacity of the councillors. The mayors are 
addressed the question of how many times per month they receive petitions or written 
requests from councillors, and what is the average time of responding to these requests. 
Unfortunately, only a few municipalities responded to have received petitions or written 
requests from councillors. Additionally, the deputy mayors are asked if there are any 
guidelines or training options inside the municipality for councillors to enhance their 
communication with municipal personnel and citizens. Around 25% of municipalities 
responded they provide guidelines or trainings for councillors on their communications 
towards municipal personnel and citizens. The findings point out that both, the involvement 
and the capacity of councillors as monitoring and engaging actors inside the municipality are 
quite limited despite being directly elected from localities.  
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Figure 6.9 Guidelines or Training for Councillors on Communication 
 
Finally, several questions are addressed to apprehend the information management 
system inside the municipality. The municipalities are asked if they have (1) a unit 
responsible to arrange interdepartmental communication, (2) a desk for citizens to appeal their 
complaints and requests58, (3) an electronic registry system to store the complaints received 
from citizens, (4) an information sharing system and who has access to it. Figure 6.10 
indicates that for almost all municipalities, citizens are provided with the means to appeal the 
complaints and requests. Also, an e-registry system to store complaints is available. On the 
one hand, when it comes to the internal communication, only a few municipalities responded 
affirmatively on a unit responsible of organising the interdepartmental communication. On the 
other hand, almost all municipalities responded positively having an information-sharing 
system inside the municipality. Among the given four options - i.e. mayor, deputy mayors, 
directors and municipal personnel - the level of access between actors is fairly balanced with 
the percentages for each respective actor as following; 27% for mayors, 28% for deputy 
mayors, 26% for directors and 19% for municipal personnel.  
 
                                                            
58	This desk is usually referred to as “white desk”.	
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Figure 6.10 Information Management 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Access to Information Sharing System 
 
Lastly, the comments of mayors and deputy mayors have been analysed within the 
frame of decision-making capacity. Unsurprisingly, the comments on communication and 
planning aspects of capacity have been limited in comparison to other dimensions of local 
governance capacity. Among the few municipalities which provided an input on planning and 
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communication aspects, they underlined that they do possess adequate capacity and ability in 
planning and implementing projects, as well as successfully engaging with citizens. Only one 
municipality was more receptive in relation to its shortcomings in engaging with localities and 
utilising the information collected from citizens. One mayor stated that their municipality 
lacks the necessary structure “to request the input from citizens, to make sense out of it and to 
transform it into meaningful services”.  
 
6.3 Remarks on Implementation Capacity 
The additional questions related to the managerial and human resources dimensions of 
capacity can be clustered under trainings provided inside the municipality, methods and 
means to increase performance and efficiency in personnel, and the women’s role in human 
resources.  
To start with the first aspect, the mayors are asked if the deputy mayors and director 
have received occupational trainings during the last year. 86% of the municipalities responded 
positively, with an average of 3 trainings per year provided to managers in the municipality. A 
few municipalities have noted the trainings and seminars provided by the Union of Turkish 
Municipalities were in fact useful to complement the internal trainings inside the 
municipalities. With regard to trainings, the following questions are addressed: (1) is there a 
unit responsible inside the municipality to evaluate the training needs?; (2) is there a 
municipal training program for the personnel?; (3) is there a specific budget allocated only for 
the municipal trainings? Figure 6.12 suggests that for most of the provincial municipalities, 
the means of trainings are available inside the municipality. In 78% of responding 
municipalities, there is a unit responsible to assess training needs; in 70% of the 
municipalities, there is a municipal training program for the personnel, and 62% of 
responding municipalities are allocating a specific amount of budget (75000 TL per year) for 
trainings.  
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Figure 6.12 Trainings in the Municipality 
 
The second set of questions was about the means and methods to enhance performance 
inside the municipalities. The municipalities are inquired about their motivation enhancing 
activities through the following questions; 1) ‘is there any awarding system for high 
performance?’; 2) ‘are you undertaking satisfaction surveys among personnel?’; and 3)‘are 
you organising any social events for the personnel?’.  
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Figure 6.13 Means to Increase Motivation inside the Municipality 
 
46% of responding municipalities remarked they are adopting a form of awarding 
systems for higher performance. For around 70% of municipalities, awarding takes a sort of 
financial form such as bonuses or premiums. Other popular means in awarding include letters 
of appreciation, gifts or placards. Around 45% of municipalities undertake satisfaction 
surveys among personnel, usually one time per year. Lastly, 80% of municipalities responded 
affirmatively in providing social activities for their personnel. In average of 4 times per year 
municipalities are organising social events for their personnel.  
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Figure 6.14 Performance Criteria in Municipalities 
 
Additionally, questions on the application and the extent of performance measurement 
criteria, and the existence of commonly agreed terms of reference have been directed to 
respondents with regard to municipal performance. 52% of participating municipalities 
responded to having had adopted a sort of performance criteria as part of their municipal 
decisions. Among them, 21% responded they use performance criteria on salary payments, 
while 71% use performance criteria for promotion decisions and contract renewals. 76% of 
municipalities adopt a sort of terms of reference to avoid of duplication of work, whereas 24% 
responded negatively on this.  
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Figure 6.15 Terms of Reference in Municipal Works 
 
Finally, the municipalities are asked to provide information about the number of 
women in personnel and in management. The results indicate that the ratio of women in 
personnel and in management is approximately similar, which is 11,6% and 11,1% 
respectively. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the national average of 
women employment in 2013 was 25.9% . The women employment in municipalities is way 
below the national average of employment, yet it is remarkable to observe that there is not a 
significant decrease between the women employment in personnel and in management. This 
result suggests that the gender disparity in management is mostly representative of the overall 
gender structure inside the provincial municipalities. 
 Moving to the comments of mayors and deputy mayors about the implementation 
capacity, the lack of qualified personnel is the foremost mentioned weakness in 
commentaries. A clear majority of responding municipalities underline that they either lack 
educated and technical personnel, or they have a mediocre capacity. The absence of incentives 
to attract qualified personnel due to the regulations and legal frameworks, and the absence of 
qualified personnel in smaller or poorer municipalities, are articulated as the primary reasons 
for incapacities in human resources. Also, the political polarisation among personnel has been 
identified in several times as a primary cause of the inability in utilising the qualified 
personnel in managerial positions. Additionally, different educational background and poor 
communication due to high workload are stated as other reasons for poor collaboration among 
directors. One mayor stated that there is a ‘learned helplessness’ among directors that 
municipalities are dysfunctional places and this creates inertia and distrust in management.  
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6.4 Remarks on Central Government’s Influence 
The responses of municipalities on the debt acquisition and communication are 
analysed for a more enhanced understanding of the central government’s and its agencies’ 
influences on local governance.  
First of all, the municipalities are given several actors and asked to give a value from 1 
to 5 in terms of their importance on debt acquisition. According to Figure 6.16, Bank of 
Provinces and Central Government are the two primary sources of income for the provincial 
municipalities in terms of debt acquisition. Given that a primary function of Bank of 
Provinces is to provide interest-free loans to municipalities, it is understandable why the Bank 
is a particular preference for the municipalities. Yet, this graph shows that the central 
government is also a key source for loans and a credit, which shows that provinces with 
limited financial sources are more prone to influence from the central government in terms of 
the financial dependency.   
 
Figure 6.16 Influence on Debt Acquisition 
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government. Among several given actors in locality, the municipalities are asked to evaluate 
each one of them in terms of the importance of communication. According to Figure 6.17, 
despite the relatively close values with other actors, except the municipal assembly, the 
highest valued two options are the governorate and the agencies of central government in 
locality. This graph shows that the communication with the central government and 
governorates is highly important for provincial municipalities. One interpretation of these 
results could be that provincial municipalities feel the need to consider the central 
government’s position regarding the local governance.  
 
Figure 6.17 Influence on Communication 
 
Furthermore, the mayors are asked on their preferences on their contacts with the 
central government. Four choices are given to municipalities; (1) personal contact, (2) 
contacting through the associated political party, (3) contacting through the Union of 
Municipalities, (4) contacting through the local agencies of central government. Figure 6.18 
displays that mayors primarily prefer personal contact with central government, followed by 
‘through associated political parties’, and with a slight difference by ‘through local agencies 
of the central government’ and ‘through union of municipalities’. The primary indication of 
this graph is that mayors have largely a direct access to central government and they prefer a 
direct communication with central government about their affairs. 
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Figure 6.18 Preferences on Contacting with the Central Government 
 
Finally, the comments of mayors and deputy mayors do not point out any arbitrary 
influence of central government in local governance, but they pointed out that there are 
requests from central government in terms of financial decentralisation. In this regard, two 
types of demands are prevalent in municipalities, (a) more involvement of central 
government, especially in terms of assisting municipalities on investments and providing 
additional funding from central budget, (b) an increased financial autonomy or some tax 
exemptions with regard to value added taxes and special consumption taxes (OTV) on 
municipal services. The long-term and interest-free loans provided by the Bank of Provinces 
appear as a viable option for municipalities to acquire equipment and machinery, yet these 
loans are insufficient for municipalities to maintain the existing machinery or to improve the 
physical conditions.  
 
6.5 Synthesis of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
The synthesis of the qualitative findings with the quantitative findings provides further 
insight on the interpretation of the data in Turkish case.    
First and foremost, the relationship between capacity and decentralisation is usually 
associated with financial aspects. In this regard, municipalities are divided into two clusters; 
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one group articulates that more financial decentralisation (e.g. increase discretion on levying 
taxes, collecting taxes, removing indirect taxes on municipal services) is necessary to 
overcome financial constraints, whereas another group demands more involvement from 
central government in local governance by pointing out the difficulty to raise revenues due to 
incapacities in local environment. In fact, a major statistical finding has shown that local 
capacity is the main determinant on the relationship between local governance capacity and 
decentralisation, and only mobilisation capacity showed a statistically significant relationship 
with decentralisation. Remarkably, municipalities requesting more financial decentralisation 
belong to the provinces with higher socio-economic development. Furthermore, this finding 
supports the interpretation on the relationship between the influence of central government in 
local governance and decentralisation as socio-economically developed municipalities look 
for more financial autonomy. This means that they are highly likely to perceive the central 
government’s existing presence in local governance more than necessary. Nevertheless, 
existing financial sources are sufficient for the majority of municipalities to cover the current 
expenses, and central government’s involvement is usually requested to co-finance 
investments. Similarly, debts are usually used for investment purposes. 
Secondly, lack of capacity in qualified personnel is a severe problem for 
municipalities, which is associated with the absence of tools to attract qualified personnel. On 
the one hand, this is partly due to the current legislation, as the maximum wage allowed to the 
contracted personnel cannot surpass % 25 of the highest ranked civil servant’s salary, and the 
usage of performance payments are conditioned to certain criteria59. On the other hand, 
municipalities in socio-economically poorer provinces have less access to qualified personnel. 
In this regard, trainings provide little solution to improve existing human resources capaicty, 
given that most of the municipalities already have training programmes but lack of qualified 
personnel.  
Thirdly, the influence of residents or Urban Councils appears to be limited in 
municipal decisions. Findings show that central government and its agents have more weight 
in communication in comparison to local actors. Although municipalities possess the 
technical capacities in information management, most of the communication is inside the 
                                                            
59	 Article 49 on 5393-coded Law on Municipalities states that personnel expenses cannot exceed 30% of 
municipal revenues. For the municipalities with less than 10000 residents, the regulation is that personnel 
expenses cannot exceed 40% of municipal revenues. Moreover, the same article states that the performance 
payments are only applicable to permanent civil servants, they cannot be allocated more than twice a year and 
limited with the 10% of municipal personnel. 	
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organisation and the involvement of councillors is limited. Correspondingly, the two 
indicators of decision-making capacity measuring the impact on actual decision-making 
(iDM3 and iDM5), were the least influential indicators on DM variable. An interpretation of 
these findings could be that the participation of citizens in governance is not effective in the 
Turkish case. In that sense, we can talk about a disconnection between the involvement of 
citizens and decision-making in local governance. 
Fourthly, none of the respondents reported an arbitrary involvement of central 
government in local governance, but the impact of political differences in personnel and 
management have been mentioned several times as a reason of poor performance in 
implementation. Nevertheless, the later argument is not supported by the statistical findings. 
The correlation matrix (Table 5.18) did not point out any significant correlation between Party 
(i.e. different party affiliations inside the municipality) and IMP variables. 
Lastly, findings on municipal partnerships suggest that there is room for improvement 
to utilise municipal partnership as alternative methods to mobilise resources, but at the current 
moment municipal partnerships are not instrumental on mobilisation capacity.  
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CHAPTER VII- CONCLUSION 
 
Empowering the local versus the centre and vice versa, has always been an integral 
part of theoretical debates in governance. There are many authors who even perceive the 
history of governments as a pendulum between centralization and decentralization (see 
Atasoy, 2009; Sanderson, 1995). When the term decentralization appeared for the first time in 
English language in the mid of 19th century, it was used as the binary opposite of 
centralization which was largely accepted as the panacea of ineffective, bad governance in the 
post-French revolution Europe. Tocqueville, one of the earliest supporters of decentralization, 
challenged this idea arguing that decentralization is not only better for democratic principles 
but also better for efficient and effective governance, thus contesting the key argument of the 
supporters of centralism. While the supporters of decentralization had been marginal until the 
second part of the 20th century, both concepts – decentralization and centralization -  have 
prevailed in academic circles. New battlefields were discovered for their supporters to argue 
which concept provides the best alternative in democracy building, management, economics 
and development. In the second half of the 20th century, decentralization emerged victorious 
in this long rivalry as the best alternative for governance in the post-nation state and 
globalized world system. Once decentralization was acknowledged as the best alternative, the 
debate on whether decentralization or centralization is better for governance, shifted into a 
debate which was preoccupied with diagnosing the conditions for the best outcomes in 
decentralized systems. Any conflicting empirical result coming from developing countries 
was treated with the interest to identify the failing institutions or discordant cultural elements, 
which could be addressed with proper institutional arrangements and learning programs. Even 
though countless donor programmes and research is established to build capacities in failing 
institutions and to change legal infrastructures, it has been largely unrevealed how these 
presumed capacities or contextual conditions are affecting the outcomes of decentralization. 
Driven by this academic debate, this study addressed the broader discussion of ‘when 
decentralization leads to better governance’ by focusing on the mechanism between the 
capacities for better governance and decentralization. The study addressed two central 
questions (1) which capacities are important for decentralization, and (2) how these capacities 
are affecting decentralization. One novel approach in this research is that capacities are not 
engaged solely as the attributes of the governance institutions, but also as the socio-economic 
attributes of the surrounding environment, which is conceptualised as the local capacity.  
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Inevitably, concepts such as capacity, decentralization or governance require a diligent 
attention on how to conceptually frame and operationalize them. An analogical framework 
was established to measure the local governance capacity by focusing on the three 
fundamental functions (i.e. mobilization of resources, decision-making in policies and 
implementation of the decisions) of local governments with regards to governance. The 
outcome of decentralization has been operationalized in terms of the financial autonomy of 
local government. To control the contextual factors, the country case specific conditions of 
Turkey are analysed and several influential variables such as influence of central government 
in local governance, size of the province, political diversities between local and central 
government and also the political divergences inside the municipalities, are identified. 
In terms of methodological choices, the study undertook a quantitative approach based 
on the data collected from the mayors and deputy mayors. The selection of the same tier of 
local government institutions from a single country case enabled a controlled environment, 
free from the influence of any legal or country specific cultural conditions. Hence, the 
findings of this research have better generalizability across other country cases.  
Before elaborating on the findings, the theoretical and practical implications of the 
study, it is imperative to say that the most significant contribution of this study is first 
shedding light on the inadequately understood mechanism of decentralization, and second, 
how to increase the predictability of decentralization policies on better governance.  
 
7.1 Empirical Findings 
The primary empirical finding of this study has been that financial autonomy of the 
local government is strongly associated with the socio-economic conditions in the province 
and to a lesser extent with the local governance capacity, predominantly the mobilization 
capacity of the municipality. In relation to the research questions, any prediction on the 
outcomes of the decentralization policies should consider both the local capacity and local 
governance capacity. 
The empirical findings point out that local capacity does not only directly influence 
the outcome of decentralization, but it also influences the relationship between local 
governance capacity and decentralization. This influence has been most notable on the 
relationship between decision-making capacity and decentralization. The statistical analysis 
pointed out that the level of socio-economic development explains most of the covariance 
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between decision-making capacity and decentralization. One logical explanation of this 
influence is that in Turkey, the practice of involving citizens or their representatives in actual 
decision-making is limited, and most of the information about the locality comes from the e-
government sources. Therefore, any province with lower levels of Internet usage or 
broadband connection would inevitably have lesser sophistication in e-government system, 
either because of the material incapacities or because of less interest to invest in it.  
Among the control variables, perceived influence of central government in local 
governance has been the only significant predictor on the level of decentralization. This 
empirical finding was interpreted in congruence with the qualitative responses which showed 
that municipalities in socio-economically more developed provinces, feel more confident and 
more capable to generate income from local resources. Thus, they request more fiscal 
decentralization from the central government. On the contrary, municipalities from socio-
economically less developed provinces are requesting more involvement from central 
government in local governance; thus, they feel the presence of the central government is less 
than it ought to be. None of the control variables showed any significant influence on 
decentralization. This finding is important because it disputes the impact of the municipality’s 
size on decentralization and leaves the socio-economic development as a more important 
indicator on financial autonomy than the population of the province. Similarly, political 
diversities inside the municipal management or municipalities governed by the opposition 
party do not necessarily affect the financial autonomy. This does not suggest that an arbitrary 
act by the central government would not affect the financial autonomy of the municipality. 
Rather, the assumed effects will be limited if the capacity conditions are sufficient.  
 
7.2 Theoretical Implications 
The most notable theoretical implication of this research is that socio-economic 
development in local level is an essential precondition in order to predict the outcomes of 
decentralization.  
With regards to the existing literature on the preconditions of successful 
decentralisation, this study suggests that socio-economic development in local level is an 
important prerequisite on the success of the decentralization. Hence, any policy planner of 
decentralization should consider the socio-economic differences in regions or provinces 
beforehand.  
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Although the impact of local or regional socio-economic conditions on successful 
decentralization has been articulated in previous studies (e.g. Barrett, Mude, & Omiti, 2007), 
there the socio-economic conditions are addressed as part of the contextual realities of the 
country case, and the question of how socio-economic conditions are influencing the 
outcomes of decentralization has been intact. A contribution of this study is that not only it 
confirms the vast importance of socio-economic development on decentralization, but also 
presents a model to predict the value of change in financial autonomy vis-à-vis local 
development level.  
The findings of this study challenge the propositions of fiscal federalism. The theory 
on fiscal federalism argues that the local governments can monitor and act better on local 
needs, thus the assignment of the tax and expenditure authority to lowest level of government 
would create the conditions of higher accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in 
governance. By setting the importance of socio-economic development on the success of 
decentralisation, this research suggests that, the outcomes of fiscal federalism are largely 
determined by the local socio-economic development instead of the local government’s 
convenience to act on local needs.  
A number of studies treat the relationship between decentralization and development 
from a counter-causal perspective, arguing that decentralization leads to socio-economic 
development in regional or local level (e.g. Bartlett, Malekovic, & Monastiriotis, 2013; 
Romeo, 2012). For instance, on her essay on the impact of decentralization on local regional 
development in Croatia, Alibegovic (2013) implements methodologically similar choices on 
the analysis between decentralization and local development. Alibegovic adopts regional GDP 
per capita as the indicator of regional development and regressed it against several indicators 
for fiscal decentralization, and observes a statistical significant relationship between regional 
development and the subnational government share of own tax revenues. She concludes that 
higher level of fiscal autonomy is expected to exert higher local and regional development, 
and recommends central governments to pursue fiscal decentralization for local and regional 
development. Alibegovic’s research is important to mention for two reasons. First, the 
measurement of variables are almost identical as decentralization is measured by the share of 
subnational government in own-tax revenues and the regional development is measured by 
the GDP per capita, which is one of the indicators in this study to measure the socio-economic 
development. Although two studies draw different conclusions, the statistical significant 
relationship between local development and decentralisation shows the generalizability of the 
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results in different country cases. In fact, one of the biggest challenges in decentralization 
studies is identifying the notions that can be applied in different country cases because the 
outcomes of decentralization are shaped extensively by country’s idiosyncrasies. Secondly, 
interpreting this statistical finding as the impact of decentralization on development, is to say 
the least, overly optimistic. A more logical assumption would be that higher regional 
economic development affects the own tax revenues of the regional or local government; thus, 
increasing its financial autonomy.  
Nonetheless, ‘decentralization leads to development’ is a predominantly accepted idea 
among primary international donor organizations (e.g. UNDP, the EU, ICDS…etc). A major 
programme under UNDP called ‘Decentralized Governance for Development’, promotes the 
idea that decentralized governance is ‘crucial to attain human development and MDGs 
(Millennium Development Goals)’ (UNDP, 2004). Despite this strong stance, there is hardly 
any empirical evidence in the literature that decentralized governance leads in fact to higher 
human development or reduction in poverty in developing countries. What is more, almost all 
empirical studies on the topic call for the necessity on careful policy crafting in national and 
local level, the establishment of required institutional settings and capacity buildings.  
My argument on the relationship between decentralization and local development is 
that decentralization can be a policy instrument to attain better governance if certain socio-
economic conditions exist in the locality. Only then, decentralization policies reforming the 
institutional and legal framework in the local level could result in better-tuned policies to 
promote local development. In cases of a lack of socio-economic parameters, central 
government should be an active participant in investments and promote incentives for private 
sector to engage in economical activities, in order to attain local development. Thus, I argue 
that the conflicting empirical results in developing countries are partly explained by the 
corresponding socio-economic realities, rather than the implementation of decentralization 
policies or capacities in the local and national governments.  
 
7.3. Policy Implications  
 The strong relationship between socio-economic development in the locality and the 
level of financial autonomy of local administration, necessitates the policy implementer and 
capacity-building practitioners to consider the socio-economic realities before implementing 
any institutional changes that seek to empower the local governments for better governance. 
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Especially in developing countries, which are usually faced with disproportionate distribution 
of wealth and inequities among regions, are more likely to result with different outcomes in 
terms of governance if a uniform, symmetrical decentralization policy is applied at the 
national level. For these countries, a mixed decentralization policy could result with better 
outcomes in local governance. One policy recommendation is the creation of a benchmark 
among regions or local areas to cluster different development levels matching different 
discretions, in terms of financial autonomy and public service delivery. Regions with higher 
indices can be authorized with higher fiscal autonomy such as levying taxes and higher self-
financing responsibilities in expenditure assignments, whereas regions with lower indices can 
have a co-financing option and share of responsibility in public services with central 
government’s agencies. 
 Furthermore, capacity building practices in local governments should not only focus 
on the engagement of citizens in governance, but also empower the local governments on 
their entrepreneurial and tax-collection capabilities. Local governments with higher 
mobilization capacities can generate the most revenues out of the available local sources; 
thus, higher accountability in return of higher financial dependency on local sources can be 
established easier.  
 Finally, the statistical analysis failed to establish a significant relationship between the 
population level and the relationship between capacity and decentralization. This finding is 
crucial especially considering the recent Turkish law on new metropolitan municipalities and 
the law regulating the intergovernmental transfer shares. In 2014, 14 former provincial 
municipalities with a population above 750.000 have been raised to metropolitan municipality 
status. The new status brings enhanced rights on financial discretion. However, the findings of 
this research suggest that the municipalities with lower development levels but higher 
population (e.g. Van) would most likely fail to attain higher financial autonomy despite 
increased financial discretion. Similarly, in 2008 the new law on intergovernmental transfer 
shares has introduced new criteria such as development level or geographical size, to regulate 
the transfer shares from general budget. Yet, the population criterion still has the largest 
impact (80%) on the final amount. A policy recommendation of this study is to increase the 
weight of development index on calculating the shares from general budget to increase the 
policy effectiveness. 
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7.4 Limitations of the study 
This study was conducted on a single country case and on a specific tier of local 
governments. Although this methodological choice enabled the controlled environment to 
address the research questions, only a limited population in sample size was available to 
strengthen the statistical findings. Despite the relatively good response rate of 50% from a 
long survey conducted with mayors and deputy mayors, the achieved sample size of 33 is 
relatively low to draw statistical conclusion with prediction purposes. Nevertheless, even with 
the limited sample size, the study was able to address the research questions and elaborate on 
the relationship between decentralization and capacity in local governance. Nonetheless, a 
future research with more sample size would increase the predictability value of the model 
presented in Chapter V.   
 
7.5 Final remarks and recommendations for future research 
The most important contribution of this study to decentralisation and governance 
studies is that it establishes the local socio-economic development as an integral part on 
evaluation and design of decentralisation policies. Hitherto, the equivocal outcomes of 
decentralization practices, especially in developing countries, were largely addressed as part 
of 'management deficit' in governance and various capacity building programmes have been 
implemented by international donor organizations to educate managers, organizations, even 
communities and institutions. Albeit not being a substantial evidence of improvement in 
governance, every year billions of dollars are invested in capacity building programmes to 
enhance the governance capacity in developing countries. Relying on surveys and official data 
collected from 65 Turkish provincial municipalities, this study evidences that socio-economic 
conditions are most important on the outcomes of decentralization for better local governance. 
Based on this, the relationship between decentralization and governance should not only be 
addressed with a managerial perspective but also with development one.  
To generate achievable policy strategies and development targets with regards to 
decentralization, replication of this study in other country cases is recommended. Adaption of 
the analytical model in different country specific conditions can provide further insights on 
how different country cases are influencing the outcomes in local governance capacities.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Local Administration Budget Balance 2006-2015 
(Million TL) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Expenditures 33.009 39.383 45.942 48.227 52.226 61.011 69.299 87.590 84.173 65.962 
Personnel Cost 7.096 7.516 9.044 9.531 10.286 11.259 12.193 13.489 13.347 10.980 
Govern. Premiums to 
Social Security Agencies 996 1.147 1.257 1.483 1.818 1.904 1.968 2.173 2.172 1.736 
Good and Service Purchase 9.915 11.785 14.343 15.468 17.984 22.105 26.196 31.736 32.546 27.482 
Interest Expenditures 607 634 938 1.454 1.361 1.322 1.433 1.412 1.765 1.299 
Current Transfers 1.356 1.685 2.125 2.573 2.919 2.417 2.413 2.957 2.983 2.519 
Capital Expenditures 12.256 15.771 17.391 15.332 16.391 19.780 23.315 33.577 28.644 20.150 
Capital Transfers 426 313 241 733 385 1.167 740 524 676 725 
Lending 357 533 603 1.653 1.082 1.056 1.040 1.720 2.040 1.072 
Revenues 31.725 35.474 38.842 42.477 53.582 63.415 69.263 83.376 87.171 69.388 
Taxes 3.378 3.691 4.190 3.776 5.904 6.901 7.250 8.213 9.292 7.413 
Property Income 8.060 8.993 9.188 10.558 11.922 13.868 16.050 17.917 18.025 15.531 
Grants and Aids and 
Special Revenues 4.305 4.589 5.209 5.860 8.876 10.261 10.331 13.939 6.980 4.999 
Interest, Shares and Fines 13.622 16.013 18.404 19.885 24.172 28.852 32.547 37.691 42.935 38.441 
Capital Revenues 2.003 1.949 1.732 1.333 2.690 3.483 3.049 5.607 6.661 2.820 
Collections from Loans 358 239 119 1.064 17 48 36 9 3.278 184 
Budget Balance -1.284 -3.909 -7.100 -5.750 1.356 2.404 -35 -4.213 2.998 3,426 
Source: www.maliye.gov.tr 
 267 
 
Local Administrations’ Detailed Budget Balance 2011 (January-December) 
 
 
 
 
(Thousand 
TL) 
 
 
Local Administrations 
Municipalities 
Municipal 
Enterprises SPA Unions 
Local 
authorities 
(central 
adm.) 
 Provincial Municipalities 
District and 
Town Mun. Total Metropolitan 
Mun. 
Non-
metropolitan 
mun. 
Total 
Expenditures 
 
15.570.973 
 
4.901.245 
 
20.439.747 
 
20.716.418 
 
41.132.755 
 
8.463.086 
 
10.216.828 
 
2.694.867 
 
61.011.336 
Compensation 
of Employees 
1.585.518 1.101.478 2.686.996 4.892.182 7.579.178 1.276.630 2.201.255 202.411 11.259.474 
Govern. 
Premiums to 
Social 
Security 
Agencies 
273.531 199.726 473.257 816.005 1.289.262 246.106 342.807 26.199 1.904.374 
Good and 
Service 
Purchase 
4.100.762 2.036.898 6.137.660 9.158.772 15.296.432 3.456.525 2.376.501 975.275 22.104.733 
Interest 
Expenditures 
669.269 108.175 777.444 297.257 1.074.701 231.270 10.469 5.618 1.322.058 
Current 
Transfers 
990.042 138.018 1.100.098 810.548 1.887.236 272.194 408.264 131.811 2.416.930 
Capital 
Expenditures 
5.469.735 1.280.962 6.750.697 4.647.892 11.398.589 2.545.360 4.583.170 1.253.027 19.780.146 
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Capital 
Transfers 
757.579 25.420 778.490 71.413 849.903 3.334 294.116 95.601 1.167.435 
Lending 1.724.537 10.568 1.735.105 22.349 1.757.454 431.667 246 4.925 1.056.186 
Revenues 
 
15.560.584 
 
4.518.688 
 
20.079.272 
 
20.660.955 
 
40.740.227 
 
9.581.186 
 
11.678.259 
 
2.221.391 
 
63.415.789 
Taxes 333.122 595.026 928.148 5.949.992 6.878.140 0 16.814 6.535 6.901.489 
Property 
Income 
 
1.302.592 
 
1.237.736 
 
2.540.328 
 
2.825.555 
 
5.365.883 
 
7.695.203 
 
331.679 
 
476.053 
 
13.868.818 
Grants and 
Aids and 
Special 
Revenues 
 
120.000 
 
92.869 
 
212.869 
 
413.844 
 
626.713 
 
820.623 
 
8.003.367 
 
1.483.291 
 
10.261.712 
Interest, 
Shares and 
Fines 
11.928.431 2.412.481 14.340.912 10.050.304 24.391.216 938.128 3.276.131 246.606 28.852.081 
Capital 
Revenues 
1.750.415 180.576 1.930.991 1.420.281 3.351.272 80.286 50.268 1.806 3.483.632 
Collections 
from Loans 
126.024 0 126.024 979 127.003 46.946 0 7.100 48.057 
Budget 
Balance 
 
 
-
10.389 
 
 
-382.557 
 
 
-360.475 
 
 
-55.463 
 
 
-392.528 
 
 
1.118.100 
 
 
1.461.431 
 
 
-473.476 
 
 
2.404.453 
Source: www.maliye.gov.tr 
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Personnel Numbers in Local Administrations 
Type  
 
Civil Servant Contracted Personnel Worker Total 
Permanent Temporary 
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
SPA 8.142 9.404 1.264 1.537 30.390 28.626 740 260 40.536 39.827 
Municipalities 
 
76.618 
 
81.732 
 
13.520 
 
13.621 
 
124.347 
 
112.909 
 
9.556 
 
7.736 
 
224.041 
 
215.998 
Municipal Enterprises 
 
5.014 
 
7.406 
 
913 
 
1.104 
 
18.345 
 
18.470 
 
564 
 
327 
 
24.836 
 
27.307 
Unions 
 
454 
 
784 
 
264 
 
364 
 
2.944 
 
2.537 
 
1.011 
 
1.270 
 
4.673 
 
4.955 
Total 
 
90.228 
 
99.326 
 
15.961 
 
16.626 
 
176.026 
 
162.542 
 
11.871 
 
9.593 
 
294.086 
 
288.087 
Source: (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011) 
 
 
Personnel Numbers In Local Administrations On The Basis Of Service Groups 
Year Manager and 
qualified 
personnel 
Administrative 
Staff 
Technical 
Staff 
Health 
Personnel 
Assistants City 
Police  
Firefighters Other 
personnel 
Total 
number 
2009 
 
7.574 
 
31.100 
 
14.587 
 
1.997 
 
4.682 
 
15.278 
 
9.938 
 
5.072 
 
90.228 
2010 
 
13.486 
 
33.540 
 
17.365 
 
2.082 
 
4.170 
 
14.993 
 
10.197 
 
3.493 
 
99.326 
Source: (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011) 
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List Of Indicators 
 
Capacity Indicators 
  Code  Name  Clarification Relevancy Type Instrument Source of 
data 
Measu
rement 
Level 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Mobilisation 
Capacity MOB1 Property Taxation 
The ratio of collected 
taxes to overall 
registered residents 
Capability in 
own source 
revenues 
Financial Survey Deputy Mayor (q2) Ratio 0-1 
MOB2 Utilization of immovable 
The ratio of the annual 
revenue attained from 
immovable to the overall 
value of the immovable 
owned by the 
municipality. 
Capability in 
own source 
revenues 
Financial Survey Deputy mayor (q1) Ratio 0-1 
MOB3 Debt structure The ratio of short term debts to long term debts 
Sustainable 
debt level Financial 
Survey or 
Municipality's 
own data 
Deputy 
mayor or 
manager of 
financial 
department 
(q4) 
Ratio 0-1 
MOB4 
Adequacy of 
financial 
resources 
The score on the 
adequacy of existing 
financial resources for 
municipal functions 
Financial 
capacity Financial Survey 
Mayor 
(q21) Ordinal  
1 to 5 
scale 
MOB5 Purchasing power  
The ratio of the 
expenditures on goods 
and services to the 
overall expenditures  
Financial 
capability on 
purchasing 
Material 
Survey or 
Municipality's 
own data 
Deputy 
mayor or 
manager of 
financial 
department 
Ratio 0-1 
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MOB6 
Physical and 
technical 
adequacy 
The mean score of 5 
Likert items on adequacy 
in; (1) computer and 
computer hardware, (2) 
technical equipment and 
machinery, (3) internet 
connection and computer 
software, (4) physical 
conditions of civil 
servant's offices, (5) 
physical conditions of 
manager's offices. 
Material 
adequacy 
inside the 
municipality  
Material Survey Deputy mayor (q7) Interval 1-5 
MOB7 
Material 
adequacy in 
public services 
The mean score of the 
adequacy in equipment 
in each service area.  
Material 
adequacy in 
terms of 
service areas 
Material Survey Mayor (q18) Interval 1-5 
MOB8 Public procurement 
The mean score of 4 
Likert-items, (1) 
swiftness of public 
procurement, (2) 
Sufficiency of public 
procurement to meet the 
municipality’s needs, (3) 
competence of municipal 
personnel on public 
procurement processes, 
(4) adequacy in e-
procurement options 
Capacity in 
public 
procurement 
Material Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q11/1,2,4,
5) 
Interval 1-5 
Decision-making 
Capacity 
DM1 
Success in 
strategic 
planning 
The mean score of the 
mayor and deputy 
mayor's evaluation of the 
last strategic planning.   
Capability in 
strategic 
planning 
Planning Survey 
Mayor (q 
9,1) and 
Deputy 
Mayor 
(q36) 
Interval 1-5 
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DM2 Performance budgeting 
The mean score of 7 
Likert-item on 
performance budgeting; 
(1)timing in budget 
planning, (2)integration 
of budget plans with 
performance plans, 
(3)implementation of 
performance criteria on 
budget negotiations, 
(4)coherence with 
strategic planning, (5) 
integration of activity-
based costing, feasibility 
analysis, risk assessment 
and cost accounting in 
budget plans, 
(6)adequacy of 
equipment to monitor 
and assess performances, 
(7) adequacy of e-budget 
system 
Capacity in 
performance 
budgeting 
Planning Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q37) 
Interval 1-5 
DM3 
Importance of 
strategic plan 
and 
performance 
plans on 
actual 
decision-
making 
The mean score of 2 
Likert items; (1) the 
importance of strategic 
plan on implementation, 
(2) the importance of 
performance reports on 
high important political 
decisions 
The actual 
impact of 
strategic and 
performance 
plans on 
decision-
making 
Planning Survey Mayor (q9/3,4) Interval 1-5 
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DM4 
Intra-
organizational 
communicatio
n 
The mean score of 7  
Likert items; (1) 
communication among 
departments, 
(2)communication 
between deputy mayors 
and directors, (3) share 
of information inside the 
municipality, (4) 
adequacy of IT systems, 
(5)storing of information, 
(6)division of work and 
collaboration among 
department, (7) 
communication between 
civil servants and 
councillors 
The capacity 
of intra-
organizational 
communicatio
n 
Communic
ation Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q27) 
Interval 1-5 
DM5 
Importance of 
local 
representative
s on decision-
making 
The mean score of the 
importance of Urban 
Council and muhtars on 
formation of the 
municipal programme. 
The relevance 
of 
representatives 
of citizens on 
decision-
making 
Communic
ation Survey 
Mayor 
(q9/5,6) Interval 1-5 
DM6 Data sheets The number of datasheets spread in 2012  
Collecting 
information on 
the 
characteristics 
of citizens 
Communic
ation Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q34) 
Ratio Number 
DM7 Citizen Polls The number of citizen polls took place in 2012 
Collecting 
information on 
the 
expectations 
of citizens 
Communic
ation Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q33) 
Ratio Number 
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DM8 E-government system 
The mean score of 
dummy variables on 
online service available 
in municipality's website. 
Each variable will be 
registered as 1 or 0. It 
comprises 8 services; (1) 
transaction with taxes, 
fees..etc., (2)business 
search, (3) reaching 
personal documents, 
(4)company registration, 
(5)statistical information, 
(6)applying for permits 
and licences, (7)personal 
statements on finances 
and taxes, (8) 
information about zoning 
status. 
Collecting 
information on 
citizens via 
online services 
Communic
ation 
Municipality 
website 
Municipali
ty website Interval 0-1 
DM9 
E-
participation 
system 
The mean score of 
dummy variables on 
online e-participation 
means in municipality's 
website. Each variable is 
registered as 1 or 0.  It 
comprises 7 variables; 
(1) announcement of 
municipal decisions, (2) 
announcement of 
projects, (3) 
announcement of plans, 
(4) broadcasting 
municipal sessions, (5) 
social media tools, (6) 
opinion polls, (7) white 
desk  
Collecting 
information 
about opinion 
of citizens via 
online services 
Communic
ation 
Municipality 
website 
Municipali
ty website Interval 0-1 
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DM10 Visitors of the website 
The ranking of municipal 
website according to the 
Alexa traffic rank. Lesser 
numbers indicate higher 
ranks..  
The level of 
online 
communicatio
n with citizens 
Communic
ation 
Alexa Traffic 
Ranking 
Alexa's 
website 
www.alexa
.com 
(06.08.201
3) 
Ratio Number 
Implementation 
Capacity 
IMP1 
Education 
level of the 
mayor 
The level of education. 
Primary school-1; Junior 
High-2; Highschool-3; 
Undergrad-4; 
Postgraduation-5; 
Doctoral-6. . 
The 
intellectual 
capacity of the 
mayor 
Manageme
nt Survey Mayor (q1) Ordinal 
1 to 6 
scales 
IMP2 Years in office The number of years in the office as mayor 
Experience of 
the mayor 
Manageme
nt Survey Mayor (q1) 
Nomin
al Number 
IMP3 
Initiative 
taking in 
management 
The mean score of 
initiative taking by the 
deputy mayors and 
directors 
The level of 
initiative 
taking in 
management 
Manageme
nt Survey 
Mayor 
(q12) Interval 1-5 
IMP4 
Collaboration 
in 
management 
The mean score of 
collaboration between 
deputy mayors and 
directors, and deputy 
mayor and mayor. 
The level of 
collaboration 
in 
management 
Manageme
nt Survey 
Mayor 
(q13) and 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q24/3,4) 
Interval 1-5 
IMP5 
Management 
Practices (staff 
development) 
The mean score of 3 
Likert items; (1) 
practices to increase 
motivation among staff, 
(2) trainings on 
leadership and 
management, (3) 
practices to increase 
The quality of 
management 
practices to 
increase 
organizational 
capacity 
Manageme
nt Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q24/1,2,5) 
Interval 1-5 
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initiative taking in 
directors and other 
personnel 
IMP6 Seniority in directors 
A sum value indicating 
the years in occupation 
for directors. There are 5 
ranges divided by 5 years 
scale. 0-5 years= 1; 5-10 
years=2; 10-15 years=3; 
15-20 years=4; above 
20=5. The number of 
personnel on each cluster 
will be multiplied by the 
corresponding number. 
Experience in 
management 
Manageme
nt Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q14) 
Interval 1-5 
IMP7 Seniority in personnel 
A sum value indicating 
the years of occupation 
for personnel. There are 
5 ranges divided by 5 
years scale. 0-5 years= 1; 
5-10 years=2; 10-15 
years=3; 15-20 years=4; 
above 20=5. The number 
of personnel on each 
cluster will be multiplied 
by the corresponding 
number. 
Experience in 
personnel 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q15) 
Interval 1-5 
IMP8 Norm cadre 
The norm cadre indicates 
the number of personnel 
required for municipal 
functions. The ratio of 
number of norm cadre to 
the total number of 
Sufficiency in 
number of 
personnel or 
overstaffing 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q12) 
Ratio Number 
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employees.  
IMP9 Technical personnel 
The ratio of technical 
personnel to overall 
number of personnel  
Capacity in 
technical 
personnel 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q13) 
Ratio 0-1 
IMP10 Specialised Personnel 
The ratio of personnel 
graduated postgrad or 
equivalent vocational 
training to overall 
personnel 
Capacity in 
qualified 
personnel 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q13) 
Ratio 0-1 
IMP11 
Personnel in 
municipal 
companies 
The ratio of number of 
personnel employed in 
municipalities to overall 
number of personnel 
Sufficiency in 
number of 
personnel  
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q12) 
Ratio Number 
IMP12 
HR 
management 
system 
The mean score of 7 
Likert items: (1) the 
functionality of HR 
management system 
(mayor), (2) the 
sufficiency of HR 
management system, (3) 
the coherence of the HR 
management plans with 
the municipality's needs, 
(4) competence of the 
HR department, (5) 
implementation of HR 
strategies, (6) monitoring 
and assessing the training 
need, (7) trainings meet 
the municipality’s needs 
Capacity in 
HR 
management 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Mayor 
(q10) and 
deputy 
mayor 
(q19) 
Interval 1-5 
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IMP13 Employment policies 
The mean score of 4 
Likert items; (1) 
sufficiency in personnel 
number, (2) sufficiency 
in qualified personnel 
number, (3) efficiency of 
employment policies, (4) 
match of new recruits the 
job criteria 
The success in 
employment 
policies 
Human 
Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q20) 
Interval 1-5 
IMP14 Formation 
The average hour of 
occupation training per 
personnel who received 
training 
HR quality Human Resources Survey 
Deputy 
mayor 
(q18) 
Ratio Number 
 
 
 
Decentralisation Indicator 
DEC Decentralisation 
The ratio of own source revenues (tax 
revenue+revenue from 
enterprise&properties+capital 
revenues+ receivables) to overall 
revenues 
Financial 
Autonomy  
Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
Datasheet on 
local 
administration's 
revenue 
http://www.bumko.
gov.tr Ratio 0-1 
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Control Variables  
INF 
Influence of 
central 
government 
The mean score of 8 Likert-items for the 
influence of central government and its 
agencies on: (1) delivery of municipal 
services, (2) administrative activities, (3) 
decision-making about municipal 
services, (4) partnerships with other local 
administrations, private sector 
organisations and civil society 
organisations, (5) own-source revenues, 
(6) grants and aids, (7) debts and loans, 
(8) investments 
Influence of central 
government on 
local governance 
External 
Factor Survey Mayor (q24) Interval 1-5 
POP Population  
The rank of the province in terms of 
population. The lower the rank, the 
higher the population 
Direct impact on 
financial capacity 
and local capacity 
External 
Factor 
Union of 
Turkish 
Municipality's 
database 
http://www.tbb.
gov.tr/storage/ca
talogs/2012-
belediye-
nufuslari.pdf 
Interval 
from 
1 to 
81 
PolDiv Political diversity  
Municipalities which are not governed 
by the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) will be rated as 0, the rest will be 
rated as 1. 
Arbitrary stance of 
central government 
towards 
municipalities 
governed by 
opposition parties 
can affect 
decentralization and 
capacity. 
External 
Factor 
Local 
Elections 
Newsportal 
http://secim.hab
erler.com/2009/i
l-sonuclari.asp 
Ordinal 0 or 1 
Party Party affiliation 
The percentage of votes of winning party 
in the municipality according to the 2009 
local election. Lower percentage 
indicates less party affiliation among the 
management. 
Different party 
affiliation inside the 
municipality might 
affect capacity in 
local government 
External 
Factor 
Local 
Elections 
Newsportal 
http://secim.hab
erler.com/2009/i
l-sonuclari.asp 
Ratio 0-1 
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Data List 
 
Mobilisation Capacity 
provinces MOB1 MOB2 MOB3 MOB4 MOB5 MOB6 MOB7 MOB8 
Adiyaman  0.54 0.009 0.189 2.00 0.310 4.20 3.86 3.25 
Afyonkarahisar 0.85 0.051 0.000 4.00 0.365 4.60 4.79 4.25 
Aksaray 0.77 0.21 0.700 3.00 0.341 . 4.64 . 
Amasya 0.57 0.019 0.795 3.00 0.331 4.00 4.21 4.00 
Ardahan 0.37 0.007 0.621 1.00 0.369 3.00 2.86 5.00 
Artvin 0.73 0.034 0.000 4.00 0.334 . 4.64 4.50 
Bilecik 0.70 . 0.000 2.00 0.340 5.00 3.64 2.75 
Bitlis 0.33 0.017 0.030 . 0.287 3.80 . 4.75 
Bolu 0.68 0.023 0.410 . 0.425 4.50 4.21 5.00 
Burdur 0.51 0.01 0.077 3.00 0.460 4.00 4.14 3.50 
Canakkale 0.64 0.02 0.176 5.00 0.362 3.80 4.07 3.00 
Corum . . . 4.00 0.419 . 4.14 . 
Denizli 0.66 0.027 0.239 . 0.369 4.60 . 4.25 
Giresun 0.65 . . 4.00 0.415 . 4.86 . 
Gumushane . . . 3.00 0.391 . 3.83 . 
Kahramanmaraş 0.78 0.024 0.450 3.50 0.400 5.00 4.64 4.00 
Karabuk 0.76 0.0175 0.296 4.00 0.412 3.20 4.07 3.25 
Karaman 0.77 0.0057 0.200 3.00 0.294 4.80 3.57 1.00 
Kars 0.80 0.0131 0.000 3.00 0.381 3.40 3.64 3.50 
Kastamonu 0.58 . 0.000 5.00 0.355 4.80 4.57 4.00 
Kutahya . . . 5.00 0.344 . 4.14 . 
Manisa 0.84 . 0.300 5.00 0.413 4.60 4.93 4.50 
Mardin 0.65 0.0027 0.000 1.00 0.346 4.20 4.21 4.75 
Mugla 0.82 0.1395 0.195 3.00 0.414 4.60 5.00 4.00 
Mus 0.68 . 0.000 1.00 0.307 4.40 4.00 4.50 
Nigde 0.72 . 0.044 3.00 0.355 . 4.21 . 
Rize 0.74 0.0488 0.100 . 0.502 4.40 . . 
Sivas 0.70 0.0187 0.555 4.00 0.435 4.20 4.07 4.75 
Tokat . . . 5.00 0.384 . 4.29 . 
Trabzon 0.60 0.0085 0.614 2.00 0.458 5.00 4.64 5.00 
Usak 0.78 0.0723 0.400 4.00 0.333 . 4.43 3.25 
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Van . . . 1.00 0.362 . 2.79 . 
Yozgat 0.80 0.1271 0.089 3.00 0.411 4.20 4.36 3.50 
 
 
Decision-Making Capacity 
provinces DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4 DM5 DM6 DM7 DM8 DM9 DM10 
Adiyaman  3.13 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.50 3449743.00 
Afyonkarahisar 3.88 4.00 4.50 4.43 4.50 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.63 1169742.00 
Aksaray 4.50 4.00 5.00 3.71 2.50 5.00 2.00 0.63 0.63 551612.00 
Amasya 4.00 3.57 5.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.50 1961721.00 
Ardahan 2.63 4.14 5.00 4.29 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 4914915.00 
Artvin 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.50 2543869.00 
Bilecik 3.63 3.71 3.50 3.57 2.00 4.00 2.00 0.38 0.25 966902.00 
Bitlis . 4.00 . 4.14 . 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 8373694.00 
Bolu 4.38 3.50 4.00 . 3.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 569875.00 
Burdur 4.38 4.29 4.00 4.00 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.50 2867540.00 
Canakkale 4.00 3.14 4.00 4.29 4.00 12.00 1.00 0.75 0.63 448494.00 
Corum . . 4.00 . 2.00 . . 0.50 0.88 1484275.00 
Denizli . 4.00 . 4.57 . 12.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 319202.00 
Giresun . . 5.00 . 4.00 . . 0.00 0.50 1616509.00 
Gumushane . . . . 3.00 . . 0.25 0.38 3340409.00 
Kahramanmaraş 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.71 5.00 2.00 2.00 0.50 0.75 362258.00 
Karabuk 3.38 2.71 4.00 3.86 3.50 3.00 0.00 0.75 0.88 1685665.00 
Karaman 3.88 4.00 5.00 2.43 3.50 4.00 1.00 0.88 0.50 1162660.00 
Kars 3.00 2.86 4.00 3.29 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 3481300.00 
Kastamonu 4.50 3.43 4.50 3.57 4.50 1.00 . 0.75 0.38 2942933.00 
Kutahya . . 4.00 . 3.00 . . 0.63 0.88 2550939.00 
Manisa 4.63 5.00 5.00 4.14 4.50 . 2.00 0.63 0.75 467635.00 
Mardin 3.50 3.14 5.00 4.29 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1702479.00 
Mugla 4.00 4.29 4.00 5.00 4.50 3.00 2.00 0.50 0.63 2604425.00 
Mus 3.50 3.29 4.50 3.57 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.50 5949733.00 
Nigde 4.00 4.71 3.00 4.43 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.63 795495.00 
Rize . . . . . 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.50 1568630.00 
Sivas 4.50 3.14 5.00 3.29 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.83 388966.00 
Tokat . . . . 1.50 . . 0.50 0.38 2053151.00 
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Trabzon 4.88 3.57 5.00 4.57 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.63 453182.00 
Usak 3.88 3.86 4.50 4.57 2.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 576835.00 
Van . . 3.50 . 4.00 . . 0.00 0.25 3113899.00 
Yozgat 3.50 3.00 4.50 4.14 3.50 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 5514491.00 
 
 
 
 
Implementation Capacity 
provinces 
IM
P1 
IM
P2 
IM
P3 
IM
P4 
IM
P5 
IM
P6 
IM
P7 
IM
P8 
IM
P9 
IMP
10 
IMP
11 
IMP
12 
IMP
13 
IMP
14 
Adiyaman  4.00 9.00 4.00 3.33 3.33 3.41 1.62 1.17 0.09 0.10 0.00 3.14 3.25 32 
Afyonkara
hisar 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.67 4.33 3.34 4.35 1.30 0.21 0.12 0.00 3.43 4.50 86 
Aksaray 4.00 9.00 4.00 4.00 2.67 3.49 2.41 1.75 0.13 0.02 0.00 3.14 4.00 9 
Amasya 4.00 4.00 3.50 4.67 3.33 3.86 4 1.02 0.16 0.07 1.49 4.15 4.00 20 
Ardahan 4.00 4.00 1.50 3.67 3.33 2.4 1.33 0.75 0.07 0.15 0.00 3.71 3.25 17 
Artvin 4.00 
14.0
0 5.00 4.67 3.33 3.28 3.75 0.87 0.16 0.24 0.84 4.14 4.00 7 
Bilecik 4.00 9.00 3.00 3.67 3.00 . . . . . 0.00 2.57 3.00 20 
Bitlis 4.00 4.00 . . 4.00 3.19 3.6 1.91 0.12 0.17 0.07 . 3.75 0 
Bolu 4.00 9.00 3.50 . . 3 3.92 1.09 0.08 0.03 0.74 . . 5 
Burdur 4.00 9.00 4.00 4.33 3.33 3.29 2.29 1.57 0.19 0.40 1.44 3.43 3.25 0 
Canakkale 4.00 
10.0
0 4.00 4.33 4.00 2.82 4.18 1.54 0.13 0.36 0.25 3.15 3.50 200 
Corum 4.00 4.00 3.50 . . . . . . 0.26 . . . 3 
Denizli 4.00 2.00 . . 4.67 2.86 4.05 1.32 0.20 0.02 0.00 . 3.75 147 
Giresun 4.00 4.00 4.50 . . . . 1.43 0.07 . . . . 94 
Gumushan
e 4.00 
14.0
0 4.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kahraman
maraş 4.00 
10.0
0 4.00 4.67 4.67 3.05 3.92 1.84 0.15 0.21 3.17 4.57 3.75 32 
Karabuk 3.00 4.00 4.50 4.67 1.67 2.03 4.18 1.55 0.10 0.02 1.88 4.71 5.00 . 
Karaman 6.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.33 3.19 2.48 1.35 0.15 0.30 0.06 2.86 2.00 24 
Kars 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.67 2.67 3.51 1.59 2.20 . 0.25 1.34 3.28 2.75 30 
Kastamonu 4.00 
14.0
0 4.50 4.00 4.00 3.08 2.75 . 0.09 0.15 1.04 3.57 3.75 16 
Kutahya 5.00 9.00 3.50 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Manisa 4.00 4.00 4.50 4.67 3.33 . .  2.26 0.25 0.14 1.82 2.43 3.00 10 
Mardin 4.00 4.00 3.50 4.33 4.33 3.44 1.47 2.11 0.21 0.11 1.46 4.43 4.00 20 
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Mugla 5.00 
14.0
0 5.00 5.00 4.67 2.39 4.36 1.68 0.19 0.38 0.00 4.00 4.50 13 
Mus 4.00 9.00 3.50 3.33 2.33 3.34 3.88 0.90 0.05 0.01 0.00 3.00 3.25 0 
Nigde 3.00 4.00 4.50 3.67 3.67 2.83 4.6 2.14 0.20 0.48 0.00 3.15 4.00 0 
Rize 4.00 9.00 . . . 2.59 3.35 2.54 0.28 0.23 1.82 . 4.00 104 
Sivas 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.33 3.00 4.02 4.76 0.93 0.15 0.24 2.20 3.43 4.50 200 
Tokat 6.00 9.00 3.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Trabzon 6.00 4.00 4.00 4.67 4.00 3.43 4.27 1.40 0.00 0.02 1.26 4.86 3.50 37 
Usak 4.00 9.00 3.00 4.33 3.33 2.84 1.3 1.34 0.13 0.45 . 3.71 4.50 78 
Van 1.00 1.00 3.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Yozgat 4.00 9.00 4.00 4.33 3.33 3.86 2.6 1.13 0.33 0.09 1.44 3.71 4.00 2 
 
 
Other Variables  
provinces INF POP PolDiv Party Dev INF 
Adiyaman  2.625 217,463 1 0.49 -0.960 2.625 
Afyonkarahisar 3.5 186,991 1 0.48 -0.080 3.5 
Aksaray 3.25 186,599 1 0.58 -0.367 3.25 
Amasya 3.5 91,874 1 0.40 0.051 3.5 
Ardahan 2.125 19,075 1 0.37 -1.138 2.125 
Artvin 2.571 25,771 0 0.44 -0.105 2.571 
Bilecik 3.875 51,260 1 0.38 0.363 3.875 
Bitlis . 46,111 1 0.43 -1.400 . 
Bolu 3.25 131,264 1 0.43 0.639 3.25 
Burdur 3.75 72,377 1 0.40 0.368 3.75 
Canakkale 3.25 111,137 0 0.39 0.600 3.25 
Corum 1.875 231,146 1 0.46 -0.241 1.875 
Denizli . 525,497 1 0.40 0.912 . 
Giresun 3.625 100,712 0 0.47 -0.256 3.625 
Gumushane 2.750 32,444 0 0.42 -0.481 2.750 
Kahramanmaraş 3.625 443,575 1 0.65 -0.468 3.625 
Karabuk 2.000 110,537 0 0.31 0.292 2.000 
Karaman 1.375 141,630 1 0.49 0.186 1.375 
Kars 2.875 78,100 1 0.33 -1.092 2.875 
Kastamonu 2.375 96,217 1 0.49 -0.147 2.375 
Kutahya 3.750 224,898 1 0.62 0.020 3.750 
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Manisa 1.625 309,050 0 0.39 0.471 1.625 
Mardin 2.250 86,948 1 0.45 -1.359 2.250 
Mugla 1.250 64,706 0 0.46 1.049 1.250 
Mus 3.125 81,764 1 0.51 -1.733 3.125 
Nigde 3.875 118,186 1 0.40 -0.376 3.875 
Rize . 104,508 1 0.47 0.155 . 
Sivas 3.000 312,587 0 0.51 -0.221 3.000 
Tokat 2.125 132,437 1 0.50 -0.382 2.125 
Trabzon 3.125 243,735 1 0.48 0.222 3.125 
Usak 2.250 187,886 0 0.40 0.374 2.250 
Van 2.250 370,190 0 0.54 -1.378 2.250 
Yozgat 4.500 78,328 1 0.55 -0.608 4.500 
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STATA Do-File 
 
* non-response check 
import excel "/Users/vjosamusliu/Desktop/REWORKED/Datalist (reworked2).xlsx", sheet("Datalist") 
cellrange(A1:AT34) firstrow 
destring,replace 
keep Dev Dev0 
ttest Dev == Dev0, unpaired 
 
* Cronsbachs alpha 
import excel "/Users/vjosamusliu/Desktop/REWORKED/Datalist (reworked2).xlsx", sheet("Cronbachs") 
firstrow 
destring, replace 
alpha Q111 Q112 Q114 Q115 
alpha Q371 Q372 Q373 Q374 Q375 Q376 Q377 
alpha Q271 Q272 Q273 Q274 Q275 Q276 Q277 
alpha MQ13 Q243 Q244 
alpha Q241 Q242 Q245 
alpha MQ10 Q191 Q192 Q193 Q194 Q195 Q196 
alpha Q201 Q202 Q203 Q204 
alpha MQ241 MQ242 MQ243 MQ244 MQ245 MQ246 MQ247 MQ248 
alpha Q71 Q72 Q73 Q74 Q75 
alpha Q361 Q362 Q363 Q364 MQ91 
 
* Imputation 
import excel "/Users/vjosamusliu/Desktop/REWORKED/Datalist (reworked2).xlsx", sheet("Datalist") 
cellrange(A1:AM34) firstrow 
destring, replace 
summarize 
impute MOB1 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB1) 
impute MOB2 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB2) 
impute MOB3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB3) 
impute MOB4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB4) 
impute MOB6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB6) 
impute MOB7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB7) 
impute MOB8 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iMOB8) 
impute DM1 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM1) 
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impute DM2 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM2) 
impute DM3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM3) 
impute DM4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM4) 
impute DM5 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM5) 
impute DM6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM6) 
impute DM7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iDM7) 
impute IMP3 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP3) 
impute IMP4 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP4) 
impute IMP5 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP5) 
impute IMP6 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP6) 
impute IMP7 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP7) 
impute IMP8 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP8) 
impute IMP9 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP9) 
impute IMP10 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP10) 
impute IMP11 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP11) 
impute IMP12 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP12) 
impute IMP13 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP13) 
impute IMP14 MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iIMP14) 
impute INF MOB5 DM8 DM9 DM10 IMP1 IMP2 DEC Dev, gen(iINF) 
 
* Check the results of imputed variables, change the negative values to 0, change the values above 5 to 5 
replace iMOB2 = 0 in 32 
replace iMOB3 = 0 in 32 
replace iMOB6 = 5 in 29 
replace iDM3 = 5 in 29 
replace iDM6 = 0 in 15 
replace iDM7 = 0 in 32 
 
* Harman's Test 
factor iMOB4 iMOB6-iMOB8 iDM1-iDM5 iIMP3-iIMP7 iIMP12 iIMP13 
 
*Normality 
sktest MOB1-IMP14 
histogram MOB1, frequency normal 
histogram MOB2, frequency normal 
histogram MOB3, frequency normal 
histogram MOB4, frequency normal 
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histogram MOB5, frequency normal 
histogram MOB6, frequency normal 
histogram MOB7, frequency normal 
histogram MOB8, frequency normal 
histogram DM1, frequency normal 
histogram DM2, frequency normal 
histogram DM3, frequency normal 
histogram DM4, frequency normal 
histogram DM5, frequency normal 
histogram DM6, frequency normal 
histogram DM7, frequency normal 
histogram DM8, frequency normal 
histogram DM9, frequency normal 
histogram DM10, frequency normal 
histogram IMP1, discreet frequency normal 
histogram IMP2, frequency normal 
histogram IMP3, frequency normal 
histogram IMP4, frequency normal 
histogram IMP5, frequency normal 
histogram IMP6, frequency normal 
histogram IMP7, frequency normal 
histogram IMP8, frequency normal 
histogram IMP9, frequency normal 
histogram IMP10, frequency normal 
histogram IMP11, frequency normal 
histogram IMP12, frequency normal 
histogram IMP13, frequency normal 
histogram IMP14, frequency normal 
 
* Linearity 
graph matrix iMOB1-iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8, half 
graph matrix iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10, half 
graph matrix IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14, half 
 
*Polychoric Correlation  
polychoric iMOB1-iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8 
polychoric iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10 
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polychoric IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14 
 
*Bartlett's & KMO 
ssc install factortest 
factortest(iMOB1 iMOB2 iMOB3 iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6 iMOB7 iMOB8) 
factortest(iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10) 
factortest(IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14) 
factortest (iMOB1 iMOB2 iMOB3 iMOB4 iMOB6 iMOB7 iMOB8) 
 
*MOB factor 
factor iMOB1-iMOB2 iMOB4 MOB5 iMOB6-iMOB8 
screeplot 
predict Factor1 
rename Factor1 MOB 
lab var MOB MOB 
 
*DM factor 
factor iDM1-iDM7 DM8-DM10 
screeplot 
predict Factor1 
rename Factor1 DM 
lab var DM DM 
 
*IMP factor 
factor (IMP1 IMP2 iIMP3-iIMP14),factor(3) 
screeplot 
rotate, varimax horst blanks(.3) 
predict Factor1  
rename Factor1 IMP 
lab var IMP IMP 
 
* significance of corr. 
pwcorr MOB DM IMP,sig 
 
* Descriptive statistics 
sum MOB DM IMP DEC Dev iINF POP PolDiv Party 
polychoric MOB DM IMP DEC Dev iINF POP PolDiv Party 
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scatter DM POP || lfit DM POP 
gen lnPOP= ln(POP) 
lab var lnPOP lnPOP 
scatter DM lnPOP || lfit DM lnPOP 
gen logDec = log(DEC/(1-DEC)) 
lab var logDec logDec 
gen logParty = log(Party/(1-Party)) 
lab var logParty logParty 
polychoric MOB DM IMP logDec Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty 
 
*Linearity 
graph matrix MOB DM IMP logDec Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv logParty,half 
 
*Normality for Dependent and Independent Variables 
qnorm MOB 
graph box MOB 
qnorm DM 
graph box DM 
qnorm IMP 
graph box IMP 
qnorm Dev 
graph box Dev 
qnorm logDec 
graph box logDec 
qnorm lnPOP 
graph box lnPOP 
sktest MOB 
summarize MOB, detail 
ksmirnov MOB = normal((MOB+8.78E-09)/0.918457) 
 
* Multiple regressions 
gen MOBxDM= MOB*DM 
gen MOBxIMP= MOB*IMP 
gen DMxIMP= DM*IMP 
gen MOBxDMxIMP= MOB*DM*IMP 
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP 
regress logDec MOB DM IMP 
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regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev  
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF lnPOP PolDiv 
logParty 
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF 
regress logDec Dev 
predict resid, residuals 
pwcorr logDec Dev iINF resid, sig 
 
*Control of MOBxDMxIMP 
scatter MOBxDMxIMP logDec || lfit MOBxDMxIMP logDec 
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev if 
MOBxDMxIMP>-4 
 
*Multicollinearity 
estat vif 
 
*Goodness of fit 
estat ic 
 
*Diagnostic test for hetereskodasticity 
hettest MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF 
 
*Influential Cases 
lvr2plot, mlabel(provinces) 
predict d1, cooksd 
clist provinces d1 if d1>4/33, noobs 
predict rstudent, rstudent 
clist provinces rstudent if rstudent>3 
clist provinces rstudent if rstudent<-3 
predict leverage, leverage 
clist provinces leverage if leverage >18/33 
dfbeta 
clist provinces _dfbeta_1 if _dfbeta_1 >2/sqrt(33) 
 
*Standardized Betas 
regress logDec MOB DM IMP MOBxDM MOBxIMP DMxIMP MOBxDMxIMP Dev iINF, beta  
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Translation Of The Survey Questions 
 
Survey I- For the mayors 
 
1) Below are some questions on your personal profile. Please fill in the required 
fields and provide explanation if necessary.  
 
What is your last degree obtained? 
(elementary, junior high, high 
school, university, vocational school, 
masters, doctorate) 
 
For how many years are you a 
mayor? 
 
Did you work as manager in a 
municipality before being elected as 
mayor?  
 
 
2) Does your municipality have a communication plan? Please mark the appropriate 
response.  
 
YES NO 
I DON’T 
KNOW 
 
3) This purpose of this question is to learn the structure of the information pathways 
in your municipality. Please fill in the required fields and provide explanation if 
necessary. For some question, you are asked to provide an approximate value. For 
these questions, please indicate a range which corresponds best to your answer. 
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How many regular meetings do you 
have per month with the municipal 
committee? 
 
How many regular meetings do you 
have per month with the directors of 
departments? 
 
How many regular meetings do you 
have per month with the elected 
councillors? 
 
How many meetings do you have 
approximately per year with the 
representatives of the central 
government? 
 
How many meetings do you have 
approximately per year with the 
governor of your province? 
 
Approximately, how many petitions are 
you receiving per month from the 
elected councillors?  
 
Approximately, how many days do you 
need to respond to the petitions from the 
elected councillors?  
 
How many regular meetings do you 
have per year with the Urban Council? 
 
How do you describe the approach of 
civil society organisations participating 
in the meetings with the Urban Council? 
(e.g. open to cooperation, critical, 
constructive, destructive …etc.) 
 
How many meetings do you have 
approximately per year with muhtars? 
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4) Please indicate the importance of communication with the actors by providing a 
value between 1 and 5. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your 
judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least important” and the value 5 indicates 
“the most important”.  
 
Scale 
L
e
a
s
t 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
 
M
o
s
t  
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
1. Municipal Assembly 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Urban Council 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Representatives of central government 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Private sector organisations in locality 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Muhtars 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Unions of municipalities 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Civil Society Organisations 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Governor 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5) Which channels do you use most on your communication with the representatives 
of the central government? Please circle the number that corresponds best with 
your judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least” and the value 5 indicates “the 
most”. 
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Scale 
L
e
a
s
t  
 
M
o
s
t  
 
1. Personal direct communication 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Via the affiliated political party 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Via the union of municipalities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Via the agents of central government in the province. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6) This question is about the participants in strategic planning and their methods of 
participation. Please, mark the boxes with ‘X’ to indicate the actors who 
participated in strategic planning and their methods of participation. It is possible 
to mark more than one box for each actor. Empty boxes will be interpreted as the 
corresponding participation did not take place in strategic planning.  
 
 METHOD OF PARTICIPATION 
Face to 
face 
meeting 
Group 
meetings 
Survey Other (Please specify) 
P 
A 
R 
T 
I 
C 
I 
P 
A 
Elected 
Councillors 
    
 
 
Municipal 
Committee 
    
 
 
Deputy Mayors     
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N 
T 
S 
 
Directors     
 
 
Non-executive 
municipal 
personnel 
    
Members of 
Urban Council 
    
 
 
Muhtars     
 
 
 
 Residents/ 
Citizens 
    
 
7) Did you receive any consultancy services during the preparation of the strategic 
plan? Please mark the appropriate answer. If your answer is ‘Yes’, please state the 
extent of the consultancy service.  
 
YES (please explain) NO 
 
8) Did you conduct citizen polls or surveys to realise citizen participation in strategic 
planning? Please mark the appropriate answer.  
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YES NO 
I DON’T 
KNOW 
 
9) This question is about your evaluation of the planning structure of your 
municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. 
The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”. 
 
Scale 
W
e
a
k
  
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
 
1. The success of your last strategic planning process 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The adequacy of current guidelines on strategic planning 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The importance of the strategic plan on the municipality’s 
functioning 1 2 3 4 5 
4. The importance of performance reports on political decisions 
of high importance (i.e. investments, appointment in high 
ranking positions, decisions on budget limits) 1 2 3 4 5 
5. The importance of Urban Council’s proposals on designating 
the municipal programme 1 2 3 4 5 
6. The importance of muhtars’ proposals on designating the 
municipal programme 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10) Do you have a human resource management system in your municipality? If yes 
please rate the effectiveness of this system by giving a value between 1 and 5 to 
evaluate. The value 1 indicates “the least effective” and the value 5 indicates “the 
most effective”.   
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YES (please give a number between 1 and 5) NO 
 
11) Did the head of departments and/or other managers receive an occupational 
training during your presidency? If yes, how many occupational trainings took 
place in last year? 
 
 
 
 
12)  Do your directors and deputy mayors take enough initiatives? Please give a value 
between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates “weak” and the value 5 
indicates “perfect”.  
 
Deputy Mayors  
 
Directors  
 
 
13)  How do you assess the level of cooperation among your departments? Please 
give a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates “the least” and the 
value 5 indicates “the most”. If you think, the level of cooperation is insufficient, 
please indicate the reasons.  
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14) Is there an awarding system for your municipality personnel? If yes, please 
explain briefly this system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15) Are there regular staff satisfaction surveys in your municipality? If yes, how often 
do you conduct satisfaction surveys? 
 
 
 
16) Are there occasional social events organised for your personnel? If yes, how often 
do you organise? 
 
 
 
 299 
 
17)  Which of these sources do you use to supply your municipality’s material needs? 
Please mark with ‘X’ the sources that you use. 
State Supply Office  
 
Municipal enterprises  
 
Other municipalities  
 
Private sector organisations  
 
 
18)  Please rate the adequacy of equipment on the public service areas given below. 
Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 
indicates “weak” and the value 5 indicates “perfect”. 
 
 
Scale 
W
e
a
k
  
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
 
1. Construction 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Water and sanitation services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Transport 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Environment and environmental health, waste collection and 
hygiene.  1 2 3 4 5 
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5. Police, fire service, emergency, rescue and ambulance 
services.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Urban traffic  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Burial and cemetery services 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Parks and recreation  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Housing 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Culture and art 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Tourism  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Sports and youth activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Social aids and services 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Promotion of local economy and trade activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
19) Please rate the importance of the sources given below on meeting the material 
needs of your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with 
your judgement. The value 1 indicates “least important” and the value 5 indicates 
“most important”. 
 
Scale 
L
e
a
s
t 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
 
M
o
s
t  
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
1. State Supply Office 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Municipal enterprises 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Other municipalities 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Private sector organisations 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
20)  Do you have unofficial partnerships with other municipalities? Please mark the 
appropriate answer. 
 
YES NO 
I DON’T 
KNOW 
 
21)  How sufficient are your financial resources to cover the municipal services? 
Please give a value between 1 and 5 to evaluate. The value 1 indicates “least 
sufficient” and the value 5 indicates “most sufficient”.  
 
 
 
22)  How important the sources given below on the debt acquisition of your 
municipality? Please circle the number that corresponds best with your 
judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least important” and the value 5 indicates 
“the most important”.  
 
 Scale 
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L
e
a
s
t 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
 
M
o
s
t  
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t 
1. Central government 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Municipal enterprises 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Private sector organisations 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Bank of Provinces 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. National and International Banks 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Other municipalities 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
23) If you have an additional 1 Million Turkish Lira to spend on freely on the 
municipal services, how would you allocate this amount on the municipal 
services? Please fill in the amount for the service areas that you wish to allocate 
money, without exceeding the total sum of 1 Million Turkish Lira. 
 
Service Areas Amount (TL) 
Administrative & General   
 
Economical activities  
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Construction  
 
Environment Preservation  
 
Education  
 
Sports, Culture, Entertainments  
 
Religion  
 
Public Security & Order  
Health  
 
Social Aid  
 
 
24) This question aims to learn the influence of central government and/or its 
provincial organisations on your municipality. Please circle the number that 
corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 indicates “the least important” 
and the value 5 indicates “the most important”.  
 
 Scale 
 304 
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
  
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m 
 
1. The influence on delivery of municipal services 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The influence on administrative activities 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The influence on decision-making about municipal services 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The influence on partnerships with other local 
administrations, private sector organisations and civil society 
organisations 1 2 3 4 5 
5. The influence on own-source revenues  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The influence on grants and aids for your municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. The influence on the debts and loans of your municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The influence on the municipality’s investments 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
25) This is an open-ended question about your assessment on the adequacy of your 
municipality’s capacity. Please state below your opinion about the adequacy of 
your municipality’s capacity.  
 
 
 305 
 
Survey II- For the deputy mayors 
 
1) This question is about the value of the municipality’s immovable. Please, fill in 
the value of immovable according to 2012 numbers.  
 
 Değer (TL) 
Total value of immovable owned by 
the municipality 
 
The reveue earned from immovable in 
2012  
 
 
2) What is the rate of property tax collection in 2012? Please state the percentage of 
property tax collection on registered residents in your municipality according to 
2012 data. 
 
 
 
 
3) According to the last budget report, what is the amount of the municipality’s 
revenue and expenditure? Please fill in.   
 
 Amount(TL) 
Total revenue   
 
 
Total expenditure   
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4) This question is about the debt structure of your municipality. Please fill in 
according to 2012 data. 
 Amount(TL) 
Total debt owned by the 
municipality  
 
 
 
Total debt with a due date in 
a year  
 
 
 
 
5) For which expense items are you utilising the municipal debts?  Please mark with 
‘X’ the appropriate responses. 
 
Administrative costs  
 
Current expense of public services  
 
Infrastructure investments  
 
Superstructure investments   
 
Financial investments to raise revenues  
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6) This question is about the structure of your municipal enterprises. Please fill in 
and provide explanation if necessary.  
 
The number of municipal enterprises   
 
 
 
The total value of your municipal 
enterprises (in case you don’t have actual 
numbers, please indicate an approximate 
value)  
 
 
 
 
7) This question is about the adequacy of the physical conditions and equipment in 
your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your 
judgement. The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates 
“perfect or most”. 
 
Scale 
W
e
a
k
  
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
 
1. Computers and computer hardware 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Technical equipment and machinery  
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. Internet connection and computer software 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Physical conditions of civil servant's offices 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Physical conditions of manager's offices. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
8) How many public bid opening did you have since January 2012 for public 
procurement? What is the total value of the public bids? 
 
Number of public bid opening in 2012  
 
 
 
 
The total value of public bids in TL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9) Do you have municipal partnership established to meet the material needs of your 
municipality? If your answer is yes, please circle the appropriate value which best 
presents your judgement on the importance of these partnerships on meeting the 
material needs. The value 1 indicates “the least important” and the value 5 
indicates “the most important”. 
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YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
10) What are the reasons of avoiding the partnerships with other municipalities? 
Please mark the options which correspond to your opinion.  
Current law is not clear about municipal partnerships.  
No adequate personnel capacity to contribute to municipal partnerships  
No adequate budget for municipal partnerships   
No municipality on the area where we want partnerships   
Not avoiding from municipal partnerships 
 
 
Other  (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
11) This question is about the effectiveness of public procurement processes. Please 
circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 
indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”. 
 
Scale 
W
e
a
k
  
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
 
1. Swiftness of public procurement 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Sufficiency of public procurement to meet the municipality’s 
needs.  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Adequacy of current legislation 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Competence of municipal personnel on public procurement 
processes. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Competence in e-procurement options 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12) This question is about the personnel structure in your municipality. Please fill in 
and provide explanation if necessary. 
  
Total number of municipal 
personnel 
 
 
Number of civil servants  
 
Number of contracted 
personnel 
 
 
Number of workers  
 
Number of norm cadre 
personnel 
 
 
Number of municipal 
personnel employed in 
municipal enterprises 
 
 
 
13) This question is about the attribute of the municipal personnel. Please fill in and 
provide explanation if necessary. 
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Total number of permanent and 
contracted personnel in technical 
services 
 
 
 
Number of personnel with a postgrad 
degree or an equivalent degree from 
vocational school 
 
 
 
Number of women personnel  
Number of women managers (i.e. 
deputy mayors and directors) 
 
 
14)  This question is about the experience of your personnel in occupation. Please 
indicate the number of personnel for each range of years in employment. 
Total number of years in 
employment 
Number of personnel 
0-5 years  
 
 
5-10 years  
 
 
10-15 years  
 
 
15-20 years  
 
 
20 + years   
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15) This question is about the experience of your directors in occupation. Please 
indicate the number of personnel for each range of years in employment. 
 
Total number of years in 
employment 
Number of personnel 
0-5 years  
 
 
5-10 years  
 
 
10-15 years  
 
 
15-20 years  
 
 
20 + years   
 
 
 
16) Is there a particular unit in the municipality responsible to monitor the training 
needs? Please mark the appropriate response. 
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YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
17) Do you have a municipal training programme for your personnel? Please mark the 
appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
 
 
18) What is the total amount of training provided to municipal personnel in 2012? 
What is the total number of participants to the trainings? 
 
Total hours of training  
 
 
 
Total number of participants   
 
 
 
 
19)  This question is about your evaluation of the human resource management in 
your municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your 
judgement. The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates 
“perfect or most”.  
 Scale 
 314 
 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Sufficiency of HR management system 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Coherence of the HR management plans with the municipality's 
needs 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Competence of the HR department 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Implementation of HR strategies 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Monitoring and assessing the training need, 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Trainings meet the municipality’s needs  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
 
 
 
20) This question is about your evaluation of employment policies in your 
municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. 
The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”. 
 
 
Scale 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Sufficiency in personnel number 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Sufficiency in qualified personnel number, 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3. Efficiency of employment policies 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Match of new recruits the job criteria 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21) Do you have a specific budget allocated for personnel training? If your answer is 
yes, please indicate the amount allocated. 
 
YES (please indicate the amount allocated) NO 
 
22) Do you adopt performance criteria in your municipality? If your answer is yes, 
please mark the options where you adopt performance criteria.  
 
Salary payment  
 
Promotion decision  
 
Contract renewal  
 
Performance criteria are not used  
 
 
23) Is there a term of reference for departments to avoid of duplication of work? 
Please mark the appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
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24)  This question is about your evaluation of the management systems in your 
municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. 
The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.  
 
Scale 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Practices to increase motivation among staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Training on leadership and management 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Collaboration and harmony between deputy mayors and directors 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Collaboration and harmony between mayor and deputy mayors 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Practices to increase initiative taking in directors and other 
personnel 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
25)  Is there a particular unit in the municipality responsible for interdepartmental 
communication? Please mark the appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
26)  Do you have an information sharing system in your municipality? If yes, please 
indicate who can reach this system. 
 
Mayor  
Deputy Mayors  
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Directors  
Civil servants  
 
 
27) This question is about your evaluation of the communication systems in your 
municipality. Please circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. 
The value 1 indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.  
 
Scale 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Communication among departments 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Communication between deputy mayors and directors 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Share of information inside the municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Adequacy of IT systems 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Storing of information 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Division of work and collaboration among departments 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Communication between civil servants and councillors 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
28) How many meetings do you organise per month with directors? Please provide 
explanations if necessary. 
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29)  Do you have guidelines or trainings for the elected councillors on how to engage 
in communication with municipal personnel? Please mark the appropriate 
response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
30) Do you have guidelines or trainings for the elected councillors on how to engage 
in communication with citizens? Please mark the appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
31) Is there a desk for citizens to appeal their complaints and requests? Please mark 
the appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
32) Is there an electronic registry system to store the complaints received from 
citizens? Please mark the appropriate response. 
YES NO I DON’T KNOW 
 
33) How many citizen polls did you undertake in 2012? 
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34) How many spreadsheets did you disperse in 2012 via your website or on hand? 
 
 
 
 
35) Did you allocate a specific amount for ‘Information and Technology’ on your last 
budget?  If your answer is yes, please indicate the amount allocated. 
 
YES (please indicate the amount allocated) NO 
 
36) This question is about your evaluation of the strategic planning process. Please 
circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 
indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.  
 
Scale 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Describing the vision, mission and strategic goals 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Identifying measurable outputs and performance indicators for 
goals 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Monitoring the implementation of the strategic plan 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Evaluation of the implementation of the strategic plan 
1 2 3 4 5 
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37) This question is about your evaluation of the budget planning process. Please 
circle the number that corresponds best with your judgement. The value 1 
indicates “weak or least” and the value 5 indicates “perfect or most”.  
 
Scale 
w
e
a
k 
 
p
e
r
f
e
c
t 
1. Timing in budget planning 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Integration of budget plans with performance plans 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Implementation of performance criteria on budget negotiations 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Coherence with strategic planning 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Integration of activity-based costing, feasibility analysis, risk 
assessment and cost accounting in budget plans 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Adequacy of equipment to monitor and assess performances 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Adequacy of e-budget system 
1 2 3 4 5 
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doctoraten  in  de  sociale  wetenschappen en  doctoraten  in  de  sociale  EN  
CULTURELE  ANTROPOLOGIE 
I.  Reeks  van  doctoraten  in  de  sociale  wetenschappen (1) 
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6. DEFEVER, M., De huisartssituatie in België, 1972, 374 blz. 
 
7. LAUWERS, J., Kritische studie van de secularisatietheorieën in de sociologie, 1972, 364 blz. 
 
8. GHOOS, A., Sociologisch onderzoek naar de gevolgen van industrialisering in een rekonversiegebied, 1972, 256 blz.   + 
bijlagen. 
 
9. SLEDSENS, G., Mariage et vie conjugale du moniteur rwandais.  Enquête sociologique par interview dirigée parmi les 
moniteurs mariés rwandais, 1972, 2 delen, 549 blz. 
 
10. TSAI, C., La chambre de commerce internationale.  Un groupe de pression international.  Son action et son rôle dans 
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bijlagen. 
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1973, 434 blz. 
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15. MARTENS, A., 25 jaar wegwerparbeiders.  Het Belgisch immigratiebeleid na 1945, 1973, 319 blz. 
 
16. BILLET, M., Het verenigingsleven in Vlaanderen.  Een sociologische typologieformulering en hypothesetoetsing, 1973, 
695 blz. + bijlagen. 
 
17. BRUYNOOGHE, R., De sociale structurering van de gezinsverplegingssituatie vanuit kostgezinnen en patiënten, 1973, 
205 blz. + bijlagen. 
 
18. BUNDERVOET, J., Het doorstromingsprobleem in de hedendaagse vakbeweging.  Kritische literatuurstudie en verkennend 
onderzoek in de Belgische vakbonden, 1973, 420 blz. + bijlagen. 
 
19. GEVERS, P., Ondernemingsraden, randverschijnselen in de Belgische industriële democratiseringsbeweging.  Een 
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1974, 250 blz. 
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Analyse toegespitst op het Nederlandstalige deel van België, 1975, 200 blz. + bijlage. 
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